The Concept of “Unusual Punishments” in Anglo-American Law: The Death Penalty as Arbitrary, Discriminatory, and Cruel and Unusual by Bessler, John D.
Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy
Volume 13 | Issue 4 Article 2
Spring 2018
The Concept of “Unusual Punishments” in Anglo-
American Law: The Death Penalty as Arbitrary,
Discriminatory, and Cruel and Unusual
John D. Bessler
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy by an authorized editor of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
John D. Bessler, The Concept of “Unusual Punishments” in Anglo-American Law: The Death Penalty as Arbitrary, Discriminatory, and Cruel
and Unusual, 13 Nw. J. L. & Soc. Pol'y. 307 (2018).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njlsp/vol13/iss4/2
Copyright 2018 by Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law  `Vol. 13, Issue 4 (2018) 




The Concept of “Unusual Punishments” 
in Anglo-American Law: The Death Penalty as 
Arbitrary, Discriminatory, and Cruel and 
Unusual 
 





The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, like the English Bill of Rights 
before it, safeguards against the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” To better 
understand the meaning of that provision, this Article explores the concept of “unusual 
punishments” and its opposite, “usual punishments.” In particular, this Article traces the 
use of the “usual” and “unusual” punishments terminology in Anglo-American sources 
to shed new light on the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 
The Article surveys historical references to “usual” and “unusual” punishments in early 
English and American texts, then analyzes the development of American constitutional 
law as it relates to the dividing line between “usual” and “unusual” punishments. The 
Article concludes that customary punishments were often described as “usual 
punishments,” but that it was understood—and has long been understood by the U.S. 
Supreme Court itself—that punishments might become “unusual” over time. The Article 
further concludes that the protection against the infliction of “cruel and unusual 
punishments” arose out of a desire to protect against torture and the arbitrary infliction 
of punishments, including ones that were either out of step with societal values or that 
had become at odds with societal norms. In light of the decline in death sentences and 
executions, the Fourteenth Amendment’s post-Civil War guarantee of “due process” and 
“equal protection of the laws,” and the Eighth Amendment’s long-standing prohibition 
against torture, this Article concludes that America’s death penalty, which has always 
been cruel, has now become a highly arbitrary and unusual punishment. The Article 
concludes that life sentences are now the “usual” punishment for the most serious 
crimes, and that the death penalty is now “unusual” and that its use is incompatible with 
the text and guarantees of the U.S. Constitution. Not only are executions now extremely 
rare, especially in comparison to life sentences, but the death penalty is administered in 
an arbitrary, error-prone, discriminatory, and torturous manner. 
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The English Bill of Rights of 1689 included a prohibition on the infliction of “cruel 
and unusual punishments.”1 That provision was a byproduct of the Glorious Revolution 
of 1688, a revolution that overthrew King James II of England, a Catholic, and installed 
Dutch stadtholder William III of Orange-Nassau and his wife, Mary II, as England’s new 
king and queen.2 On February 13, 1689, William and Mary, while seated on armchairs 
“under a Canopy in the Banqueting-House,” listened as a clerk read a declaration 
recounting how King James II had abrogated the throne and violated the rights of the 
English people.3 To vindicate “their Ancient Rights and Liberties,” the “Lords Spiritual 
and Temporal, and Commons”—those who had joined forces with William of Orange to 
put parliamentary limits on monarchical power—publicly declared their rights, the tenth 
of which read: “That Excessive Bail ought not to be required, nor Excessive Fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual Punishments inflicted.”4 
                                                 
1 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577 (2005); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966 (1991). That 
protection has been described as a “fundamental principle of the Government of England” intended “to 
establish mercy, even to convicted offenders.” JEAN LOUIS DE LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND; 
OR, AN ACCOUNT OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT 385 (1789); see also id. at 385–86 (citing Article 10 of 
the English Bill of Rights and noting “Torture has, from the earliest times,” been “unknown in England”): 
From the same cause also arose that remarkable forbearance of the 
English Laws, to use any cruel severity in the punishments which 
experience shewed it was necessary for the preservation of Society to 
establish: and the utmost vengeance of those laws, even against the 
most enormous Offenders, never extends beyond the simple deprivation 
of life. 
Nay, so anxious has the English Legislature been to establish 
mercy, even to convicted offenders, as a fundamental principle of the 
Government of England, that they made it an express article of that 
great public Compact which was framed at the important æra of the 
Revolution, that “no cruel and unusual punishments should be used.” 
2 See generally STEVE PINCUS, 1688: THE FIRST MODERN REVOLUTION (2009). 
3 ABEL BOYER, THE HISTORY OF KING WILLIAM THE THIRD 354–56 (1702). That declaration recited that 
“Excessive Bail hath been requir’d of Persons committed in Criminal Cases,” that “Excessive Fines have 
been impos’d,” and that “Illegal and Cruel Punishments inflicted.” Id. at 355. 
4 Id.; see also Meghan J. Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause Prohibit Only 
Punishments that are Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 567, 575 (2010): 
There is no clear evidence as to what Parliament intended to probibit by 
the language of Article 10. The preamble of the English Bill of Rights 
denounces King James II’s subversion of English laws and liberties by, 
among other things, suspending laws without Parliament’s consent, 
prosecuting prelates for petitioning the King, and prosecuting 
individuals for ecclesiastical offenses. The document also charges that 
“excessive fines have been imposed; and illegal and cruel punishments 
inflicted.” Historically, scholars have disagreed whether the document 
prohibited cruel methods of punishment or cruel and illegal 
punishments, but they seem to agree that, whatever the meaning of the 
document, it was enacted “to prevent a recurrence of recent events” in 
England. 
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Like the British, Americans opposed “cruel and unusual punishments,” though that 
concept was left undefined in American constitutions. Prior to the Revolutionary War 
(1775–1783), American colonists, as British subjects living in the Age of the 
Enlightenment, felt grossly abused and oppressed by George III.5 After unsuccessfully 
seeking fair and equitable treatment in comparison to those in the British Isles, the 
colonists rebelled, declared their independence, promulgated bills of rights and 
constitutions containing important legal protections, and became American citizens.6 In 
light of that history and the fervent desire of the colonists to safeguard their individual 
rights, privileges, and liberties, it is hardly surprising that the long-standing English 
prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments” was widely copied—sometimes 
verbatim—in American declarations of rights and in constitutions in the newly forged 
republic, the United States of America.7  
The legal protection against “cruel and unusual punishments,” a prohibition early 
Americans eagerly embraced, first found its way into American law through an 
                                                 
5 BARBARA BARDES, MACK SHELLEY & STEFFEN SCHMIDT, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 
TODAY: THE ESSENTIALS 31 (2008) (“The conflict between Britain and the American colonies, which 
ultimately led to the Revolutionary War, began in the 1760s when the British government decided to raise 
revenues by imposing taxes on the American colonies.”); compare 1 ALBERT H. PUTNEY, INTRODUCTION 
TO THE STUDY OF LAW: LEGAL HISTORY 210 (1908): 
The Revolutionary War, in its broadest significance, was not 
so much between America and England, as one in which the radical 
forces in both countries were arrayed against the conservative elements 
in each. William Pitt openly rejoiced that America had resisted, while 
Fox, in his speeches in the House of Commons habitually referred to 
Washington’s forces as “our army,” and even adopted the famous blue 
and buff of the continental army as the colors of the Whig party. With 
the mass of the English people the war was so unpopular that the troops 
for the war mainly had to be hired in Germany. On the other hand, 
probably at least one-third of the whole population of the colonies were 
Tories in their sympathies, and this third included the majority (the 
great majority outside of Massachusetts) of the wealthy and educated 
classes. 
6 The Declaration of Independence, referring to “a long train of abuses and usurpations,” “absolute 
Despotism,” and “repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an 
absolute Tyranny over these States,” asserted that it was the “right” and “duty” of the people “to throw off 
such Government.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). Among the indictments of George 
III in the Declaration of Independence: “He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, 
uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their Public Records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing 
them into compliance with his measures.” Id. 
7 JOHN D. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE FOUNDERS’ EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT 155 (2012); see also Steven G. Calabresi, Sarah E. Agudo & Kathryn L. Dore, State Bills of 
Rights in 1787 and 1791: What Individual Rights are Really Deeply Rooted in American History and 
Tradition?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451, 1518 (2012): 
Six states, or 46 percent of the total number of states, comprising 56 
percent of the total U.S. population in 1787, had constitutional bans on 
cruel and/or unusual punishments. These states were Delaware, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, New Hampshire, and 
Virginia. Cruel and/or unusual punishment clauses were far more 
popular in the South . . . . 
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identically-worded provision of the Virginia Declaration of Rights.8 That declaration of 
rights was drafted in 1776 by George Mason, a plantation owner, before the issuance of 
the American Declaration of Independence.9 The safeguards against cruelty and “unusual 
punishments” also found a home in other bills of rights or state constitutions, ones that 
variously prohibited “cruel and unusual,” “cruel or unusual,” or simply “cruel” 
punishments.10 “[I]n the late eighteenth century,” Yale Law School professor Akhil Amar 
has written, “every schoolboy in America knew that the English Bill of Rights’ 1689 ban 
on excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishments—a ban repeated 
virtually verbatim in the Eighth Amendment—arose as a response to the gross 
misbehavior of the infamous Judge Jeffreys.”11 
                                                 
8 LOUIS J. PALMER, JR., THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING 
FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS 12 (1998): 
A Virginia delegate named George Mason was responsible for taking 
the tenth clause of the English Bill of Rights and placing it into 
Virginia’s Declaration of Rights. Mason was also a strong advocate at 
the Constitutional Convention for placing the tenth clause into the 
Constitution as the Eighth Amendment. His foresight eventually paid 
off, and in 1791 the tenth clause, with slight modifications, became the 
Constitution’s Eighth Amendment. 
9 VA. BILL OF RIGHTS: A DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § IX (June 12, 1776). In America itself, the notion of 
“usual” punishments—the flip side of “unusual” punishments—can be found in non-legal contexts, too. 
THE REMEMBRANCER; OR, IMPARTIAL REPOSITORY OF PUBLIC EVENTS, PART III, FOR THE YEAR 1776, at 53 
(1777) (showing an entry pertaining to August 21, 1776, in Philadelphia, notes that George Morgan 
“prevented the usual punishments of the prisoners upon their entry”). 
10 BESSLER, supra note 7, at 178–80. The history of the English prohibition against “cruel and unusual 
punishments” suggests that seventeenth-century Englishmen may have seen no distinction between “cruel 
and unusual” or “cruel or unusual” punishments. As one academic has written: 
The history of the English Bill of Rights reinforces the conclusion that 
the phrases “cruel and unusual” and “cruel or unusual” were 
understood to capture the same meaning. Just months after the House 
of Lords approved the Bill’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual 
punishments,” a group of Lords filed a dissenting statement in the case 
of Titus Oates. The dissenting Lords concluded that the punishments 
imposed in Oates’s cases violated the Bill of Rights, which they 
described as providing that neither “cruel nor unusual punishments [be] 
inflicted.” Their mistake suggests that they understood prohibitions of 
“cruel and unusual” and “cruel or unusual” punishments as equivalents. 
This history has particular salience because the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause was taken virtually verbatim from the English Bill 
of Rights and because the English Bill of Rights is thought to have 
been principally a reaction to the punishments in Oates’s case. 
Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 503–04 (2005); 
see also Michael David Warren Jr., Constitutional Law, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 991, 1002–03 (2010) (noting 
that whereas the U.S. Constitution prohibits “cruel and unusual” punishments, the Michigan Constitution 
prohibits “cruel or unusual” punishments). 
11 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 87 (1998). Chief Justice 
George Jeffreys of the Kings Bench had, after the 1685 trial, presided over a sentencing of a cleric, Titus 
Oates (1649–1705), who committed perjury. Oates had fabricated a supposed Catholic conspiracy, a 
“Popish Plot,” to kill King Charles II, with Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys lamenting that death was not a 
permissible punishment for perjury. As a result of his conduct, which led to the execution of more than a 
dozen innocent men, Oates was sentenced to be defrocked, to pay a fine of two thousand marks (the 
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The wording of American prohibitions against “cruel” or “unusual” punishments, 
or both, was not uniform.12 For example, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, governing 
newly acquired Western lands and famously barring slavery, included an express 
prohibition against “cruel or unusual punishments.”13 But in the U.S. Constitution’s 
Eighth Amendment, adopted by Congress in 178914 and ratified in 1791,15 the legal bar 
was expressed as one against “cruel and unusual punishments.”16 When James 
Madison—“the Father of the U.S. Constitution”17—drafted the U.S. Bill of Rights, he, 
like George Mason and many others, found the prohibition against “cruel and unusual 
punishments” to be a worthy one.18 His chosen language—now set forth in the 
Constitution’s Eighth Amendment—jettisoned the hortatory word “ought” in the English 
and Virginia provisions and replaced it with a “shall not” directive, making the bar on the 
infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments” an absolute prohibition.19 In the decades 
and centuries to come, it would, naturally, fall to American judges to decide precisely 
what such prohibitions actually meant. 
The concept of “cruel and unusual punishments” has been the subject of much 
litigation,20 endless legal scholarship,21 and tremendous public controversy.22 In the 
                                                                                                                                                 
equivalent of $10,000), to be whipped from Aldgate to Newgate (a distance of more than a mile) and, two 
days later, from Newgate to Tyburn (an additional two miles). Oates was then to be imprisoned for life and 
pilloried four times per year. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 236–37 (2001); Michael 
J. Zydney Mannheimer, Cruel and Unusual Federal Punishments, 98 IOWA L. REV. 69, 91–94, 94 n.156 
(2012); see also John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 970 (2011) [hereinafter Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause] (“Parliament condemned the punishment inflicted on Titus Oates as 
“contrary to Law and ancient Practice.”). 
12 BESSLER, supra note 7, at 178–80. 
13 Id. at 119 (emphasis added); see also 2 WILLIAM WINTERBOTHAM, AN HISTORICAL, GEOGRAPHICAL, 
COMMERCIAL, AND PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW OF THE AMERICAN UNITED STATES, AND OF THE EUROPEAN 
SETTLEMENTS IN AMERICA AND THE WEST-INDIES 490 (1795) (reprinting the NORTHWEST ORDINANCE 
(U.S. 1787), which provides in Article II, that “no cruel or unusual punishment shall be inflicted”). The act 
providing for the government of the Missouri territory also included a prohibition against “cruel or unusual 
punishment.” An Act Providing for the Government of the Territory of Missouri, 12th Cong., 1st Sess., § 
14 (June 4, 1812), reprinted in 4 LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FROM THE 4TH OF MARCH, 
1789, TO THE 4TH OF MARCH, 1815, at 442–43 (1816). 
14 CHRISTINE BARBOUR & GERALD C. WRIGHT, KEEPING THE REPUBLIC: POWER AND CITIZENSHIP IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 139 (6th ed. 2014) (“The first ten amendments to the Constitution, known as the Bill 
of Rights, were passed by Congress on September 25, 1789.”). 
15 The Eighth Amendment was ratified on December 15, 1791. RICHARD S. CONLEY, HISTORICAL 
DICTIONARY OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 73 (2016). 
16 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added). 
17 1 STEVEN HARMON WILSON, ED., THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 568 (2012). 
18 JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, AND 
AMENDING ISSUES, 1789–2002, at 156 (2d ed. 2003) (“Both the Virginia and the North Carolina ratifying 
conventions called for amendments against cruel and unusual punishments, and James Madison linked this 
guarantee to the provisions against excessive bail and fines when he presented his proposal for a bill of 
rights before Congress.”). 
19 BESSLER, supra note 7, at 155. 
20 See generally MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT (2011); CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2016); see also KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 
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academic world, a University of Florida law professor, John Stinneford, has written about 
what he describes as the original meaning of both “cruel”23 and “unusual.”24 He contends 
that the framers used the term “cruel” to denote “unjustly harsh”25 and that they used the 
term “unusual” to mean punishments “contrary to long usage.”26 “In the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries,” Stinneford observes in laying out his interpretative arguments, “the 
term ‘unusual’ had many of the meanings we currently associate with the term: ‘rare,’ 
‘uncommon,’ ‘out of the ordinary.” “The word,” he asserts, “also had a more specific 
meaning, however, as a legal term of art: ‘contrary to long usage’ or ‘immemorial 
usage.’” As Stinneford, looking to history for guidance in constitutional interpretation, 
contends: “A review of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century legal and political history 
shows that this last meaning is the only one that may plausibly be attributed to the term 
‘unusual’ in the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.”27 
In sharp contrast, Akhil Amar, in his article, “America’s Lived Constitution,” has 
written about the Eighth Amendment through a much different interpretive lens. “In 
ordinary language,” he writes, “the word ‘unusual’ focuses not merely on laws on the 
books but also on the law as actually applied.”28 Emphasizing that “the meaning of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
200 (2009) (“In the ferment of the 1960s, the death penalty produced intense debate. Proposals to abolish or 
restrict capital punishment competed with calls to expand its use.”). 
21 Compare David A. J. Richards, Constitutional Interpretation, History, and the Death Penalty, in HUGO 
ADAM BEDAU, ED., THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 214 (1997) (“The 
argument of Raoul Berger’s book, Death Penalties: The Supreme Court’s Obstacle Course, may be easily 
summarized: the persons who drafted and approved the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United 
States Constitution did not intend the former to limit, let alone invalidate, the use of the death penalty by 
the federal or state governments.” (citing RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT’S 
OBSTACLE COURSE (1982)), with Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty 
Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773 (1970) (an influential article arguing that the death penalty is 
unconstitutional); see also Jacob Lemon-Strauss, The States are Right: Arguing for the Continued Use of 
State Legislators in Forming a National Consensus for the Evolving Standards of Decency, 47 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1319, 1319 (2010) (“The Eighth Amendment has spawned a great torrent of scholarship and 
jurisprudence.”). 
22 E.g., BILLY WAYNE SINCLAIR & JODIE SINCLAIR, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: AN INDICTMENT BY A DEATH-
ROW SURVIVOR 131 (2011) (noting in Chapter 10: “In June 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the 
death penalty for child rape in Kennedy v. Louisiana. The decision caught the attention of then presidential 
candidates John McCain and Barack Obama, who went on record as disagreeing with it.”). 
23 John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Cruel”, 105 GEO. L.J. 441 (2016) [hereinafter The 
Original Meaning of “Cruel”]. 
24 John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel 
Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739 (2008) [hereinafter The Original Meaning of “Unusual”]. 
25 The Original Meaning of “Cruel”, supra note 23, at 445. 
26 The Original Meaning of “Unusual”, supra note 24, at 1745; see also John F. Stinneford, Death, 
Desuetude, and Original Meaning, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 531, 536 (2014); Rethinking Proportionality 
Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, supra note 11, at 901; compare William C. Heffernan, 
Constitutional Historicism: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment Evolving Standards of Decency Test, 
5 AM. U. L. REV. 1355, 1373 (2005) (discussing the meaning of “unusual” and noting that the U.S. 
Supreme Court, in In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890), “was confronted with the question of whether New 
York’s use of the electric chair, an innovation at the time, was constitutional,” and determined that the 
state’s use of the electric chair was constitutional).  
27 The Original Meaning of “Unusual”, supra note 24, at 1767–68. 
28 Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Lived Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 1734, 1780 n.114 (2011). As Amar 
writes of the implications of a living constitutionalism approach, using a low-level offense as an example: 
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Bill of Rights shifted when its words and principles were refracted through the prism of 
the Fourteenth Amendment,” Amar has reflected on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decades-
old penchant for counting jurisdictions that either permit or prohibit a particular 
punishment to assess its constitutionality. “Suppose that the policies of, say, Wyoming 
and California differ dramatically on a rights-related issue,” Amar writes, posing a 
hypothetical before raising these important questions as regards interpreting the 
Constitution’s Eighth Amendment: “Should the norms and practices of Wyoming’s half-
million inhabitants be given the same weight, Senate-style, as those of California’s thirty-
six million residents? Or should a proper tally reflect the population differential, House-
style?” “This issue,” Amar explains, “has pointedly arisen in cases pondering whether a 
given form of criminal punishment practiced in some states but not others violated the 
Eighth Amendment, which prohibits ‘cruel and unusual punishment.’”29  
The Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court have, themselves, interpreted the Eighth 
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in widely divergent ways.30 While 
a majority of Justices have long eschewed an eighteenth-century-centric view of that 
                                                                                                                                                 
Laws exist allowing jaywalkers to be jailed; but being jailed for 
jaywalking in America is surely “unusual.” (Whether it is also “cruel” 
is another question.) Examining law as actually applied properly brings 
constitutional institutions other than the legislature into the frame of 
Eighth Amendment analysis. Criminal laws are often written in 
overbroad ways precisely because it is understood, and in some 
respects constitutionally required, that such laws will be softened in 
practice by merciful discretion exercised by prosecutors, grand juries, 
criminal trial juries, trial judges, governors, and parole boards. Each of 
these institutions represents the public, too, and helps define what 
modern America really does believe and practice when it comes to 
punishment. 
29 Id. at 1778. The Supreme Court frequently tallies states that either permit or prohibit a given punishment. 
See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 426 (2008): 
The evidence of a national consensus with respect to the death penalty 
for child rapists, as with respect to juveniles, mentally retarded 
offenders, and vicarious felony murderers, shows divided opinion but, 
on balance, an opinion against it. Thirty-seven jurisdictions—36 States 
plus the Federal Government—have the death penalty. As mentioned 
above, only six of those jurisdictions authorize the death penalty for 
rape of a child. Though our review of national consensus is not 
confined to tallying the number of States with applicable death penalty 
legislation, it is of significance that, in 45 jurisdictions, petitioner could 
not be executed for child rape of any kind. That number surpasses the 
30 States in Atkins and Roper and the 42 States in Enmund that 
prohibited the death penalty under the circumstances those cases 
considered. 
Notably, since Kennedy v. Louisiana, additional states have abolished the death penalty altogether. LARRY 
J. SIEGEL & JOHN L. WORRALL, INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 448 (16th ed. 2018) (noting that 
Connecticut abolished the death penalty in 2012 and that Maryland abolished the death penalty in 2013). 
30 Many U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the Eighth Amendment arena have been decided by five-to-four 
votes. See, e.g., E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN 
LAW: CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS 134 (2009) (“Since 1980 the Supreme Court has 
decided six cases in which the duration of a prison sentence was attacked on Eighth Amendment grounds. 
All six cases were 5-4 decisions in form or substance . . . .”).  
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clause,31 in a dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia—the prominent originalist voice—once 
wrote: “The Eighth Amendment is addressed to always-and-everywhere ‘cruel’ 
punishments, such as the rack and the thumbscrew.”32 And when it comes to what 
punishments are “unusual,” the Justices have articulated differing views, too. While 
Justice Potter Stewart emphasized in 1972 that “death sentences are cruel and unusual in 
the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual . . . ,”33 Justice William 
O. Douglas concluded that same year that “the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is 
‘unusual’ if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth, social 
position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of 
such prejudices.”34 Justice Scalia, on the other hand, relying on popular dictionary 
definitions, defined “unusual” in Harmelin v. Michigan35 to mean “such as [does not] 
occu[r] in ordinary practice” and “[s]uch as is [not] in common use.”36 
Since 1958, the Eighth Amendment has been interpreted in accordance with the 
“evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”37 As the 
Court observed in its 1958 decision in Trop v. Dulles, where it established that now 
decades-old legal standard: “The provisions of the Constitution are not time-worn adages 
or hollow shibboleths. They are vital, living principles that authorize and limit 
governmental powers in our Nation.”38 In describing its prior holding in Weems v. United 
States, a 1910 decision invalidating a severe corporal punishment, the Court in Trop—
which essentially, without extended discussion, adopted a layperson’s understanding of 
unusual39—emphasized: “This Court has had little occasion to give precise content to the 
                                                 
31 Compare MARY WELEK ATWELL, EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY: POPULAR CULTURE AND 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 25 (2004) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth 
Amendment in accordance with the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society,” with the Court concluding that the Eighth Amendment “is not static”), with RUDOLPH J. GERBER 
& JOHN M. JOHNSON, THE TOP TEN DEATH PENALTY MYTHS: THE POLITICS OF CRIME CONTROL 90 (2007) 
(discussing Justice Scalia’s views of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against “cruel and unusual 
punishments,” with Justice Scalia having expressed the view that because the death penalty “was clearly 
permitted when the Eighth Amendment was adopted,” “it is clearly permitted today”).  
32 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 349 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
33 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
34 Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
35 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
36 Id. at 976 (quoting WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY (1828), and WEBSTER’S SECOND 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2807 (1954)). 
37 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). Several of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions applying the 
“evolving standards of decency” test have been in the death penalty arena. E.g., Brian W. Varland, Marking 
the Progress of a Maturing Society: Reconsidering the Constitutionality of Death Penalty Application in 
Light of Evolving Standards of Decency, 28 HAMLINE L. REV. 311 (2005). 
38 Trop, 356 U.S. at 103. 
39 Id. at 100 n.32 (citations omitted): 
Whether the word ‘unusual’ has any qualitative meaning different from 
‘cruel’ is not clear. On the few occasions this Court has had to consider 
the meaning of the phrase, precise distinctions between cruelty and 
unusualness do not seem to have been drawn. These cases indicate that 
the Court simply examines the particular punishment involved in light 
of the basic prohibition against inhuman treatment, without regard to 
any subtleties of meaning that might be latent in the word ‘unusual.’ If 
the word ‘unusual’ is to have any meaning apart from the word ‘cruel,’ 
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Eighth Amendment, and, in an enlightened democracy such as ours, this is not surprising. 
But when the Court was confronted with a punishment of 12 years in irons at hard and 
painful labor imposed for the crime of falsifying public records, it did not hesitate to 
declare that the penalty was cruel in its excessiveness and unusual in its character.”40  
Whereas the Court in Trop, in rejecting a rigid, purely historical interpretation of 
the Eighth Amendment, struck down the punishment of expatriation or denationalization 
for desertion, the Court in Weems41 declared unconstitutional a draconian practice in the 
Philippines known as cadena temporal.42 Notably, the Supreme Court in Trop—self-
aware of the lack of logic in striking down a non-lethal punishment when capital 
punishment laws were still in place—felt the need to mention the death penalty even as it 
invalidated a punishment that would have rendered an American soldier stateless. “At the 
outset,” the Court stressed, “let us put to one side the death penalty as an index of the 
constitutional limit on punishment.”43 As the Court, in its plurality opinion,44 then 
observed: “Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, both on moral 
grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of punishment—and they are 
forceful—the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day 
when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept of 
cruelty.”45 Those words were penned sixty years ago, decades before the United States, in 
                                                                                                                                                 
however, the meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying something 
different from that which is generally done. 
40 Id. at 100 (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)). In Weems, the Supreme Court observed: 
“What constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment has not been exactly decided. It has been said that 
ordinarily the terms imply something inhuman and barbarous,—torture and the like.” 217 U.S. at 368. 
41 Denationalization as a punishment was characterized as unusual by the Supreme Court in Trop. Trop, 
356 U.S. at 100 n.32. 
42 BESSLER, supra note 7, at 196–97; see also Weems, 217 U.S. at 378 (noting that the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause is “progressive” in nature and “may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes 
enlightened by a humane justice”). Even before Weems, the U.S. Supreme Court—in a different context—
noted that public opinion could shape punishment practices. See Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 427–28 
(1885): 
What punishments shall be considered as infamous may be affected by 
the changes of public opinion from one age to another. In former times, 
being put in the stocks was not considered as necessarily infamous. 
And by the first Judiciary Act of the United States, whipping was 
classed with moderate fines and short terms of imprisonment in 
limiting the criminal jurisdiction of the district courts . . . . But at the 
present day either stocks or whipping might be thought an infamous 
punishment. 
43 Trop, 356 U.S. at 99. 
44 The plurality opinion in Trop was authored by Chief Justice Earl Warren and joined by Justices Black, 
Douglas, and Whittaker. Id. at 87.  
45 Id. at 99 (emphasis added). Through the years, the U.S. Supreme Court has distinguished the dictionary 
definition of “cruel” from the concept of cruelty in its constitutional sense. BESSLER, supra note 7, at 210, 
295–96, 331–32. The death penalty today, of course, is no longer “widely accepted.” The majority of the 
world’s nations no longer actively make use of executions, and Americans themselves—per public opinion 
polls—are very divided (as has now long been the case) about the propriety of the punishment. SCOTT 
VOLLUM, ROLANDO V. DEL CARMEN, DURANT FRANTZEN, CLAUDIA SAN MIGUEL & KELLY CHEESEMAN, 
THE DEATH PENALTY: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, COMMENTARIES, AND CASE BRIEFS 304 (3d ed. 2015) 
(“The increasing availability of sentences of life without parole (LWOP) has added another dimension to 
public opinion about the death penalty. Recent data reveal that when given the alternative of LWOP, 
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1994, ratified the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment,46 and decades before the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa, in 1995, declared the death penalty to be unconstitutional under that 
country’s post-apartheid constitution.47 
In applying its “evolving standards of decency” test since Trop, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has used “objective” criteria to assess a punishment’s constitutionality48 while 
reserving its right—as the final arbiter of the Constitution’s meaning49—to make an 
independent judgment.50 “The beginning point,” the Court ruled in Roper v. Simmons,51 
“is a review of objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the 
enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question.”52 “We must then determine, 
in the exercise of our independent judgment,” Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for the 
Court in that case, one dealing with the legality of executing juvenile offenders, “whether 
the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juveniles.”53 In addition to gauging 
whether a “national consensus” exists against a specific punishment (or against a specific 
                                                                                                                                                 
support for the death penalty drops below 50%.”); NATHANIEL PERSILY, JACK CITRIN & PATRICK J. EGAN, 
EDS., PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 109 (2008) (“In the last hundred years, 
Americans have directly expressed their views on capital punishment through referendums and public 
opinion polls. Progressive Era referendums in Ohio, Oregon, and Arizona reveal electorates closely divided 
on the abolition of the death penalty, with Oregon voters going so far as to affirm the death penalty in 1912, 
reject it in 1914 by a very narrow margin, and then vote for its restoration in 1920.”); 3 PETER 
HODGKINSON, ED., THE INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF ESSAYS ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: POLICY AND 
GOVERNANCE (2016) (unpaginated at Part V): 
At the end of the eighteenth century, a movement to abolish, or at least 
sharply limit, the death penalty emerged in the Western world. Though 
this abolitionist movement has ebbed and flowed during the past two 
centuries, it has enjoyed striking success during the past forty years as a 
majority of the world’s nations, including virtually every Western 
nation except the United States, has abolished capital punishment. 
46 JOHN D. BESSLER, THE DEATH PENALTY AS TORTURE: FROM THE DARK AGES TO ABOLITION 176–78, 
183–84 (2017). 
47 LILIAN CHENWI, TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN AFRICA: A HUMAN RIGHTS 
PERSPECTIVE 128 (2007). 
48 E.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (holding that “[p]roportionality review under those 
evolving standards” should be informed by “‘objective factors to the maximum possible extent,’” and 
further noting, “[w]e have pinpointed that the ‘clearest and most reliable objective evidence of 
contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures’”) (citations omitted). 
49 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
50 Ian P. Farrell, Strict Scrutiny Under the Eighth Amendment, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 853, 870 (2013) 
(“While the Court has engaged, on the one hand, in the complex analysis of objective indicia . . . , it has 
also insisted that reliance on indicators of public opinion does not amount to the Court abrogating its own 
responsibility to interpret the Constitution.”); Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (“[T]he task of interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment remains our responsibility.”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 
597 (1977)) (“We also acknowledged in Coker that the objective evidence, though of great importance, did 
not ‘wholly determine’ the controversy, ‘for the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own 
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth 
Amendment.’”). 
51 543 U.S. 551. 
52 Id. at 564. 
53 Id. 
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punishment for a specific class of offender),54 the Court has looked to actual state 
practices, including past usage and jury verdicts,55 a punishment’s frequency,56 as well as 
trends57 and the consistency of the direction of the change.58 
The U.S. Supreme Court has often wrestled with what constitutes a cruel and 
unusual punishment. In applying the “evolving standards” test, the Court—to date—has 
declared unconstitutional various punishment practices, including: (1) the execution of 
non-homicidal offenders,59 those who played a less culpable role in the commission of 
the crime,60 offenders under age eighteen,61 the insane,62 and the intellectually disabled;63 
and (2) life-without-parole sentences for juveniles, whether for homicide or non-
                                                 
54 E.g., Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1048 (2017) (“Executing intellectually disabled individuals, we 
concluded in Atkins, serves no penological purpose, runs up against a national consensus against the 
practice, and creates a ‘risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a 
less severe penalty.’”) (citations omitted). 
55 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288 (1976) (“Central to the application of the [Eighth] 
Amendment is a determination of contemporary standards regarding the infliction of punishment. As 
discussed in Gregg v. Georgia, indicia of societal values identified in prior opinions include history and 
traditional usage, legislative enactments, and jury determinations.”) (citations omitted); Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822 (1988) (“[W]e first review relevant legislative enactments, then refer to jury 
determinations.”); see also Aliza Plener Cover, The Eighth Amendment’s Lost Jurors: Death Qualification 
and Evolving Standards of Decency, 92 IND. L.J. 113, 115 (2016) (“In assessing the constitutionality of the 
death penalty, the Supreme Court considers aggregate capital trial outcomes as ‘objective indicia’ of our 
nation’s ‘evolving standards of decency.’”) (citations omitted). 
56 E.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (“[E]ven in those States that allow the execution of mentally retarded 
offenders, the practice is uncommon. Some States, for example New Hampshire and New Jersey, continue 
to authorize executions, but none have been carried out in decades.”); Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–65 (citations 
omitted): 
Atkins emphasized that even in the 20 States without formal 
prohibition, the practice of executing the mentally retarded was 
infrequent. Since Penry, only five States had executed offenders known 
to have an IQ under 70. In the present case, too, even in the 20 States 
without a formal prohibition on executing juveniles, the practice is 
infrequent. Since Stanford, six States have executed prisoners for 
crimes committed as juveniles. In the past 10 years, only three have 
done so: Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia. 
See also Tiffani Darden, Exploring the Spectrum: How the Law May Advance a Social Movement, 48 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 261, 272 (2016) (“When considering the ‘objective indicia of consensus,’ the Court looks to 
sentencing statutes and the frequency of their application.”). 
57 E.g., Emily Taft, Moore v. Texas: Balancing Medical Advancements with Judicial Stability, 12 DUKE J. 
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 115, 121 (2017) (“Applying the ‘evolving standards of decency’ test for 
the Eighth Amendment, the Court in both Atkins and Hall found the trends among the states probative to its 
decisions.”) (citations omitted). 
58 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315 (“It is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the 
consistency of the direction of change.”). 
59 Coker, 433 U.S. 584; Kennedy, 554 U.S. 407. 
60 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
61 Roper, 543 U.S. 551. 
62 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); see also Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 960 (2007) 
(“Petitioner’s submission is that he suffers from a severe, documented mental illness that is the source of 
gross delusions preventing him from comprehending the meaning and purpose of the punishment to which 
he has been sentenced. This argument, we hold, should have been considered.”). 
63 Atkins, 536 U.S. 304; Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014); Moore, 137 S. Ct. 1039. 
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homicide offenses.64 “While the modern Court has splintered on various issues of 
counting methodology,” Akhil Amar stresses, “‘unusual’ should mean what it says.”65 As 
he cogently argues in his Yale Law Journal article, using a pragmatic approach to reading 
the word unusual: “If 240 million modern Americans live in states that flatly prohibit 
punishment X while only sixty million live in states that vigorously practice punishment 
X, then X is ‘unusual’ in the ordinary everyday meaning of that word.”66 Taking note of 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence, one that has allowed many 
executions to take place while simultaneously barring others, Amar has also written of 
how the Supreme Court has responded to data on state practice (e.g., executions and the 
enactment of laws) in the Eighth Amendment context since the 1960s.67 
                                                 
64 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (“This Court now holds that for a juvenile offender who did 
not commit homicide the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole. This clear line is 
necessary to prevent the possibility that life without parole sentences will be imposed on juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders who are not sufficiently culpable to merit that punishment.”); Miller v. Alabama, 
567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (“We therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that 
mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.”); see also Montgomery v. 
Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (“A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile 
homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them . . . . Allowing those 
offenders to be considered for parole ensures that juveniles whose crimes reflected only transient 
immaturity—and who have since matured—will not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.”). 
65 Amar, supra note 28, at 1778. 
66 Id. As Amar writes: “Citizens, not states, should thus count equally in interpreting both the Eighth 
Amendment word ‘unusual’ and modern America’s lived Constitution more generally.” Id.; see also id. at 
1780 (“Although Justice Scalia has argued that modern Eighth Amendment interpreters should count each 
state equally regardless of state population, this approach warps the Reconstruction vision.”); id. (“Judicial 
interpreters should be seeking to discover and channel the collective wisdom of the American people, and 
on certain questions the wisest way to tap that collective wisdom is to survey all Americans and to weight 
each American equally.”); compare id. at 1781 (“If the issue is whether a given punishment is genuinely 
unusual, presumably the punishment may sometimes be upheld even if it is a minority practice. If, say, 
states accounting for forty-five percent of the nation’s population routinely use punishment X, it would be 
hard to say that X is truly unusual even though it is a minority practice in America.”). 
67 Id. at 1783 n.118: 
In the late 1960s, actual executions dropped to zero in America. In 
response to this apparent national consensus, the Court in 1972 seemed 
to hold the death penalty categorially unconstitutional. See Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Over the next four years, both Congress 
and some thirty-five states representing an overwhelming majority of 
the American population pushed back against this ruling with a new 
round of death penalty statutes. In response, the Court reconsidered its 
position and gave its blessing to the penalty in certain situations where 
the underlying crime was particularly heinous and where strict 
procedural safeguards were in place. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153 (1976). Since then the Court has imposed additional substantive 
and procedural limits on capital punishment with a close eye on 
evolving American practice. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(2002) (overruling, in effect, Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)); 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (overruling Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 
(2008). 
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When the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual punishments” prohibition is 
analyzed through a “living constitutionalist” lens, the American death penalty does not 
fare well. Several Enlightenment thinkers, including the Italian philosophe Cesare 
Beccaria and the American revolutionary Dr. Benjamin Rush, a signer of the Declaration 
of Independence, freely spoke of the death penalty’s unnecessary severity or cruelty more 
than 200 years ago.68 The eighteenth-century death penalty, however, could not plausibly 
have then been described as an “unusual” punishment because, in that century, death was 
the customary penalty for multiple felonies69 and executions were the mandatory 
punishment for their commission.70 In light of everything that has transpired in the last 
two centuries, especially since the development of discretionary punishments and the 
post-World War II recognition of universal human rights,71 comparing eighteenth-century 
and twenty-first-century laws and practices is like comparing apples and oranges or 
rotary dial phones and iPhones. Many punishments that were permissible in the 
eighteenth century are simply no longer authorized today,72 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment—put in place after all of America’s founders had died—changed American 
constitutional law in monumental and fundamental ways.73 
                                                 
68 Cesare Beccaria asserted that the death penalty “is not useful because of the example of cruelty that it 
gives to men.” BESSLER, supra note 7, at 35. Dr. Benjamin Rush, who opposed the death penalty for any 
crime, said “[t]he punishment of murder by death, is contrary to reason, and to the order and happiness of 
society” and that “[h]umanity” revolts “at the idea of the severity and certainty of a capital punishment.” Id. 
at 53, 70; DAGOBERT D. RUNES, THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN RUSH xi, 35–42 (1947) (reprinting 
Dr. Benjamin Rush’s 1792 essay on the topic, “On Punishing Murder by Death”); see also BENJAMIN 
RUSH, ESSAYS, LITERARY, MORAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 63 (2d ed. 1806) (“In barbarous ages every thing 
partook of the complexion of the times. Civil, ecclesiastical, military, and domestic punishments were all of 
a cruel nature. With the progress of reason and Christianity, punishments of all kinds have become less 
severe.”). 
69 See, e.g., JACKSON J. SPIELVOGEL, WESTERN CIVILIZATION: VOLUME B: 1300–1815, at 518 (10th ed. 
2018) (noting that punishments in eighteenth-century societies “were often cruel and even spectacular,” 
that “[p]ublic executions were a basic part of traditional punishment,” and that “[t]he death penalty was still 
commonly used for property crimes as well as for violent crimes”). 
70 John D. Bessler, Tinkering Around the Edges: The Supreme Court’s Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 49 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1913, 1943 (2012). 
71 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was an important step forward for the idea that certain 
rights, such as the right to be free from cruelty and torture, are universal human rights. See generally 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
72 PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, 
AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607–1900, at 91, 152, 172, 182 (1999) (noting the use of the pillory, ear cropping, and 
mutilation as punishment in the eighteenth century); KENNETH L. KUSMER, DOWN AND OUT, ON THE ROAD: 
THE HOMELESS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 21 (2002) (noting the use of corporal punishments on convicted 
vagrants in colonial New York, including “the stockades, pillory, ear-cropping, and branding, in addition to 
whipping”); PAUL M. FINK, JONESBOROUGH: THE FIRST CENTURY OF TENNESSEE’S FIRST TOWN, 1776–
1876, at 13 (2002) (“Lesser crimes might bring confinement in the pillory or stocks, or the whipping post, 
with a specified number of lashes ‘well laid on.’ Women as well as men felt the whip . . . .”). 
73 DANIEL W. CROFTS, LINCOLN AND THE POLITICS OF SLAVERY: THE OTHER THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
AND THE STRUGGLE TO SAVE THE UNION 266 (2016) (“The Fourteenth Amendment, [Garrett] Epps writes, 
brought about ‘by far the most sweeping and complex change ever made in the original Constitution.’ 
Indeed, Epps contends that the 1787 Constitution ‘died at Fort Sumter’ and that the architects of the new 
‘second Constitution,’ who attempted to repair the flawed work of the Founders, should be considered the 
‘second founders.’”). 
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Already, non-lethal corporal punishments such as ear cropping, whipping, and the 
pillory have fallen out of favor and are no longer used in America’s penal system.74 For 
example, in Jackson v. Bishop,75 Justice Harry Blackmun—then writing for the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit—ruled that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the 
lashing of prisoners (once a common, or usual, practice) within Arkansas prisons.76 
Likewise, in Hope v. Pelzer,77 the U.S. Supreme Court bluntly declared that it was an 
“obvious” Eighth Amendment violation to handcuff a shirtless Alabama inmate to a 
hitching post for seven hours, thus resulting in the inmate’s dehydration and 
sunburning.78 “Despite its long tradition,” one scholar notes, “corporal punishment (in the 
form of whipping, caning, flogging, lashing, paddling, etc.) has been outlawed as method 
of disciplining adult prisoners and military personnel.”79 It is thus clear that once usual 
punishments can become unusual and, consequently, once constitutional punishments can 
become unconstitutional. 
Such facts—and such Eighth Amendment cases—make America’s continued use of 
capital punishment a particular enigma, with U.S. Supreme Court Justices themselves 
expressing considerable angst and reservations about the punishment of death.80 In 1972, 
                                                 
74 John D. Bessler, The Anomaly of Executions: The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in the 21st 
Century, 2 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 297, 430–39 (2013); compare S. Meeson Morris, The Obsolete 
Punishments of Shropshire, in 8 TRANSACTIONS OF THE SHROPSHIRE ARCHÆOLOGICAL AND NATURAL 
HISTORY SOCIETY 92–93 (1885): 
The substitution of imprisonment, fines, and similar punishments now 
in vogue, for the curious contrivances formerly used, has rendered the 
pillory, ducking stool, and other instruments before referred to, things 
of the past, but the modes of correction employed by our forefathers, in 
what are familiarly termed “the good old days,” must always prove of 
considerable interest, serving, as they undoubtedly do, to remind us of 
the comparative improvement effected in the infliction of punishments 
during the present age of progress and advancement. Many alterations 
and amendments remain to be made before perfection can be nearly 
attained, but anyone looking back at what our system of punishment 
once was cannot fail to observe the many steps in this direction that 
have already been taken. 
75 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968). 
76 Id. at 579: 
[W]e have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the use of the 
strap in the penitentiaries of Arkansas is punishment which, in this last 
third of the 20th century, runs afoul of the Eighth Amendment; that the 
strap’s use, irrespective of any precautionary conditions which may be 
imposed, offends contemporary concepts of decency and human dignity 
and precepts of civilization which we profess to possess . . . . 
77 536 U.S. 730 (2002). 
78 Id. at 738. 
79 ELIZABETH T. GERSHOFF, KELLY M. PURTELL & IGOR HOLAS, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN U.S. SCHOOLS: 
LEGAL PRECEDENTS, CURRENT PRACTICES, AND FUTURE POLICY 61 (2015). 
80 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2780–81 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting): 
The State plans to execute petitioners using three drugs: midazolam, 
rocuronium bromide, and potassium chloride. The latter two drugs are 
intended to paralyze the inmate and stop his heart. But they do so in a 
torturous manner, causing burning, searing pain . . . . [I]t leaves 
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in Furman v. Georgia,81 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down America’s death penalty as 
violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,82 with some Justices noting then—
more than forty-five years ago—the rarity and freakish nature of death sentences and 
executions.83 The Supreme Court, though, reversed course four years later in 1976 in 
Gregg v. Georgia84 and two companion cases,85 thereby allowing executions to resume.86 
It was Justice Anthony Kennedy who, in 2008 in Kennedy v. Louisiana,87 expressed this 
quite pointed concern about capital punishment in declaring the death penalty 
unconstitutional for non-homicidal child rape: “When the law punishes by death, it risks 
its own sudden descent into brutality, transgressing the constitutional commitment to 
decency and restraint.”88 
The Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment cases—as well as the shifting history of 
punishment practices—raises an important series of questions: At what point do 
punishments that were once usual become unusual? What should the criteria be for 
gauging whether a punishment is one or the other? And what consequences, if any, does 
this have for American courts evaluating the constitutionality of punishments such as the 
death penalty? These are particularly important questions to address given what we know 
now about the American death penalty’s sordid and error-prone administration since its 
inception,89 and also given that a majority of the world’s nations have now abandoned the 
death penalty and have turned away from death sentences and executions.90 The continent 
of Europe is now essentially a death penalty-free zone, with two protocols to the 
European Convention on Human Rights absolutely barring the death penalty’s use in both 
peacetime and wartime.91  
                                                                                                                                                 
petitioners exposed to what may well be the chemical equivalent of 
being burned at the stake. 
81 408 U.S. 238. 
82 See MICHAEL S. GREEN & SCOTT L. STABLER, EDS., IDEAS AND MOVEMENTS THAT SHAPED AMERICA: 
FROM THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO “OCCUPY WALL STREET” 175 (2015) (Volume 1:A–E) (discussing the ruling 
in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)). 
83 Furman, 408 U.S. at 291 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The outstanding characteristic of our present 
practice of punishing criminals by death is the infrequency with which we resort to it. The evidence is 
conclusive that death is not the ordinary punishment for any crime.”); id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal 
systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.”); id. at 313 (White, 
J., concurring) (“[T]he death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes 
and . . . there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many 
cases in which it is not.”). 
84 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
85 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
86 The first execution after Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), was that of Gary Gilmore in 1977. 
MIKAL GILMORE, SHOT IN THE HEART, at xi (1994). 
87 554 U.S. 407. 
88 Id. at 420. 
89 See generally Rob Warden & Daniel Lennard, Death in America Under Color of Law: Our Long, 
Inglorious Experience with Capital Punishment, 13 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 194 (forthcoming Spring 2018).  
90 Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries (as of March 2018), AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/act50/6665/2017/en/ (“More than two-thirds of the countries in the 
world have now abolished the death penalty in law or practice.”). 
91 Eur. Consult. Ass., Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, ETS No. 114 (Apr. 28, 1983) 
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To better understand what “unusual punishments” are, it may be helpful—and, in 
truth, actually seems rather intuitive—to try to better understand what they are not. With 
that in mind, this Article explores past usages of “unusual punishments” and “usual 
punishments.” By examining and thinking about the difference between them, perhaps 
twenty-first century American judges will gain some insight—whether profound or not—
into their own Eighth Amendment decision making. The natural, binary opposite of 
“unusual punishments” is “usual punishments,” with a literature review revealing that, to 
date, while at least a few scholars have written about “unusual punishments,”92 very little 
has been written about “usual punishments.”93 This Article seeks to fill that scholarly 
void by examining, from an historical perspective, not only “unusual punishments,” but 
the flip side of the “unusual punishments” coin. Part II of the Article thus surveys early 
English and American sources referencing either “unusual” or “usual” punishments.  
The Article’s pragmatic goal is to assist courts in interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, which was drafted, approved, and 
ratified in the eighteenth century, as they grapple with twenty-first century legal 
challenges. After a review of historical sources in Part II, Part III examines the modern 
American death penalty and its administration and, in some cases, its immutable 
characteristics. This task is undertaken to help assess whether capital punishment is, in 
this day and age, an unusual or usual punishment and whether or not it should be declared 
unconstitutional. In Part IV, the Article specifically evaluates the constitutionality of 
death sentences and executions, exploring what factual and legal considerations courts 
should take into account in making the determination of when a traditional, or “usual,” 
punishment should be considered to be (or should be found to have transformed into) an 
“unusual” one.  
In that respect, this Article highlights the importance of reading the U.S. 
Constitution as a whole, much as lawyers and judges do with contracts.94 The 
                                                                                                                                                 
(forbidding the death penalty’s use in peacetime); Eur. Consult. Ass., Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Concerning the Abolition of the Death 
Penalty in All Circumstances, ETS No. 187 (May 3, 2002) (extending the prohibition on the death penalty’s 
use to wartime). 
92 The Original Meaning of “Unusual”, supra note 24; Joshua L. Shapiro, And Unusual: Examining the 
Forgotten Prong of the Eighth Amendment, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 465 (2008); see also Ryan, supra note 4, at 
569–70 (“Although the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments has been the focus of many a 
scholarly article, neither the Court nor legal scholars have carefully examined how the cruelty and 
unusualness components of the Clause relate to each other.”); id. at 599 (“[M]ost scholars . . . have 
neglected the role of unusualness in their interpretations and applications of the Eighth Amendment, 
suggesting that cruelty, alone, is the only relevant factor.”); id. at 610 (“‘[C]ruel and unusual’ cannot be 
interpreted as simply ‘cruel,’ because by completely ignoring ‘and unusual,’ such an interpretation would 
violate a central principle of construction that every term must be given meaning.”). Scholar Meghan 
Ryan—one of the scholars to focus on the unusual terminology—has observed that “[a]lthough ‘cruel’ and 
‘unusual’ have historically been treated as distinct terms, they are certainly related.” Id. at 603. 
93 The U.S. Supreme Court itself has only infrequently referred to the notion of “usual punishments.” In its 
1910 decision in Weems, the U.S. Supreme Court, in discussing its prior case of Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 
130 (1878), noted that death was a “usual punishment for murder.” Weems, 217 U.S. at 369. 
94 See, e.g., Peterson v. Minidoka Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 331, 118 F.3d 1351, 1359 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The usual 
rule of interpretation of contracts is to read provisions so that they harmonize with each other, not 
contradict each other. That task of construction is for the court.”). Of course, interpreting a constitution—
one that applies to an entire society, one composed of millions of people—is a much more complicated and 
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Constitution is itself a social contract or compact that has survived for many 
generations,95 though its interpretation—because it governs the lives of people not yet 
born at its creation—naturally presents unique and much more complicated challenges 
than the interpretation of a run-of-the-mill commercial contract.96 The text of the U.S. 
Constitution and its amendments—as well as the principles and values undergirding 
those textual provisions—should be of primary importance in deciding how modern 
judges should read it, and the proper interpretation of the words cruel and unusual is thus 
of considerable consequence. The Constitution conspicuously guarantees various 
individual rights, often employing broad and general language (e.g., “due process”, 
“equal protection”, etc.). And many of those rights are specifically designed to protect 
                                                                                                                                                 
weighty endeavor than interpreting a private contract between two parties. Cf. Walter F. Murphy, 
Constitutional Interpretation: The Art of the Historian, Magician, or Statesman, 87 YALE L.J. 1752, 1770 
(1978) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977)) (“Because of the broad and basic political character of a constitution, it 
is not amenable to the rules of interpretation that apply to private contracts or to statutes. Because of the 
complex nature of the interlocking arrangements contained in a constitution, an interpreter must look at it 
as a whole, examine its structure, as Charles Black would say.”).  
95 G. EDWARD DESEVE, THE PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEE’S HANDBOOK 129 (2d ed. 2017) (“The men who 
wrote and signed [the U.S. Constitution] at the 1787 Constitutional Convention—lawyers, merchants, 
farmers—were students of the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment who learned about the 
social compact from John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau and wove those principles into the American 
experiment.”); compare LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 93 (1990): 
There is a different set of difficulties with treating the United States 
Constitution as our contemporary social compact. For the Constitution 
was born without principal ingredients of a social compact, and age has 
not cured and has even aggravated those defects. A direct and 
immediate descendant of the Articles of Confederation, “a more perfect 
union” of the states, the Constitution was declared to be ordained by 
“We the people” as had been the constitutions of the several states, but 
the compact implied in that preambular phrase was largely rhetorical 
and symbolic. The small federal superstructure which the framers 
projected was not, and was not expected to become, a significant 
government with significant relations to the people, implicating their 
rights. The real social compact remained the state constitution, the 
polity that the people had contracted for was the state polity, the 
government instituted to secure their rights was the state government; 
the United States Constitution was only a small “codicil” to state social 
compacts. 
96 The debate over how the U.S. Constitution should be interpreted has generated fierce debate. It was 
ratified in the eighteenth century and, though amended from time to time, including after the Civil War and 
in the Progressive Era, it governs twenty-first century citizens—people with very diverse views who were 
not, themselves, even born when the original Constitution or, for example, its Reconstruction Amendments, 
were adopted and ratified. E.g., Christopher J. Peters, What Lies Beneath: Interpretive Methodology, 
Constitutional Authority, and the Case of Originalism, 2013 BYU. L. REV. 1251, 1255 (2014): 
We have managed to squeak by for more than two hundred years 
without a consensus approach to constitutional interpretation. Perhaps 
our interpretive disagreement even deserves some credit for this: no 
single approach dominates, so everyone’s preferred approach is always 
in play. Still, it is profoundly strange that we agree so broadly that the 
Constitution is the supreme law of the land but diverge so widely on 
how to determine just what that law requires of us. 
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those accused of crimes and, in the case of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 
offenders themselves.97 In deciding Eighth Amendment disputes, twenty-first century 
judges must decide how to interpret the Constitution, and nothing less than the Rule of 
Law—and, in the case of the death penalty, life or death—is at stake.98  
While the English “Bloody Code” and a wide assortment of draconian punishments 
(both lethal and non-lethal) are a part of Anglo-American history,99 this Article 
specifically discusses the special relevance of the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process 
Clauses100 and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause101 in assessing 
whether a punishment is—or has become—“unusual.” The Article argues that the 
language of those clauses should be fully taken into account as part of the Eighth 
Amendment analysis and calculus, and that the arbitrary, discriminatory, error-prone, and 
torturous nature of death sentences and executions must also be taken into consideration 
in evaluating whether capital punishment is “cruel and unusual.” After exploring the 
history and specific language of the U.S. Constitution, the Article concludes that the 
American death penalty is arbitrarily applied, unequally and unfairly administered, and 
is—if fairly judged—not only incredibly “cruel,” but torturous and highly “unusual.”  
 
II. “USUAL” VS. “UNUSUAL” PUNISHMENTS: 
AN HISTORICAL SURVEY 
 
 
A. Common Usage, the Dichotomy Between “Usual” and “Unusual” Punishments, 
and English and American Law 
 
The notion of “unusual punishments” dates back many centuries.102 The notion of 
“usual punishments”—its converse—also appears commonly in historical sources.103 For 
                                                 
97 See generally JACQUELINE R. KANOVITZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (14th ed. 2015). 
98 E.g., Stephen Macedo, The Rule of Law, Justice, and the Politics of Moderation, in IAN SHAPIRO, ED., 
THE RULE OF LAW 158 (1994) (“Many debates over the proper nature of constitutional interpretation owe 
something to the tensions . . . between the rule of law and equity: questions about the legitimate grounds 
and norms of interpretation, questions of constraint and discretion, and questions about the distribution of 
authority among institutions (founders, legislatures, executives, judges, etc.) and across time.”); RONALD 
DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 
145 (1993) (“The Constitution insists that our judges do their best collectively to construct, reinspect, and 
revise, generation by generation, the skeleton of freedom and equality of concern that its great clauses, in 
their majestic abstraction, command.”). 
99 MITCHEL P. ROTH, AN EYE FOR AN EYE: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 77 (2014) 
(“The term ‘Bloody Code’ has been used to refer to the English system of criminal law that roughly 
corresponded with the years 1688-1815, when literally hundreds of felonies carrying the death penalty were 
added to the criminal statutes.”). 
100 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.  
101 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
102 The Original Meaning of “Unusual”, supra note 24, at 1770 (noting that “[a]ctions that comported with 
long usage were often said to be ‘usual’” and that “[a]ctions that were contrary to long usage, on the other 
hand, were described as ‘unusual’”; “Americans in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries also 
used the term ‘unusual’ to describe actions that were contrary to ‘long usage’”); see also id. at 1772 (noting 
that the English jurist Edward Coke “argued that the common law consisted of customary practices that 
enjoyed ‘long’ or ‘immemorial usage’”); id. at 1805 (discussing Patrick Henry’s use of the “unusual 
punishments” terminology). While the word unusual was, naturally, employed in a wide variety of different 
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example, Edward Gibbon’s The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 
published in London in 1776, makes reference to “the usual punishments of death, exile, 
and confiscation” being inflicted in the Roman empire.104 Robert Bissett’s The History of 
the Reign of George III, published in the United States in 1811, as well as Edward 
Baines’ history of the French Revolution, also make reference “to the usual punishments 
prescribed by law.”105 An eighteenth-century Roman history observes that “[t]he usual 
punishments inflicted were fines, banishment, and death,”106 while in seventeenth-century 
proceedings against Thomas Earl of Danby for high treason during King James II’s reign, 
one man emphasized that for “ages” after “the conquest,” “confiscation of estate and 
banishment were the usual punishments.”107 
The U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment was ratified in 1791, enshrining in 
American law the protection against “cruel and unusual punishments.” In fact, references 
to “unusual punishment”—quite apart from concerns about “cruel” punishment—show 
                                                                                                                                                 
contexts and writings in America’s founding era, Samuel Johnson’s famous dictionary defined “unusual” as 
“Not common; not frequent; rare.” A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 250 (1756); see also 
THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1789) (defining 
“Unusual” as “Not common, not frequent, rare”). 
103 88 THE ANNUAL REGISTER, OR A VIEW OF THE HISTORY, POLITICS, AND LITERATURE, FOR THE YEAR 
1777, at 244 (1788) (“The usual punishments are fine and imprisonment for such offences . . . .”); PIERRE-
JOSEPH DUMONT, NARRATIVE OF THIRTY-FOUR YEAR SLAVERY AND TRAVELS AND AFRICA 17, 42 (J. S. 
Quesne comp., 1819) (referencing “threats of the usual punishments” and noting that in one locale “the 
most usual punishment is decapitation”); 3 GEORGE BURDER, COMP., THE WORKS OF THE REVEREND ISAAC 
WATTS, D.D. 358 (1810) (noting that “[a] fine of money or cattle to be paid, a cutting off from the people 
or congregation, scourging or beating at most with forty stripes, the loss of a limb, or the loss of life” were 
“some of the usual punishments of criminals appointed in the jewish law”); ISAAC WATTS, A SHORT VIEW 
OF THE WHOLE SCRIPTURAL HISTORY 68 (8th ed. 1767) (noting same); 2 SARAH TRIMMER, ED., SACRED 
HISTORY, SELECTED FROM THE SCRIPTURES; WITH ANNOTATIONS AND REFLECTIONS, PARTICULARLY 
CALCULATED TO FACILITATE THE STUDY OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES IN SCHOOLS AND FAMILIES 37 (6th ed. 
1810) (“The usual punishments of criminals among the Israelites were, a fine of money or cattle to be paid, 
or cutting off from the congregation, scourging or beating (not exceeding forty-nine stripes), the loss of a 
limb, or the forfeiture of life.”); 23 THE LADY’S MAGAZINE OR ENTERTAINING COMPANION FOR THE FAIR 
SEX, APPROPRIATED SOLELY TO THEIR USE AND AMUSEMENT 275 (1792) (“The council of finances at 
Brussels have published an ordinance, prohibiting the vending to or furnishing the French with provisions, 
ammunition, &c. under pain of the usual punishments.”); 8 THE ECLECTIC REVIEW 36 (1812) (noting, in a 
discussion of GEORGE COOK, A HISTORY OF THE REFORMATION IN SCOTLAND (1811), that two people 
“were condemned to the usual punishments”). 
104 1 EDWARD GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 357 (1776). Many 
during the Enlightenment began to question the propriety of capital punishment, then the usual punishment 
for various offenses. See CHARLES COOTE, THE HISTORY OF EUROPE: FROM THE PEACE OF PARIS, IN 1763, 
TO THE TREATY CONCLUDED AT AMIENS IN 1802, at 283–84 (1817) (“Condorcet said, ‘Death is the usual 
punishment of conspirators; but, as such a sentence is repugnant to my principles, I never will concur in 
it.’”).  
105 4 ROBERT BISSETT, THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF GEORGE III, at 233 (1811); EDWARD BAINES, 
HISTORY OF THE WARS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 156 (1817). 
106 2 CHARLES ROLLIN, THE ROMAN HISTORY FROM THE FOUNDATION OF ROME TO THE BATTLE OF 
ACTIUM: THAT IS, TO THE END OF THE COMMONWEALTH 406 (1739). 
107 11 T. B. HOWELL, COMP., A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH 
TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783, WITH 
NOTES AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS 755 (1816). 
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up in America’s founding period in the debate over the Constitution itself.108 For 
example, in asserting that the Constitution left states no control of their own militias, 
William Grayson, an Anti-Federalist lawyer from Prince William County, Virginia, 
worried specifically about the infliction of “unusual punishments.”109 George Mason—
the principal drafter of the Virginia Declaration of Rights—also expressed concern about 
“punishments of an unusual nature” in discussing the militia.110 In that debate, no less a 
figure than Patrick Henry—fearful of the proposed U.S. treaty power, and of “Give me 
liberty or give me death!” fame—expressed a specific apprehension about the infliction 
of “unusual punishments.”111 
History, of course, is informative but not determinative of how modern-day judges 
should assess a punishment’s legitimacy. A review of sources published before and 
shortly after the adoption of the U.S. Bill of Rights—a time of revolutions and much 
social and political upheaval—shows the historical context for the Eighth Amendment’s 
origins.112 In such sources, one finds multiple references to “usual punishments”113 and 
                                                 
108 See BESSLER, supra note 7, at 299–306 (discussing references to “unusual punishments” in America’s 
founding period). 
109 Id. at 299. 
110 Id. at 299–300. 
111 Id. at 301; see also 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN SHEFFIELD, EARL OF MULGRAVE, MARQUIS OF NORMANBY, 
AND DUKE OF BUCKINGHAM 151–52 (2d ed. 1729): 
John Kerby a mercer and John Algore a grocer of the city of London, in 
the time of Richard II, had kill’d John Imperial, a publick Minister 
from the State of Genoa; and the Parliament happening to be sitting, 
pass’d an Act 3 Richard II. that they should be attainted of High 
Treason in the King’s Bench; and they were executed accordingly. It 
was said, that all Judges after this were oblig’d to hold for Treason the 
killing any foreign Minister in the same manner, notwithstanding it is 
none of those crimes recited in the Act of 25 Edward III . . . . 
. . . [I]f a Parliament upon an extraordinary occasion, as that of the 
Genoa Embassador, shall in their great prudence inflict any unusual 
punishment; by what colour of reason should that be construed, as if 
they would have all the ordinary Judges hereafter do the same thing, 
without tarrying for their judgment? 
One Parliament’s proceeding is the best sort of precedent for 
another: But that it should be an example for inferiour Courts, is a 
preposterous and dangerous, as if a Schoolmaster should imitate a 
General, and instead of whipping a scholar, should put him to death by 
a general council of school-boys. 
112 The Eighth Amendment’s language was approved and ratified in close proximity to the promulgation of 
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789), a declaration that Thomas Jefferson 
assisted the Marquis de Lafayette—a Revolutionary War hero—in drafting.  WINSTON P. NAGAN, JOHN 
A.C. CARTNER & ROBERT J. MUNRO, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DYNAMIC HUMANISM 121 (2017) (“Jefferson 
collaborated with the Marquis de Lafayette in the first draft of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and of the Citizen. This Declaration adopted by the French National Assembly on August 26, 1789, was a 
descendant of the American Declaration of Independence.”); DAVID EDWIN HARRELL, JR., EDWIN S. 
GAUSTAD, JOHN B. BOLES, SALLY FOREMAN GRIFFITH, RANDALL M. MILLER & RANDALL B. WOODS, 
UNTO A GOOD LAND: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, VOLUME 1: TO 1900, at 218 (2005) (“On 
September 25, 1789, the Senate approved the twelve amendments that the House had agreed to the day 
before. By December 15, 1791, three-fourths of the states . . . had ratified the ten amendments that, 
collectively, are known as the American Bill of Rights.”). Whereas the Eighth Amendment bars “cruel and 
unusual punishments,” Article 8 of the French Declaration protects against penalties that are not 
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their opposite, “unusual punishments.”114 Thus, in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries—prior to the abolition of slavery—one finds multiple references to the “usual 
punishment” inflicted upon slaves.115 In one source, on Roman history, there is a 
reference to what was described as “the usual punishment inflicted on such slaves as 
attempted to run away from their masters”: the marking of slaves on their foreheads “with 
                                                                                                                                                 
“strictement et évidemment nécessaires,” that is, “strictly and obviously necessary.” WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, 
THE DEATH PENALTY AS CRUEL TREATMENT AND TORTURE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CHALLENGED IN THE 
WORLD’S COURTS 26 (1996). 
113 2 MATTHEW POOLE, ED., ANNOTATIONS UPON THE HOLY BIBLE: WHEREIN THE SACRED TEXT IS 
INSERTED, AND VARIOUS READINGS ANNEX’D, TOGETHER WITH THE PARALLEL SCRIPTURES (3d ed. 1696) 
(noting, in Chapter XVI, that “tis’ an usual punishment of Lyars, that they are not believed when they speak 
the truth”); SAMUEL CHANDLER, THE HISTORY OF PERSECUTION, IN FOUR PARTS 261 (1736) (“But the most 
usual Punishment of all, is their wearing Crosses upon their penitential Garments . . . .”); 1 ANTONIO DE 
ULLOA, A VOYAGE TO SOUTH-AMERICA: DESCRIBING AT LARGE THE SPANISH CITIES, TOWNS, PROVINCES, 
&C. ON THAT EXTENSIVE CONTINENT 411 (1758) (noting that “[a]n Indian” in South America for failing to 
go to church on Sundays had, at a priest’s direction, received “some lashes, the usual punishment for such 
delinquents”); R. & J. DODSLEY, EDS., THE ANNUAL REGISTER, OR A VIEW OF THE HISTORY, POLITICKS, 
AND LITERATURE, OF THE YEAR 1759, at 76 (1760) (“Joseph Halfey was tried for the murder of Daniel 
Davidson on the high seas, about 100 leagues from Cape Finisterre, found guilty, and immediately 
sentenced to the usual punishment of such crimes.”); 9 W. SANDS, A. MURRAY & J. COCHRAN, EDS., THE 
SCOTS MAGAZINE: CONTAINING, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE RELIGION, POLITICKS, ENTERTAINMENT, &C. IN 
GREAT BRITAIN 561 (1747) (noting that “in cases where from some extraordinary circumstance the usual 
punishment might be too severe,” it “therefore required a mitigation”); THE NATURAL HISTORY AND 
ANTIQUITIES OF SELBORNE, IN THE COUNTY OF SOUTHHAMPTON 372 (1789) (“[T]he usual punishment is 
fasting on bread and beer.”). 
114 E.g., The Original Meaning of “Unusual”, supra note 24, at 1805, 1809–11 (discussing the concept of 
“unusual punishments” by Patrick Henry in America’s founding era, contending that the use of the word 
“unusual” in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause “was meant to be a check on the federal 
government’s ability to innovate in punishment,” and discussing early American cases, including Barker v. 
People, Commonwealth v. Wyatt, and People v. Potter, where state courts rejected arguments that 
punishments were “unusual”); see also Barker v. People, 20 Johns. 457, 459 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823) (“[T]he 
disfranchisement of a citizen is not an unusual punishment.”); Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 
694, 701 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1828) (“The punishment of offences by stripes in certainly odious, but cannot be 
said to be unusual”; the discretion to impose whipping under the statute was said to be “of the same 
character with the discretion always exercised by Common Law Courts to inflict fine and imprisonment, 
and subject to be restrained by the same considerations.”); People v. Potter, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 235, 245 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846) (“[T]he governor may grant a pardon on a condition which does not subject the 
prisoner to an unusual or cruel punishment. Banishment is neither. It is sanctioned by authority, and has 
been inflicted, in this form, from the foundation of our government.”). 
115 12 T. OSBORNE, A. MILLAR & J. OSBORN, EDS., AN UNIVERSAL HISTORY, FROM THE EARLIEST ACCOUNT 
OF TIME 451 (1747) (“Upon the accusation of a slave, Betucius and Æmilia were condemned to the usual 
punishment.”); THE PRO-SLAVERY ARGUMENT, AS MAINTAINED BY THE MOST DISTINGUISHED WRITERS OF 
THE SOUTHERN STATES: CONTAINING THE SEVERAL ESSAYS, ON THE SUBJECT, OF CHANCELLOR HARPER, 
GOVERNOR HAMMOND, DR. SIMMS, AND PROFESSOR DEW 158 (1853) (“Now, in the time of Christ, it was 
usual for masters to put their slaves to death on the slightest provocation. They even killed and cut them up 
to feed their fishes.”); id. at 136 (“‘The usual punishment for theft is to place the culprit’s head between the 
legs of one of the biggest boys, and each boy in the pit—sometimes there are twenty—inflicts twelve lashes 
on the back and rump with a cat.’”). 
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a red-hot iron.”116 The concepts of “usual” and “unusual” punishments were even used by 
Biblical commentators and playwrights—or at least by their English translators.117 
References to “usual” and “unusual” punishments pre-date the English Bill of 
Rights, with many draconian bodily punishments then in widespread use.118 In a book 
published in 1661, before the Glorious Revolution of 1688, a chapter titled “Of the 
Roman Punishments” speaks of “the usual Punishments exercised” for “City 
Discipline.”119 “Punishments publickly inflicted on malefactors,” Thomas Godwyn wrote 
there, “are either Pecuniary mulcts, or corporal punishments.”120 “The corporal 
punishments,” he emphasized, “were either such as were Capital, depriving a man of his 
life: or Castigatory, such corrections as served for the humbling and reforming of the 
offender, or for the destroying of him.”121 Those sentenced to prison for “notorious 
                                                 
116 13 T. OSBORNE, AN UNIVERSAL HISTORY, FROM THE EARLIEST ACCOUNT OF TIME 356 (1748). 
117 1 TERENCE’S COMEDIES, TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH PROSE, AS NEAR AS THE PROPRIETY OF THE TWO 
LANGUAGES WILL ADMIT 232 (S. Patrick trans., 3d ed. 1767) (showing a scene involving Pythias and 
Parmeno contains this line: “Now he threatens him also with the usual Punishment of Adulterers: a thing I 
never saw in my Life, nor desire to see”); JOHN VANDERKEMP, THE CHRISTIAN ENTIRELY THE PROPERTY OF 
CHRIST, IN LIFE AND DEATH: EXHIBITED IN FIFTY-THREE SERMONS ON THE HEIDELBERGH CATECHISM 96 
(John M. Van Harlingen trans., 1810) (“With regard to Isaiah xxviii. 21, we do not read there, that God’s 
work and act of punishing is strange to God, but only that it is strange: and to whom should it be strange? to 
God? no: but to the transgressors, on whom God would inflict a strange and unusual punishment.”); 1 THE 
WORKS OF PHILO JUDÆUS, THE CONTEMPORARY OF JOSEPHUS 288 (C. D. Yonge trans., 1800) (“[A]ll those 
who voluntarily and of deliberated purposes have rejected the living God, exceeding even the bounds of 
wickedness itself, for what other evil of equal weight can possibly be found? Such men should suffer not 
the usual punishments of evil doers, but something new and extraordinary.”).  
118 There is some evidence—and at least some suggestion—that the provision of the English Bill of Rights 
proscribing “cruel and unusual punishments” was designed to prevent “illegal” punishments, though the 
clause, on its face, does not refer to illegal punishments. See Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination 
Eighth Amendment, 28 HARV.  J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 135 (2004) (noting that Clause 19 of a draft of the 
English Bill of Rights presented to the House of Commons on February 2, 1689, read: “The requiring 
excessive Bail of Persons committed in criminal Cases and imposing excessive Fines, and illegal 
Punishments, to be prevented.”); id. (noting that the final version of the English Bill of Rights recited: 
“And excessive Fines have been imposed; and illegal and cruel punishments inflicted.”); id. at 136: 
In the context of common law punishment for common law crimes, to 
punish illegally was to punish differently for no morally sufficient 
reason. The word unusual “was appropriate to convey the idea that the 
punishments were ‘uncommon’ and ‘exceptional,’ outside what the law 
permitted.” To punish cruelly and unusually was to single out an 
offender on a morally insufficient basis for more punishment than was 
customarily applied. 
119 THOMAS GODWYN, ROMANÆ HISTORIÆ ANTHOLOGIA RECOGNITA ET AUCTA: AN ENGLISH EXPOSITION 
OF THE ROMAN ANTIQUITIE 182 (1661); cf. id. at 203 (“Thus have we generally and briefly touched the 
more usual Punishments. But sometimes wrongs done between party and party, were punished with a 
retaliation of the same kind: according to that, A tooth for a tooth, and an eye for an eye. And this kind of 
punishing was called Talio.”). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 183. Punishments involving the taking of one’s life were “called Ultimum Supplicium.” Id.; cf. id. 
at 185 (“Those punishments that deprived of life in ordinary use, and of which there is most frequent 
mention in Roman Authors, are these which follow: Furca, Crux, Carcer, Culeus, Equuleus, de rupe 
Tarpeia dejectio, Scala, Gemonia, Tunica, Damnatio, in gladium, in ludum, ad bestias.”). A description of 
those punishments is set forth elsewhere in the book. Id. at 186–88. For example, in a chapter about 
“Crux,” it was noted: “Crucifixion hath been a punishment in ancient use among the Romans; it was 
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crimes,” Godwyn relayed, had “shackles and bolts about their legs” to prevent their 
escape, were forced to labor by digging or tilling the ground or grinding with a hand-mill, 
and also had “their foreheads marked or burned with some letters of infamy.”122 
“[P]ublishing the cause” of one’s punishment “either by Inscription, or by the voice of a 
common Crier,” Godwyn added, “was not unusual in . . . capital punishments.”123  
A large number of references to “usual” or “unusual” punishments can also be 
found in relation to English law,124 including in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
                                                                                                                                                 
abrogated by Constantine. It was a death that commonly servants were sentenced unto, seldom times 
freeman . . . .” Id. at 188. Godwyn noted that for floggings, the Romans—“to augment the pains”—“did 
usually in these scourges tye certain huckle-bones, or plummets of Lead at the end of the whip cords, or 
thongs, and such scourges they termed Scorpiones.” Id. at 203. “The cruelty of the scourges,” he wrote, 
“was such, that they many times died under them.” Id.  
122 Id. at 200; cf. id. at 201 (“[T]he punishment which Suetonius speaketh of, is some strange or unusual 
punishment: now seeing that Senators themselves were often exiled, it could not seem strange that Roman 
Knights should be banished into forraign lands; but this was a matter unusual, and unheard of that a Roman 
Knight should be imployed in such drudgeries.”). 
123 Id. at 189. Other pre-1688, English-language sources—that is, those pre-dating the Glorious 
Revolution—also contain the “usual” or “unusual” punishments verbiage. One book, printed in 1678, 
recited that in 1593 a vagabond attempted to kill France’s king. H. C. DAVILA, THE HISTORY OF THE CIVIL 
WARS OF FRANCE 627 (1678). After being “tortured” and sentenced to die, the man was said to have 
“suffered the usual punishments.” Id. 
124 THE STUDENT’S LAW-DICTIONARY; OR COMPLEAT ENGLISH LAW-EXPOSITOR (1740) (showing the entry 
for “Penance,” reads in part as follows: “[I]n the Cases of Adultery, Fornication, &c. for which we are told 
the usual Punishment is, that the Offender stands in the Church Barefoot and Bareheaded, in a White Sheet, 
&c.”); 1 JOSEPH SHAW, THE PRACTICAL JUSTICE OF PEACE, AND PARISH AND WARD-OFFICER: OR, A 
TREATISE SHEWING THE PRESENT POWER AND AUTHORITY OF THESE OFFICERS, IN ALL THE BRANCHES OF 
THEIR DUTY 114 (6th ed. 1756) (showing in a section on “Bastardy” written by a lawyer of the Middle 
Temple, it is recorded that “[t]he usual Punishment for these Offenders, is Pillory, publick Whipping, &c”); 
JOSEPH SHAW, PARISH LAW: OR, A GUIDE TO JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, MINISTERS, CHURCHWARDENS, 
OVERSEERS OF THE POOR, CONSTABLES, SURVEYORS OF THE HIGHWAYS, VESTRY-CLERKS, AND ALL 
OTHERS CONCERN’D IN PARISH BUSINESS 206 (8th ed. 1753) (showing in a paragraph on “Bastards,” it 
notes that “[t]he usual Punishment for these Offenders, is Pillory, publick Whipping, &c”); 50 SYLVANUS 
URBAN, THE GENTLEMAN’S MAGAZINE AND HISTORICAL CHRONICLE 249 (1780) (“[H]e sentenced the 
prisoner to 12 months imprisonment in Newgate, which doubles the usual punishment.”); 1 THOMAS 
CARTE, A GENERAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 689 (1747) (referring to “the usual punishment for the murder 
of laymen”); 3 GEORGE LORD LYTTELTON, THE HISTORY OF THE LIFE OF KING HENRY THE SECOND, AND 
OF THE AGE IN WHICH HE LIVED 210 (1771) (referring to “the usual punishment for the murder of a 
layman”); 1 WILLIAM RUSSELL, LL.D., THE HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE: WITH A VIEW OF THE PROGRESS 
OF SOCIETY FROM THE RISE OF THE MODERN KINGDOMS TO THE PEACE OF PARIS, IN 1763, at 170 (1857) 
(noting of English law: “That the murderers of a clergyman should be tried before the judiciary, in the 
presence of the bishop or his official; and besides the usual punishment for murder, should be subjected to a 
forfeiture of their estates, and a confiscation of their goods and chattels.”); 5 DE RAPIN THOYRAS, THE 
HISTORY OF ENGLAND AS WELL AS ECCLESIASTICAL AS CIVIL 120 (1728) (“[T]he Lord Scroop suffered the 
usual Punishment of Traitors.”); CHARLES BOURNE & VILLIAM ISAAC BLANCHARD, THE TRIAL OF 
LIEUTENANT CHARLES BOURNE, UPON THE PROSECUTION OF SIR JAMES WALLACE, KNT. FOR AN ASSAULT 
144 n.† (1783) (“Mr. Bourne must here observe, that he was tried as a citizen for a breach of the common 
law, as a citizen he was convicted of a common assault upon a fellow citizen, and if the records of the 
courts are to be believed, many matters of equally serious and important consideration have come before 
them, though no such cruel and unusual punishment as that under which he suffers, can be shewn since the 
revolution.”). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY [2018 
 330 
not too distant from the all-important Glorious Revolution of 1688.125 For example, in 
1700, a dictionary of Greek and Roman antiquities—translated from French into 
English—was published in London.126 One entry notes that condemned criminals “were 
exposed to Beasts without any Arms to defend themselves and often they were bound, 
and the People were pleased to see them torn to pieces, and devoured by those hungry 
creatures.”127 “This was the most usual Punishment, which the Pagan Emperors inflicted 
upon the first Christians, whom they ordered to be given to the Beasts,” that dictionary 
reported just over a decade after the adoption of the English Bill of Rights.128 Another 
source, printed in Edinburgh, notes how, in 1594, the Parliament itself—for an attempt on 
Henry IV’s life—condemned a Jesuit, John Chatel, “to the usual punishment due to such 
offenders.”129  
The number of eighteenth-century English sources referring to “usual punishments” 
is substantial.130 Matthew Hale’s treatise, The History of the Pleas of the Crown, 
discusses the “usual punishment” of heretics;131 David Hume’s The History of England 
                                                 
125 SIR RICHARD BAKER, KNIGHT, A CHRONICLE OF THE KINGS OF ENGLAND 490 (1684) (reporting a 
proclamation from 1641 containing the following language: “And if any person were censured to the 
Pillory, or Whipping, it was for known Perjury, the ordinary and usual punishment in such a case . . . .”); 2 
CAPTAIN WILLIAM DAMPIER, VOYAGES AND DESCRIPTIONS IN THREE PARTS 80 (1699) (noting that, in 
Tonquin, “[t]heir punishment in capital crimes is usually beheading”; also containing the following index 
entry: “Stocks, an usual Punishment . . . .”); see also 2 POPERY NOT FOUNDED ON SCRIPTURE: OR, THE 
TEXTS WHICH PAPISTS CITE OUT OF THE BIBLE, FOR THE PROOF OF THE POINTS OF THEIR RELIGION, 
EXAMIN’D, AND SHEW’D TO BE ALLEDG’D WITHOUT GROUND 523 (1689) (printed for Richard Chiswell)  
(referring to “Leprosy, the usual Punishment of Pride”); TRAFANO BOCALINI, I RAGGVAGLI DI PARNASSO: 
OR, ADVERTISEMENTS FROM PARNASSUS: IN TWO CENTURIES: WITH THE POLITICK TOUCHSTONE 156 
(Henry Earl trans., 2d ed. 1669) (“Apollo, who was not well pleased . . . condemned the Literato to the 
usual punishment . . . that none should excuse his error, none should pity him, and that all men should 
laugh at him.”); id. at 160 (“Apollo highly offended at the immensity of such a fault, gave Sentence, That 
the guilty party should undergo the usual punishment for sale of Justice: which was, That he should be 
slayed alive.”); accord TRAFANO BOCALINI, I RAGGVAGLI DI PARNASSO: OR, ADVERTISEMENTS FROM 
PARNASSUS; IN TWO CENTURIES WITH THE POLITICK TOUCHSTONE 181, 186 (Henry Earl trans., 1656) 
(“Apollo . . . condemned the Litterato to the usual punishment of imprudency.”; “Apollo highly offended at 
the immensity of such a fault, gave sentence that the guilty party should undergo the usual punishment for 
sale of Justice.”). 
126 PIERRE DANET, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN ANTIQUITIES (1700). 
127 Id. (unpaginated). 
128 Id. (unpaginated). 
129 ARCHIBALD BRUCE, FREE THOUGHTS ON THE TOLERATION OF POPERY, DEDUCED FROM A REVIEW OF ITS 
PRINCIPLES AND HISTORY, WITH RESPECT TO LIBERTY AND THE INTERESTS OF PRINCES AND NATIONS 113 
(1781). 
130 E.g., 2 PHILIP HORNECK, THE HIGH-GERMAN DOCTOR 86 (1719) (referring to “the usual Punishment 
inflicted”); BARTHOLOMEW LEONARDO DE ARGENSOLA, THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF THE 
MOLUCCO AND PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: CONTAINING, THEIR HISTORY, ANCIENT AND MODERN, NATURAL AND 
POLITICAL 88 (1708) (noting that an “Ensign” was “Strangled, as a Traytor to his King” and that two other 
soldiers were “Bannish’d” and that “Severity to some of the Company” was “shew’d . . . on Account of the 
same Crime, which, it was believ’d, had not been so fully prov’d upon them, as is requisite for inflicting the 
usual Punishment”). 
131 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 384, 388, 709–10 (1778) (stating the 
author says he will consider “[w]hat was the usual punishment of heresy here in England before the time of 
Richard II. and Henry IV.”; “As to the penalty of death, ultimum supplicium: it should seem the antient 
imperial constitutions made a difference between heresies in relation to that punishment: it appears by the 
edict of Theodofius Codice, cap. 4 the Manichees and Donatists were punished with death . . . many other 
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speaks of “the usual punishment for murder”;132 The Works of Samuel Johnson contains a 
reference to “the usual punishment” for felons;133 Oliver Goldsmith’s The History of 
England notes that “the usual punishment” for traitors was for offenders “to be hanged, 
drawn, and quartered”;134 and other sources contain references to either “the usual 
Punishment of Law”135 or “the usual Punishment of the Law.”136 The phrase “usual 
punishments” is also found in Parliamentary debates137 and pertaining to the French 
Revolution.138 
                                                                                                                                                 
heretics were under milder sentences, some were punished with exile, some with extermination from the 
city, some with pecuniary mulcts, and some with confiscation, which, it seems, was the most usual 
punishment”; “And tho by the imperial law some particular heresies were punishable with death yet it does 
not appear, that even in the empire heresy in general was punished capitally, till the constitution of Frederic 
II. about the year 1234, which indistinctly adjudges all heretics to the flames: but in England the usual 
punishment seems to have been imprisonment . . . .”) (citations omitted); see also FRANCIS DOUGLAS, A 
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE EAST COAST OF SCOTLAND, FROM EDINBURGH TO CULLEN 24 (1782): 
By an act of King James the First’s second parliament, it was enacted, 
“that heretics should be punished according to the law of the haly kirk, 
and that the secular power assist.” Beaton having called to his 
assistance a few of the clergy, put this act summarily in execution. It is 
a pity that a law, so repugnant to religion and humanity, should 
reproach the reign of one of the wisest and best of our princes. The act 
is very cautiously worded; it does not mention burning, the usual 
punishment inflicted upon heretics, as the English statute did, but 
simply refers to the law of the holy kirk; perhaps from a presumption, 
that the merciful mother would inflict a milder punishment on her 
children. 
132 1 DAVID HUME, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE INVASION OF JULIUS CAESAR TO THE 
REVOLUTION IN 1688, at 196 (1825). 
133 1 JOHN HAWKINS, THE WORKS OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, LL.D. TOGETHER WITH HIS LIFE, AND NOTES ON 
HIS LIVES OF THE POETS 520 (1787). 
134 1 OLIVER GOLDSMITH, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE DEATH OF 
GEORGE THE SECOND 284 (12th ed. 1823); see also 5 TOBIAS GEORGE SMOLLETT & THOMAS FRANCKLIN, 
EDS., THE WORKS OF M. DE VOLTAIRE: TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH, WITH NOTES, HISTORICAL AND 
CRITICAL 262 (1761) (referring to “the usual punishment for traitors” as being to be “sentenced to be 
hanged” and to have one’s “heart cut out” and “thrown” in one’s “face”). 
135 1 THOMAS SALMON, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE-TRIALS, AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH-
TREASON, AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANOURS; FROM THE REIGN OF KING RICHARD II, TO THE END 
OF THE REIGN OF KING GEORGE I, at 235 (2d ed. 1730) (showing that in a discussion of the Gunpowder 
Plot, one finds this reference: “The Conclusion shall be from the admirable Clemency and Moderation of 
the King, in that howsoever these Traitors have exceeded all others their Predecessors in Mischief . . . ; yet 
neither will the King exceed the usual Punishment of Law, nor invent any new Torture or Torment for 
them; but is graciously pleased to afford them as well an ordinary Course of Trial, as an ordinary 
Punishments, much inferior to their Offence.”); see also id. at 722 (showing that in a section on The Trial 
of Thomas Earl of Strafford, one finds this reference: “And if any Person were censured to the Pillory or 
Whipping, it was for known Perjury, the ordinary and usual Punishment in such a case.”); THE 
GUNPOWDER-TREASON: WITH A DISCOURSE OF THE MANNER OF ITS DISCOVERY 120–21 (1679) (“[Y]et 
neither will the King exceed the usual punishment of Law, nor invent any new torture or torment for 
them.”). 
136 2 GEORGE BUCHANAN, HISTORY OF SCOTLAND 378 (4th ed. 1752). 
137 3 THOMAS C. HANSARD, ED., THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES FROM THE YEAR 1803 TO THE PRESENT 
TIME 858 (1805) (showing in a debate on March 12, 1805, over the “Mutiny Bill,” it is reported: “He did 
not say, that the usual punishments inflicted were more severe than necessary, for which reason, the clause 
he should recommend, would, in its effects, rather serve to strengthen the powers of regimental courts 
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In Great Britain’s Parliament, the prohibition against “cruel and unusual 
punishments” was specifically brought up in discussions of the English Bill of Rights, 
described as “that important statute.”139 For example, in the parliamentary debates for 
April 24, 1809, the Petition of Henry White—reprinted as part of those debates—was 
presented to Parliament by a member of Parliament, a “Mr. Whitbread.” Henry White’s 
petition states in part as follows: 
 
Your Petitioner submits to the consideration of this honourable house, the extreme 
severity of the sentence passed upon him, as being contrary to the rights and 
liberties of every British subject in these realms, guaranteed to them by the Bill of 
Rights, which expressly says, “that excessive fines ought not to be imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted,” your Petitioner having already suffered, 
under a state of severe and dangerous illness, upwards of nine months 
imprisonment and banishment in Dorchester-Gaol, from his home, his business, 
and the Country where he was tried, and which has already subjected him to a 
pecuniary expense of upwards of 500l., and which, unless mitigated by the 
interference of this honourable house, it is more than probable will prove fatal to 
the life of your Petitioner, and ruinous to his circumstances, and future welfare of 
his family.140  
 
Commentators on English law also frequently made use of the “usual” punishments 
terminology. For example, Guy Miège (1644–c.1718), a Swiss writer from Lausanne who 
taught English as a foreign language,141 published a book in 1691 titled The New State of 
England Under Their Majesties K. William and Q. Mary.142 In it, Miège described the 
“the publick Justice administered at four times of the Year in Westminster” and by 
“Twelve Judges,” of the courts known as Assizes, “twice a Year . . . in the Country . . . in 
                                                                                                                                                 
martial.”); 1 THE PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER; OR, AN IMPARTIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES THAT HAVE 
OCCURRED IN THE TWO HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT, IN THE COURSE OF THE SIXTH SESSION OF THE FOURTH 
PARLIAMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND 552 (1812) (showing in a 
February 20, debate over “the Local Militia Bill,” a “Lord A. Hamilton” remarked that the bill provided 
that persons belonging to the local militia would were found guilty of offenses would suffer “the usual 
punishments inflicted in such cases”). 
138 2 JEREMIAH WHITAKER NEWMAN, THE LOUNGER’S COMMON-PLACE BOOK, OR, MISCELLANEOUS 
ANECDOTES: A BIOGRAPHIC, POLITICAL, LITERARY, AND SATIRICAL COMPILATION 113–14 (1796) 
(referencing “the massacres of Paris” and “the severities exercised on her sovereign, her nobles, her priests, 
and her citizens” and that “their numerous executions are in fact no other than the usual punishments 
inflicted, at various times, by all new governments on rebellious subjects”). 
139 14 T. C. HANSARD, ED., THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES FROM THE YEAR 1803 TO THE PRESENT TIME 
605 (1809) (quoting discussions during the debate of May 18, 1809). 
140 Id. at 182. 
141 A. P. R. HOWATT & H. G. WIDDOWSON, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEACHING 57–59 (2d ed. 
2004). 
142 GUY MIÈGE, THE NEW STATE OF ENGLAND UNDER THEIR MAJESTIES K. WILLIAM AND Q. MARY (1691). 
This book was printed “for Jonathan Robinson, at the Golden Lion in St. Paul’s Church-yard.” Id. 
(unpaginated title page). The dedication page of the book reads: “To the Most Honourable Thomas, 
Marquess of Caermarthen, Earl of Danby, Viscount Latimer, Baron Osborn of Kiveton, Lord President of 
His Majesties Most Honourable Privy-Council, And Knight of the most Noble Order of the Garter, This 
New State of England is humbly Dedicated by the Author.” Id. (unpaginated dedication page). 
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the several Counties the King is pleased to appoint them for.”143 Noting that England’s 
judicial system was “divided into Six Parts, called Circuits,”144 Miège wrote in Chapter 
XVI: “My Business is now to speak of the Punishments inflicted here upon Criminals of 
what nature soever.”145 In a chapter titled “Of the Punishments inflicted on Malefactors,” 
he took note of “the Manner of Trying Criminals in England; wherein is to be 
commended our English Humanity towards Prisoners that are upon their Trial.”146 
“Hanging,” Miège emphasized, “is the usual Punishment of Death in England, either for 
High Treason, Petty Treason, or Felony.”147 “As to Persons of great Birth and Quality, 
                                                 
143 Id. at 80–81 (Chapter IX). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 125 (Chapter XVI). 
146 Id. Miège compared the English practice to those of “other Nations,” which, he wrote, “have devised 
such racking Tortures to extort the Confession, as make often the Innocent cry Guilty, and prefer Death to 
the Rack.” Id. In the course of his book, Miège also described how prisoners could demand “the Benefit of 
the Clergy, an ancient Liberty of the Church, which has been confirmed by divers Parliaments.” Id. at 88 
(Chapter IX). As Miège described the process for invoking that ancient right: 
By vertue whereof one in Orders arraigned of Felony by a Secular 
Judge, might pray his Clergy, which was as much as if he prayed to be 
delivered to his Ordinary, to purge himself of the Offence objected. But 
the ancient Course of the Law in this point of Clergy is much altered, 
so that Lay-men have been made capable of this Benefit in many 
Cases; As in Theft of Oxen, Sheep, Mony, and other Things, not 
forcibly taken to the terrour of the Owner. So favourable is our Law, 
that for the first Fault the Felon shall be admitted to his Clergy. In order 
to which the Bishop sends a Clergy-man, with a Commission under his 
Seal, to be Judge in that matter at every Goal-Delivery. If the Prisoner 
demands to be admitted to his Book, the Judge commonly gives him a 
Psalter, and turns to what place he pleases. The Prisoner reads as well 
as he can, and it happens most times but sadly. Then the Judge asketh 
of the Bishops Commissary, Legit ut Clericus? To which the 
Commissary must answer Legit, or Non legit; for these be the formal 
Words, and our Men of Law are the most precise in their Forms. If he 
say Legit, the Judge proceeds no further to Sentence of Death. But, if 
he say Non legit, the Sentence follows either that Day or the next, in 
these Words, Thou A. hast been Indited of such a Felony, and therefore 
Arraigned; Thou hast pleaded Not Guilty, and put they self upon God 
and thy Country; They have found thee Guilty, and Thou hast nothing 
to say for thy Self; The Law is, that Thou shalt return to the Place from 
whence thou camest, and from thence Thou shalt go to the Place of 
Execution, where Thou shalt Hang by the Neck till Thou be dead. 
Whereupon he charges the Sheriff with the Execution. But he that 
claimeth his Clergy in Cases where it is admitted is in the presence of 
the Judges burnt in the brawn of his Hand with a hot Iron, marked with 
the Letter T. for a Thief, or M. for Manslayer. Then he is delivered to 
the Bishops Officer, to be kept in the Bishops Prison; from whence, 
after a certain time, he is delivered by a Jury of Clerks. But, if he be 
taken and found Guilty again, and his Mark discovered, then ’tis his 
Lot to be hanged. 
Id. at 88–90. 
147 Id. at 125 (Chapter XVI). A later edition of Miege’s book said much the same thing. GUY MIEGE, THE 
PRESENT STATE OF GREAT-BRITAIN AND IRELAND, IN THREE PARTS 295 (4th ed. 1718) (“The most usual 
Punishment in England for capital Crimes, is Hanging.”). 
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convicted of High Treason, Petty Treason, or Felony, tho the Judgment be the same with 
that of common Persons,” Miège qualified, “yet by the Kings Favour they are usually 
Beheaded.”148 In other words, a particular method of execution could be a “usual” 
punishment. 
In his popular and widely distributed Commentaries on the Laws of England, Sir 
William Blackstone himself used the phrase “usual punishment” in writing about the 
punishment of “petit treason” committed “by those of the female sex.”149 In another part 
of his Commentaries, Blackstone specifically referenced the bar on “cruel and unusual 
punishments.” In particular, Blackstone saw the prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishments as constraining arbitrary and discretionary power. As to fines and prison 
sentences, Blackstone observed that “the duration and quantity” of such fines or terms of 
incarceration were properly left to judges. “[H]owever unlimited the power of the court 
may seem,” Blackstone emphasized of such judgments, “it is far from being wholly 
arbitrary,” for the judge’s “discretion is regulated by law.” “For the bill of rights has 
particularly declared,” Blackstone wrote, “that excessive fines ought not to be imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”150 
That the English prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments151 was seen as 
a constraint on disproportionate penalties, arbitrary judicial power, and otherwise 
                                                 
148 MIÈGE, supra note 142, at 127 (Chapter XVI); compare id. at 128 (“Burning alive is sometimes used, 
but only for Witches, and Women convicted of High Treason, or Petty Treason.”); id. (“Pressing to Death . 
. . is a Punishment for those only that being Arraigned either of Petty Treason or Felony, refuse to Answer, 
or to put themselves upon the ordinary Trial of God and the Country.”); id. at 129 (“For Petty Larceny, or 
small Theft, that is under the ancient value of 12 d. the Punishment since Edward III. is by Whipping, and 
in the late Reigns has been often by Transportation into the West-Indies, where they live for some Years a 
slavish Life.”); id. at 130 (“Perjury, whereby Mens Estates, Reputation, and Lives ly at stake, is commonly 
punished only with the Pillory; never with Death, though it has cost the Lives of many.”); id. (“Forgery, 
Blasphemy, Cheating, Libelling, False Weights and Measures, Forestalling the Market, Offences in Baking 
and Brewing, are also punished with standing in the Pillory. But sometimes the Offender is Sentenced 
besides to have one or both Ears nailed to the Pillory and cut off, or his Tongue there bored through with a 
hot Iron.”); id. at 131 (“Vagabounds, and the like, who can give no good account of themselves, are 
punished by setting their Legs in the Stocks for certain hours. And Scolding Women (that are always 
teazing their Neighbors) by being set in a Cucking Stool placed over some deep Water and duck’d therein 
three several times, to cool their heat . . . .”); id. (“Other Misdemeanours are commonly punished with 
Imprisonment or Fines, and sometimes with both.”); id. (“Those are the Corporal Punishments commonly 
used in England for Criminals that happen to fall into the hands of Justice.”). 
149 The passage in Blackstone’s Commentaries reads as follows: 
The punishment of petit treason, in a man, is to be drawn and hanged, 
and, in a woman, to be drawn and burned: the idea of which latter 
punishment seems to have been handed down to us from the laws of the 
antient Druids, which condemned a woman to be burned for murdering 
her husband; and it is now the usual punishment for all sorts of treasons 
committed by those of the female sex. 
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 204 (1769).  
150 BESSLER, supra note 7, at 173.  
151 Sometimes the prohibition was expressed as one against “unusual and cruel punishments.” E.g., 30 
THOMAS JONES HOWELL, COMP., A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH 
TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783, WITH 
NOTES AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS 1342 (1822) (“He quoted the declaration of the Bill of Rights against 
excessive bail, and unusual and cruel punishments . . . .”); A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE-TRIALS 
AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH-TREASON, AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANOURS: FROM THE REIGN OF 
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boundless common-law judicial discretion is clear.152 This extended passage, from “Mr. 
Emlyn’s Preface,”153 one originally written in 1730 and reprinted in A Complete 
Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and Other Crimes and 
Misdemeanors from the Earliest Period to the Year 1783 (1816), published in London, 
makes that abundantly apparent: 
 
As to smaller Crimes and Misdemeanors, they are differenced with such a 
variety of extenuating or aggravating circumstances, that the law has not, 
nor indeed could affix to each a certain and determinate Penalty, this is left 
to the discretion and prudence of the Judge, who may punish it either with 
Fine or Imprisonment, Pillory or Whipping, as he shall think the nature of 
the crime deserves; but though he be intrusted with so great power, yet he 
is not at liberty to do as he lists, and inflict what arbitrary punishments he 
pleases; due regard is to be had to quality and degree, to the estate and 
circumstances of the offender, and to the greatness or smallness of the 
offence; that Fine, which would be a mere trifle to one man, may be the 
utter ruin and undoing of another; and those marks of ignominy and 
disgrace, which would be shocking and grievous to a person of a liberal 
education, would be slighted and despised by one of the vulgar sort. A 
Judge therefore who uses this discretionary power to gratify a private 
revenge, or the rage of a party, by inflicting indefinite and perpetual 
Imprisonment, excessive and exorbitant Fines, unusual and cruel 
                                                                                                                                                 
KING GEORGE II, at xi (3d ed. 1742) (referring to “the Illegality of unusual and cruel Punishments”); 
WILLIAM SULLIVAN, SEA LIFE; OR, WHAT MAY OR MAY NOT BE DONE, AND WHAT OUGHT TO BE DONE BY 
SHIP-OWNERS, SHIP-MASTERS, MATES AND SEAMEN 75 (1837) (“Unusual and cruel punishments are 
forbidden; nor could any law of congress make them lawful.”); THE PROCEEDINGS AND SPEECHES, AT THE 
MEETING THE SEVENTEENTH NOVEMBER, 1795, AT ST. ANDREW’S HALL, NORWICH, TO PETITION 
PARLIAMENT AGAINST LORD GRENVILLE’S AND MR. PITT’S TREASON AND SEDITION BILLS 13 (1795) (“The 
10th clause of the Bill of Rights declares, that unusual and cruel punishments shall not be inflicted . . . .”); 
38 THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES FROM THE YEAR 1803 TO THE PRESENT TIME 1128 (1818) (“[T]hough 
the bill declared against all unusual and cruel punishments . . . no provisions were made to carry these 
declarations into effect.”). 
152 E.g., 1 THOMAS JONES HOWELL, COMP., A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS 
FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 
1783, WITH NOTES AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS xxxv (1816). 
153 THOMAS BAYLY HOWELL, ED., COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS, AND 
PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD 
TO THE PRESENT TIME xxii, xxxv (1809) (reprinting “Mr. Emlyn’s Preface to the Second Edition of the 
State Trials, in Six Volumes Folio: Printed in the Year 1730”); FRANCIS HARGRAVE, A COMPLETE 
COLLECTION OF STATE-TRIALS, AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH-TREASON, AND OTHER CRIMES AND 
MISDEMEANOURS xi–xii (4th ed. 1776) (reprinting the preface to the second edition). Sollom Emlyn (1697–
1754) was an Irish legal writer who became a member of Lincoln’s Inn, was the compiler of the six-volume 
second edition of state trials and contributed “a lengthy preface critically surveying the condition of English 
law at the time.” 25 THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA: A DICTIONARY OF ARTS, SCIENCES, LITERATURE 
AND GENERAL INFORMATION 806 (11th ed. 1911); PETER CANE & JOANNE CONAGHAN, ED., THE NEW 
OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 1123 (2008); LOUIS HYMAN, THE JEWS OF IRELAND: FROM EARLIEST TIMES 
TO THE YEAR 1910, at 16 (1972); BASIL MONTAGU, THE OPINIONS OF DIFFERENT AUTHORS UPON THE 
PUNISHMENT OF DEATH ix (1812); Emlyn, Sollom (DNBoo), WIKISOURCE, 
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Emlyn,_Sollom_(DNB00) (last visited Feb. 24, 2018). 
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Punishments, is equally guilty of perverting justice and acting against law, 
as he, who in a case, where the law has ascertained the penalty, willfully 
and knowingly varies from it. If no measures were to be observed in these 
discretionary Punishments, a man who is guilty of a Misdemeanor might 
be in a worse condition than if he had committed a capital crime; he might 
be exposed to an indefinite and perpetual Imprisonment, a punishment not 
at all favoured by law, as being worse than death itself: nor does an 
extravagant Fine, which is beyond the power of the offender ever to pay or 
raise, differ much from it; for if his Imprisonment depend upon a 
condition, which will never be in his power to perform, it is the same as if 
it were absolute and unconditional; if the offender be not able to pay such 
a Fine as his offence deserves, he must then submit to a corporal 
punishment in lieu of it, according to the old Rule, Qui non habet in 
crumena, luat in cute.154 It is true, that Clause of Magna Charta which 
requires the saving every man’s contenement, (viz. his means of 
livelihood)155 extends only to Amerciaments,156 which are ascertained by a 
                                                 
154 This Latin maxim, not defined in the original source, may be unfamiliar to a modern reader but it has 
been translated as follows: “He who has nothing in his purse must pay the penalty with his body.” See 
JAMES A. BALLENTINE, A LAW DICTIONARY OF WORDS, TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND PHRASES WHICH 
ARE PECULIAR TO THE LAW AND OF THOSE WHICH HAVE A PECULIAR MEANING IN THE LAW 410 (1916); 
ALEXANDER M. BURRILL, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY: CONTAINING FULL DEFINITIONS OF 
THE PRINCIPAL TERMS OF THE COMMON AND CIVIL LAW, TOGETHER WITH TRANSLATIONS AND 
EXPLANATIONS OF THE VARIOUS TECHNICAL PHRASES IN DIFFERENT LANGUAGES, OCCURRING IN THE 
ANCIENT AND MODERN REPORTS, AND STANDARD TREATISES; EMBRACING ALSO ALL THE PRINCIPAL 
COMMON AND CIVIL LAW MAXIMS 854 (1850) (defining “Qui non habet in crumena, luat in corpore” as 
“He who has not [the means of satisfaction] in his purse, must pay in his body. If a man cannot pay his fine, 
he must go to prison”). 
155 This doctrine has been explored in a recent law review article. See Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, 
Ability to Pay, and the Original Meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 834, 
835 (2013) (discussing the “largely forgotten principle of English law known as salvo contenemento suo 
(translated as ‘saving his contenement,’ or livelihood),” a principle “[e]nshrined in the Magna Carta” that 
“had become firmly established as a fundamental principle at common law by the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries”); see also RICHARD BURN & JOHN BURN, NEW LAW DICTIONARY: INTENDED FOR 
GENERAL USE AS WELL AS FOR GENTLEMEN OF THE PROFESSION 325 (1792): 
AMERCEMENT is, to be at the king’s mercy with regard to the 
quantum of a fine imposed. By magna charta, c. 14. no man shall have 
a larger amercement imposed upon him than his circumstances or 
personal estate will bear, saving to the landowner his land, to the trader 
his merchandize, and to the husbandman his team and instruments of 
husbandry; in order to ascertain which, the great charter also directs, 
that the amercement, which is always inflicted in general terms, shall 
be set or reduced to a certainty by the oath of a jury. In the court-leet 
and court-baron, this is usually done by affeerors, or jurors sworn to 
affeere; that is, to tax and moderate the general amercement according 
to the particular circumstances of the offence and the offender. In 
limitation of which, in courts superior to these, the ancient practice 
was, to inquire by a jury, when a fine was imposed upon any many, 
how much he was able to pay by the year, saving the maintenance of 
himself, his wife, and children. And since the disuse of such inquest, it 
is never usual to assess a larger fine than a man is able to pay, without 
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Jury, and not to Fines, which are imposed by the Court; but nevertheless 
those Fines ought to be moderate and within bounds; where a court has a 
power of setting Fines, that must be understood of setting reasonable 
Fines: “an excessive Fine,” says lord Coke, “is against law,” and so it is 
declared to be by the Act “for declaring the Rights and Liberties of the 
Subject,” &c. The same Statute declares the Illegality of unusual and cruel 
Punishments.157 
 
That the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments was targeted at 
runaway discretion also showed up in America, including, in one case, almost a century 
after the publication of William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England. On 
May 30, 1864, at a constitutional convention in Maryland, a Mr. Stockbridge proposed 
combining into a single provision Maryland’s separate prohibitions against “cruel and 
unusual pains and penalties” and “cruel or unusual punishments.”158 Saying that the 
proposed change “is one rather of form than of substance,” Mr. Stockbridge offered an 
amendment so that the newly consolidated provision would bar the infliction “in any 
case” of “cruel, unusual or excessive pains, penalties and punishments.”159  In response, a 
Mr. Miller objected, saying that the first prohibition was “a prohibition on the power of 
the Legislature to pass any law inflicting cruel and unusual pains and punishments, and 
penalties” whereas the second prohibition “relates to the administration of justice by the 
Courts of Law.”160 Mr. Miller then argued: 
 
It is well known to gentlemen here, to the gentleman from Baltimore city 
(Mr. Stockbridge) that the common law prevails in this State, in pursuance 
of an article adopted in the bill of rights. Under that common law, the 
Courts, when the party is convicted of any offence, for which no penalty is 
prescribed by statute, have the power, in their discretion, of inflicting 
fines, penalties or imprisonment; and this 24th article is directed against 
undue exercise by the courts of the power they thus have entrusted to them 
by the common law. When the statutes define the penalty and prescribe 
                                                                                                                                                 
touching the implements of his livelihood, but to inflict corporal 
punishment, or a stated imprisonment, which is better than an excessive 
fine, for that amounts to imprisonment for life, and by the bill of rights 
it is particularly declared, that excessive fines ought not to be imposed. 
156 An amercement is “[a] pecuniary penalty imposed upon an offender by a judicial tribunal.” 1 JOHN 
BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION: WITH REFERENCES TO THE CIVIL AND 
OTHER SYSTEMS OF FOREIGN LAW 155 (1892); see also id. (“As distinguished from a fine, at the old law an 
amercement was for a lesser offence, might be imposed by a court not of record, and was for an uncertain 
amount . . . .”). 
157 HOWELL, supra note 152, at xxxv (citations omitted).  
158 1 THE DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND, ASSEMBLED AT 
THE CITY OF ANNAPOLIS, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 27, 1864: BEING A FULL AND COMPLETE REPORT OF THE 
DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION, TOGETHER WITH THE OLD CONSTITUTION, THE LAW 
UNDER WHICH THE CONVENTION ASSEMBLED, AND THE NEW CONSTITUTION 224 (1864). 
159 Id. at 224–25. 
160 Id. at 225. 
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the punishment for any offence, then no Court of Law can exceed it in 
according the punishment for the offence, And the 24th article is designed 
to prevent the Courts of Justice from inflicting unusual and cruel 
punishments in cases where the punishment is left entirely to their 
discretion; and that I think is a good provision. And as these two articles 
relate to different subjects-matter, I think they should continue as separate 
and distinct provisions in the bill of rights. The one prohibiting the 
passage by the Legislature of an act which would warrant a Court of 
Justice in inflicting cruel and unusual pains and penalties, and the other 
providing that, in cases where the common law prevails, no such cruel or 
unusual punishments should be inflicted at the arbitrary will of the Judge, 
or in the mere discretion of the Court.161 
 
The prohibitions against “cruel and unusual pains and penalties” and “cruel or 
unusual punishment” in Maryland’s constitution remained separate. Article XVI of 
Maryland’s 1867 constitution, using language similar to that in Maryland’s 1776 
Declaration of Rights,162 Maryland’s 1851 Declaration of Rights,163 and Maryland’s 1864 
                                                 
161 HOWELL, supra note 152, at xxxv. A Mr. Chambers also objected to Mr. Stockbridge’s proposal, saying 
it would “but save a half-a-dozen words.” Id. “As has been said,” Chambers argued, referencing the earlier 
statement of Mr. Miller of Anne Arundel, “if gentlemen will look to the two articles referred to, they will 
find that they refer to two different departments of the Government, the one being a direction to the 
Legislature, and the other a direction to the Courts themselves.” Id. Mr. Stockbridge, however, declined to 
withdraw his proposed amendment, repeating that he considered it “more a matter of form than substance.” 
Id. Mr. Stockbridge then stated as follows: 
Now the purpose of this bill of rights is to declare the rights of the 
people, and this section means only that they shall be exempt from all 
cruel punishments and excessive bail, and nothing more, and that this 
principle instead of being incorporated in one section is embodied in 
two sections, one restraining the legislative department, and the other 
restraining the judiciary, when they could as well have been embraced 
in one. There would be just as much propriety in adding another section 
to restrain the executive department, and so on for every other officer 
of the government. My object was simply to consolidate these two 
articles, and make one general declaration that the people shall be 
protected against all unusual and cruel pains and penalties. Neither the 
one or the other article amount to much, but as it has been thought best 
to have this principle asserted, for whatever it may be worth, I thought 
it best to have it all in one article. However, I am not strenuous on the 
point. 
Id. After further debate, the question of Mr. Stockbridge’s amendment was taken up by the state convention 
and—as the record reflects—“it was not agreed to.” Id. at 226. 
162 ALFRED S. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 356 (1915) (noting that Article XIV of 
Maryland’s Declaration of Rights (1776) provided: “That sanguinary laws ought to be avoided, as far as is 
consistent with the safety of the State; and no law, to inflict cruel and unusual pains and penalties, ought to 
be made in any case, or at any time hereafter.”). 
163 Id. at 397 (noting that Article XIV of Maryland’s Declaration of Rights (1851) provided: “That 
sanguinary laws ought to be avoided as far as is consistent with the safety of the State; and no law to inflict 
cruel and unusual pains and penalties ought to be made in any case, or at any time hereafter.”). 
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Declaration of Rights,164 declared: “That sanguinary Laws ought to be avoided as far as it 
is consistent with the safety of the State; and no Law to inflict cruel and unusual pains 
and penalties ought to be made in any case, or at any time, hereafter.”165 Meanwhile, 
Article XXV of Maryland’s 1867 constitution, employing language used in Maryland’s 
1776 Declaration of Rights,166 Maryland’s 1851 Declaration of Rights,167 and Maryland’s 
1864 Declaration of Rights,168 provided: “That excessive bail ought not to be required, 
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted by the Courts of 
Law.”169  
 
B. The Customs and Practices of Nations 
 
There was a fascination in earlier times—as is still the case today—with the social 
mores and customs and laws of other nations. Thus, in eighteenth-century sources, 
numerous references can be found to “usual punishments” or “unusual punishments,” 
particularly in relation to the practices of other countries or locales.170 For example, in a 
                                                 
164 Id. at 431 (noting that Article XVI of Maryland’s Declaration of Rights (1864) provided: “That 
sanguinary laws ought to be avoided as far as it is consistent with the safety of the State; and no law to 
inflict cruel and unusual pains and penalties ought to be made in any case or at any time hereafter.”). 
165 Id. at 36, 476 (citing Article XVI of Maryland’s Declaration of Rights (1867)). 
166 Article XXII of Maryland’s Declaration of Rights (1776) provided: “That excessive bail ought not to be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted, by the courts of law.”  
Id. at 357 (citing Article XXII of Maryland’s Declaration of Rights (1776)). 
167 Id. at 398 (noting that Article XXII of Maryland’s Declaration of Rights (1851) provided: “That 
excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment 
inflicted by the courts of law.”). 
168 Id. at 432 (noting that Article XXV of Maryland’s Declaration of Rights (1864) provided: “That 
excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment 
inflicted by the courts of law.”). 
169 Id. at 49, 476 (citing Article XXV of Maryland’s Declaration of Rights (1867)). Alfred Niles, a lecturer 
on constitutional law at the University of Maryland, later reported in his treatise, Maryland Constitutional 
Law (1915), that Article XVI of Maryland’s 1867 constitution “ought properly to be considered in 
connection with the last clause of article XXV,” with—as Niles emphasized—“article XVI forbidding the 
passage of any law inflicting unusual pains and penalties and the last clause of article XXV prohibiting the 
court from inflicting cruel and unusual punishments, even though the law might upon its face be 
unobjectionable.” Id. at 36. 
170 E.g., DANIEL LOMBARD, A SUCCINCT HISTORY OF ANCIENT AND MODERN PERSECUTIONS 123 (1747) 
(referring to “the usual Punishment for high Treason”); 7 ANDREW REID, ED., THE PRESENT STATE OF THE 
REPUBLICK OF LETTERS 299 (1731) (noting that when “Quacks that practice . . . in a fraudulent manner . . . 
are catch’d . . . their usual Punishment is to be forc’d to swallow down all the Aloes, Mercury, and Pills that 
are found in their Houses, &c.”); THE NEW ANNUAL REGISTER, OR GENERAL REPOSITORY OF HISTORY, 
POLITICS, AND LITERATURE, FOR THE YEAR 1788, at 156 (1789) (“In the Visitatio Notabilis the usual 
punishment is fasting on bread and beer; and in cases of repeated delinquency, on bread and water.”); THE 
WORKS OF PETRONIUS ARBITER, TRANSLATED BY SEVERAL HANDS 174 (4th ed. 1714) (writing of a soldier 
“dreading the usual Punishment”); JOHN HOWIE, BIOGRAPHIA SCOTICANA: OR, A BRIEF HISTORICAL 
ACCOUNT OF THE LIVES, CHARACTERS, AND MEMORABLE TRANSACTIONS OF THE MOST EMINENT SCOTS 
WORTHIES 490 (2d ed. 1781) (noting that a woman “was burnt at Craigfergus; the usual punishment of 
malefactors in that country”); JOHN PENNINGTON MUNCASTER, HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF THE SLAVE 
TRADE, AND ITS EFFECTS IN AFRICA: ADDRESSED TO THE PEOPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN 59 (1792) (discussing 
that after a writer referenced that a man, “having lain with one of his Majesty’s wives,” was sentenced by 
“the King of Dogo or Hindo” to be banished and to have his ears cut off, it was reported that “this was an 
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section on the “Oriental Islands,” a 1751 history of the nations of the world noted: “One 
of their usual Punishments is to strip the Criminal, bind him Hand and Foot, and tie him 
to a Post, and expose his Face to the Sun from Morning to Night, when the Musketoes or 
Gnats almost cover his Body, and sting him unmercifully, and he is perfectly blistered by 
the Sun’s scorching Heat.”171 “[S]ometimes,” that source reported, “they lay him flat on 
his Back on the hot Sands, while he is almost devoured by the Musketoes.”172 The idea of 
usual punishments thus reflected those punishments either commonly or traditionally 
inflicted in particular places. 
The writer’s viewpoint—or perception of a place’s history—could determine the 
usage of the “usual” or “unusual” terminology. In discussing Roman history, a subject of 
great fascination, writers frequently discussed the “usual punishment” of slaves173 and 
offenders,174 including of vestal virgins who violated their vows of chastity.175 “The 
breaking of the legs of slaves,” one book noted, “was not an unusual punishment among 
the Romans; which was done by laying the legs on an anvil, and breaking them in two 
with hammers.”176 The authors of an earlier book, in discussing “an ancient Roman” who 
learned a “freed-man” had kissed his “marriageable” daughter, reported: “We are not told 
whether or not he contended himself with the usual punishment inflicted for a kiss”—
“which was whipping.”177 Twelve men, “each carrying a bundle of rods bound together 
                                                                                                                                                 
unusual punishment inflicted on him, and made him be scorned and laughed at by all who saw him”); 1 
JOHN LYON, THE HISTORY OF THE TOWN AND PORT OF DOVER, AND OF DOVER CASTLE; WITH A SHORT 
ACCOUNT OF THE CINQUE PORTS 317 (1813) (“The pilots in the Isle of Thanet were to keep to their own 
bays, and the North Foreland. The usual punishments were inflicted for their disobedience.”); 5 THE 
WORKS OF NATHANIEL LARDNER, D.D. 261 (1815) (“The usual punishments among the Jews were 
strangling and stoning . . . .”). 
171 A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE SEVERAL NATIONS OF THE WORLD, FROM THE FLOOD, TO THE PRESENT 
TIMES 401 (1751) (printed in London for D. Browne, J. Shuckburgh, and W. Johnston). 
172 Id. 
173 LE FÈVRE DE MORSAN, THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE ROMANS 109 (1740) (“The usual 
punishment of slaves was the whip . . . .”); cf. JEAN LOUIS DE LOLME, MEMORIALS OF HUMAN 
SUPERSTITION 51 (2d ed. 1784) (“It is not to be doubted, that flagellations had been invented, and were 
become, in early times, a common method of punishment in the Pagan world. Even before the foundation 
of Rome, we meet with instances which prove that it was the usual punishment inflicted on Slaves.”). 
174 2 WILLIAM GUTHRIE, TRANS., THE ORATIONS OF CICERO 16 n.b (1758) (“[W]e must here observe, that a 
Sentence of Banishment was seldom or never pronounced against any Roman; there being no Law which 
punished any Crime with Exile. The usual Punishment was a pecuniary Mulct; they were condemned to pay 
a Sum of Money, in Proportion to the Greatness of their Crime.”). 
175 CHARLES ROLLIN, THE ROMAN HISTORY FROM THE FOUNDATION OF ROME TO THE BATTLE OF ACTIUM: 
THAT IS, TO THE END OF THE COMMONWEALTH 355 (1739) (“The Vestal Oppia was convicted of having 
broken her vow of chastity, and suffered the usual punishment.”); TITUS LIVIUS’S ROMAN HISTORY, 
TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH, AND ILLUSTRATED WITH NOTES, CRITICAL, HISTORICAL, AND GEOGRAPHICAL: 
FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS IN HUMANITY 168 (William Gordon trans., 1783) (“[T]he vestal Opia being 
convicted of incontinence, was condemned, and suffered the usual punishment.”); 1 OLIVER GOLDSMITH, 
THE ROMAN HISTORY FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE CITY OF ROME, TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE 
WESTERN EMPIRE 3 (1789) (“The mother was condemned to be buried alive, the usual punishment for 
vestals who had violated their chastity, and the twins were ordered to be flung into the river Tyber.”). 
176 2 JOHANN JAKOB RAMBACH, MEDITATIONS AND CONTEMPLATIONS ON THE SUFFERINGS OF OUR LORD 
AND SAVIOUR JESUS CHRIST; IN WHICH THE HISTORY OF THE PASSION, AS GIVEN BY THE FOUR 
EVANGELISTS, IS CONNECTED, HARMONISED, & EXPLAINED 343 (1811). 
177 8 A GENERAL DICTIONARY, HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL: IN WHICH A NEW AND ACCURATE 
TRANSLATION OF THAT OF THE CELEBRATED MR. BAYLE, WITH THE CORRECTIONS AND OBSERVATIONS 
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with a leathern throng, in the midst of which was an ax,” a 1740 book detailing Roman 
customs reported, “served” the Roman king “in the double capacity of guards and officers 
to execute justice and his commands; whether it were to cut off an head, or whip a 
criminal; which were the usual punishments amongst the Romans.”178 In another source, 
from 1680, there is a reference to “some strange or unusual punishment,”179 suggesting a 
punishment that was, in the eye of the beholder, out of the ordinary. 
Turkish practices, like Roman traditions, also drew considerable attention. As 
Thomas Salmon’s Modern History reported: “The usual punishments appropriated to 
crimes in Turkey are as follow, viz. A murderer is beheaded, a thief strangled, an apostate 
burnt, a traytor is dragged at a horse’s tail, and afterwards impaled; and if one maims or 
wounds another, the like punishment is inflicted on the offender: an eye for an eye, a limb 
for a limb, according to the Jewish law.” “[T]he usual punishment in Turkey,” Salmon 
said elsewhere, “is the salack; where the offender being obliged to sit down on the 
ground, and having his legs held up, receives a certain number of blows upon the soles of 
his feet with a little rattan or cane of the bigness of a man’s finger.”180 “The most usual 
punishments in Turkey for capital offences,” one memoir concluded, revealing the 
context in which the usual terminology was used, “are beheading, drowning, hanging, 
strangling, burning, impaling, and the strappadoe; the two last as the most cruel, and are 
appointed only for Turks who renounce the Mahometan faith, or renegadoes who return 
to the Christian religion.”181 “The usual punishments for slight offences,” wrote another 
historian, “are whipping, or public labour for a length of time proportioned to the nature 
of the crime.”182 
The “usual” or “unusual” references are found in countless descriptions of many 
other places or legal systems, too, including Algiers,183 Carthage,184 Ceylone,185 China,186 
                                                                                                                                                 
PRINTED IN THE LATE EDITION AT PARIS, IS INCLUDED 588 (John Peter Bernard, Thomas Birch & John 
Lockman, eds., 1739). 
178 LE FÈVRE DE MORSAN, THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE ROMANS 129 (1740). 
179 THOMAS GODWYN, ROMANÆ HISTORIÆ ANTHOLOGIA RECOGNITA ET AUCTA: AN ENGLISH EXPOSITION 
OF THE ROMAN ANTIQUITIES 201 (1680). 
180 1 THOMAS SALMON, MODERN HISTORY: OR, THE PRESENT STATE OF ALL NATIONS 441–42 (3d ed. 
1744); see also JOSEPH RANDALL, A SYSTEM OF GEOGRAPHY; OR, A DISSERTATION ON THE CREATION AND 
VARIOUS PHÆNOMENA OF THE TERRAQUEOUS GLOBE 316 (1744): 
The usual Punishment appropriated to Crimes are as follow: viz. A 
Murderer is beheaded; a Thief strangled; an Apostate burnt; a Traitor is 
dragg’d at a Horse’s Tail, and afterwards impaled; and, if any one 
maims or wounds another, the like Punishment is inflicted on the 
Offender, an Eye for an Eye, a Limb for a Limb, according to the 
Jewish Law. For Perjury they are set upon an Ass, with their Faces 
towards the Tail, which the Criminal holds in his Hand, and thus they 
are led through the City, and afterwards burnt in the Cheek. 
181 MEMOIRS OF PETER HENRY BRUCE, ESQ.: A MILITARY OFFICER, IN THE SERVICES OF PRUSSIA, RUSSIA, 
AND GREAT BRITAIN 64 (1782) (printed for the author’s widow).  
182 THOMAS THORNTON, THE PRESENT STATE OF TURKEY; OR A DESCRIPTION OF THE POLITICAL, CIVIL, AND 
RELIGIOUS CONSTITUTION, GOVERNMENT, AND LAWS, OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 415–16 (1807) (“[I]n 
instances of greater enormities the guilty person is punished with the loss of his ears, and is sentenced to 
work in the salt mines for the remainder of his life”; “[t]he punishment of death, though not wholly 
abolished, is rarely inflicted.”). 
183 1 NEW MEMOIRS OF LITERATURE, CONTAINING AN ACCOUNT OF NEW BOOKS PRINTED BOTH AT HOME 
AND ABROAD 129 (1725) (printed in London for William and John Innys) (“Burning is the usual 
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Egypt,187 France,188 Germany,189 Greece,190 India,191 Ireland,192 Japan,193 Java,194 
Persia,195 Siam,196 Sumatra,197 Sweden,198 and the West Indies.199 A translation of 
                                                                                                                                                 
punishment of the Jews, when they are condemned to death, to make a difference between them, and the 
Turks, Moors and Christians.”).  
184 1 CHARLES ROLLINS, THE ANCIENT HISTORY OF THE EGYPTIANS, CARTHAGINIANS, ASSYRIANS, 
BABYLONIANS, MEDES AND PERSIANS, MACEDONIANS, AND GRECIANS 190 (5th ed. 1768) (“[A]fter having 
been long tormented by being kept for ever awake in this dreadful torture, his merciless enemies nailed him 
to a cross, their usual punishment, and left him to expire on it.”); 1 JACOB ROBINSON, THE HISTORY OF THE 
WORKS OF THE LEARNED, FOR THE YEAR ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED AND FORTY 152 (1740) 
(reciting that a man was “nailed” to “a Cross,” with the history saying that, for “the Carthaginians,” that 
was the “usual Punishment among them”). 
185 SALMON, supra note 180, at 300 (“[T]he most usual way of punishing those that are intended to be 
restored, is by banishing them to some distant village, where they remain confined till they are made 
sensible of their faults; and sometimes they are forgotten, and it proves an imprisonment for life.”). 
186 2 THOMAS OSBORNE, A COLLECTION OF VOYAGES AND TRAVELS 72 (1745) (“If the Chineze are very 
liberal in their rewards, they are as severe in the punishments, even of the slightest faults; their punishments 
are adequate to their demerits. The usual punishment is the bastinado on the back. When they receive but 
forty or fifty blows, they call this a fatherly correction . . . .”); EUSEBIUS RENAUDOT, ANCIENT ACCOUNTS 
OF INDIA AND CHINA, BY TWO MOHAMMEDAN TRAVELLERS (1733) (noting the unpaginated index entry for 
“Bambooing” describes it as “the usual Punishment inflicted in China”). 
187 JEAN DE THÉVENOT, TRAVELS INTO THE LEVANT 259 (1687) (“The usual Punishments in Ægypt are 
Beheading, which they dexterously perform . . . . Impaling is also a very ordinary Punishment with them . . 
. .”). 
188 4 STEPHEN ABEL LAVAL, A COMPENDIOUS HISTORY OF THE REFORMATION, AND OF THE REFORMED 
CHURCHES IN FRANCE 168 (2018) (“He was condemned to the usual Punishment inflicted upon such 
Traitors.”). 
189 3 JOHN STEPHEN PÜTTER, AN HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF 
THE GERMANIC EMPIRE 303 (1790) (“The usual punishment in Germany for capital offenses is beheading 
with a broad sword. The criminal is obliged to kneel, and the executioner seldom fails to perform his office 
with a single blow.”). 
190 5 SAMUEL PARKER, BIBLIOTHECA BIBLICA: BEING A COMMENTARY UPON ALL THE BOOKS OF THE OLD 
AND NEW TESTAMENT (1735) (showing unpaginated index entry for “Adultery” describes “Stoning to 
Death” as “the usual Punishment” for adultery “among the primitive Greeks”); id. at 575 (containing a 
reference to “the most usual Punishments inflicted on Slaves”). 
191 THE SENATOR: OR, CLARENDON’S PARLIAMENTARY CHRONICLE: CONTAINING AN IMPARTIAL REGISTER; 
RECORDING, WITH THE UTMOST ACCURACY, THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE HOUSES OF LORDS 
AND COMMONS, BEING THE FIFTH SESSION IN THE SEVENTEENTH PARLIAMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN, HELD IN 
THE YEAR 1795, at 691 (1795) (“His Lordship said, the history, as far as he had seen, proved that fine and 
confinement were the usual punishments imposed by absolute Princes in India on their dependents for 
disobedience and contumacy.”). 
192 3 JOHN PINKERTON, ED., A GENERAL COLLECTION OF THE BEST AND MOST INTERESTING VOYAGES AND 
TRAVELS IN ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD 819 (1809) (“One of their usual punishments (and by no means the 
most severe) was taking people out of their beds, carrying them naked in winter on horse-back for some 
distance, and burying them up to their chin in a hole filled with briars, not forgetting to cut off their ears.”); 
accord 49 TOBIAS GEORGE SMOLLETT, ED., THE CRITICAL REVIEW: OR, ANNALS OF LITERATURE 108 
(1780) (containing the same language). 
193 SALMON, supra note 180, at 45 (“Their usual punishments for great offences are burning, crucifying 
with the head downwards, tearing them to pieces with horses, and boiling them in oil; and where an 
offender refuses to come in and submit, he is ordered to be cut in pieces wherever he is found. A gentleman 
or soldier convicted of any capital crime, has the favour of dying by his own hands; and it is reckoned very 
ignominious if he waits for the executioner to dispatch him in that case.”). 
194 2 THOMAS STAMFORD RAFFLES, THE HISTORY OF JAVA ccxxxvii (1830) (showing Appendix K contains 
the following sentence: “The usual punishments are death, confinement, and servitude.”). 
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Plutarch’s Lives makes a reference to “the usual punishment,”200 with another book—on 
royal genealogies—referencing “the usual Punishment of Sacrilege.”201 Another history, 
                                                                                                                                                 
195 SALMON, supra note 180, at 56, 191, 348, 352, 441–42 (reciting that in Persia “[t]he usual punishment is 
a fine, which always goes to the King, or rather to the Governor of the province,” but that “the usual 
punishment for capital offences” is that “the criminal’s feet are tied to a camel, and his head hanging down 
to the ground, his belly is ripped open, so that all his bowels come out and hang over his head” with his 
body “dragged in this manner through the principal streets of the town, an officer marching before him”; 
also discussing, as to Persia, “the usual punishment of women who have committed capital crimes” and 
“the usual punishment” of bakers “for cheating in their weights, and raising provisions to an extravagant 
price”); JEAN DE THÉVENOT, TRAVELS INTO THE LEVANT 106–07 (1687) (“The usual punishments they 
inflict upon Malefactors whom they would not put to death, is to pluck out their Eyes; or else to pierce the 
Nerves of their Ankles, and then hanging them up by the feet, to give them a certain number of blows with 
a Cudgel, and sometimes also to cut the Nerves short off. When they condemn any to death, the most usual 
punishment is to rip open the Belly.”). 
196 7 S. RICHARDSON, T. OSBORNE, C. HITCH, A. MILLAR, JOHN RIVINGTON, S. CROWDER, P. DAVEY, B. 
LAW, T. LONGMAN & C. WARE, EDS., THE MODERN PART OF AN UNIVERSAL HISTORY, FROM THE EARLIEST 
ACCOUNT OF TIME 266 (1759) (noting that in the Kingdom of Siam “[t]he usual punishment for robbery is 
to pay double, and sometimes treble, the value of the goods stolen”); ARCHIBALD BOWER, ED., HISTORIA 
LITTERARIA: OR, AN EXACT AND EARLY ACCOUNT OF THE MOST VALUABLE BOOKS PUBLISHED IN THE 
SEVERAL PARTS OF EUROPE 393 (1731) (“They punish very severely the smallest Faults: as for instance, if 
one talks too little they slit his Mouth to his Ears; if too much, they sow it quite up. The usual Punishments 
for other such minute Offences are to pluck out the Delinquent’s Teeth, burn his Arms with a red-hot Iron, 
drive in sharp-pointed Reeds to the Roots of his Nails, &c.”). 
197 JONATHAN CARVER, THE NEW UNIVERSAL TRAVELLER: CONTAINING A FULL AND DISTINCT ACCOUNT 
OF ALL THE EMPIRES, KINGDOMS, AND STATES, IN THE KNOWN WORLD 41 (1779) (“For murder and 
adultery, the usual punishment is death, which is not inflicted by a professed executioner, but jointly by 
every person who happens to be within reach of the criminal; and the common weapon is a crice or 
dagger.”). 
198 2 JEDIDIAH MORSE, THE AMERICAN UNIVERSAL GEOGRAPHY; OR A VIEW OF THE PRESENT STATE OF 
ALL THE KINGDOMS, STATES, AND COLONIES IN THE KNOWN WORLD 173 (6th ed. 1812) (“The penal laws 
are mild. Whipping and confinement are the usual punishments.”); 2 AUBRY DE LA MOTRAYE, A. DE LA 
MOTRAYE’S TRAVEL’S THROUGH EUROPE, ASIA, AND INTO PART OF AFRICA 361 (1723) (discussing 
beheading and the work of an executioner, the author wrote: “Note, this is the most usual Punishment in 
Sweden; where, for one that is hang’d, a hundred lose their Heads. Amongst others, I have seen him behead 
a Husband who had left his Wife, and a Wife who had left her Husband . . . .”). 
199 3 THE WEEKLY ENTERTAINER; OR AGREEABLE AND INSTRUCTIVE REPOSITORY; CONTAINING A 
COLLECTION OF SELECT PIECES, BOTH IN PROSE AND VERSE; CURIOUS ANECDOTES, INSTRUCTIVE TALES, 
AND INGENIOUS ESSAYS ON DIFFERENT SUBJECTS 185 (1784) (describing “the usual punishment” in the 
West Indies—that is, for the offender to be “whipped on an ass”—for a violation of the law of “the 
governor or viceroy” that “no Indian should be employed in carrying the baggage of Europeans”); HOUSE 
OF COMMONS (GREAT BRITAIN), ABRIDGMENT OF THE MINUTES OF THE EVIDENCE, TAKEN BEFORE A 
COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE HOUSE, TO WHOM IT WAS REFERRED TO CONSIDER OF THE SLAVE-TRADE 106 
(1789) (“The usual punishments of plantation-slaves according to the nature of their crimes; of a runaway, 
it is exceedingly severe; four negroes to take hold of each arm and leg, and lay him on the ground, when the 
chief whipper lays upon their bare back 40, 50, 60, or more lashes, just at the pleasure of the owner or 
overseer.”). 
200 3 PLUTARCH’S LIVES, TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL GREEK, WITH NOTES CRITICAL AND 
HISTORICAL, AND A LIFE OF PLUTARCH 322 (John Langhorne & William Langhorne, trans., 1801) 
(“Lucullus, at his return, inflicted on the fugitives the usual punishment. He made them strip to their vests, 
take off their girdles, and then dig a trench twelve feet long; the rest of the troops all the while standing and 
looking on.”). 
201 JAMES ANDERSON, ROYAL GENEALOGIES: OR, THE GENEALOGICAL TABLES OF EMPERORS, KINGS AND 
PRINCES, FROM ADAM TO THESE TIMES 61 (1732). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY [2018 
 344 
published in 1726, also tellingly emphasized that “the usual Punishment of Heretics, 
according to the Sentence and Decrees” of “ancient Councils” was for offenders to be 
“divested both of the Name and Office of Priests.”202  
References to “usual” or “unusual” punishments are thus ubiquitous in Anglo-
American sources, with those words used in both legal and non-legal sources. In an 
English dictionary published in Edinburgh in 1816, one finds a reference to “usual 
punishments” in the entry titled “PUNISHMENT, CAPITAL.”203 That entry reads: “Every 
mode of taking away life, which the ingenuity of torture could devise, have been used in 
different cases. We decline the horrid and unnecessary detail. Hanging and beheading are 
the usual punishments of civilized nations.”204 That source suggests that whereas hanging 
and beheading were the usual punishments in civilized countries, unusual punishments 
were, presumably, the ones involving the use of torture.205 In another book, The History 
of the Life and Reign of Alexander the Great, Chapter IV begins with the following 
“friendly remonstrance” received by Alexander: “How long, sir, will you gratify your 
anger, by executions conducted in a foreign manner? Your own soldiers, your fellow-
citizens, without being allowed to plead, are hauled to punishment by their captives. If 
you deem us to merit death, at least change our executioners.” “[B]ut,” the history 
reported, “his rage had proceeded to madness” and he thus “ordered those who had 
charge of the prisoners . . . to plunge them into the river, chained as they were.” The 
history noted: “Nor did this unusual punishment raise a second mutiny . . . .”206 
 
C. Bodily Punishments and the “Usual” and “Unusual” Terminology: From 
Corporal Punishments to Methods of Execution 
 
Many of the “usual” or “unusual” punishment references in texts from past 
centuries are to bodily or corporal punishments.207 An early nineteenth-century treatise on 
                                                 
202 2 THE WORKS OF THE LEARNED JOSEPH BINGHAM, M.A.: LATE RECTOR OF HAVANT, AND SOMETIME 
FELLOW OF UNIVERSITY-COLLEGE IN OXFORD 628 (1726). 
203 18 ENCYCLOPÆDIA PERTHENSIS; OR UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY OF THE ARTS, SCIENCES, LITERATURE, 
&C., at 481 (2d ed. 1816).  
204 Id. That dictionary also defines “PRIVILEGE” as follows: “in law, some peculiar benefit granted to 
certain persons or places contrary to the usual course of the law.” Id. at 331. 
205 Of course, early conceptions of torture were much different than modern ones. See, e.g., MICHAEL PEEL 
& VINCENT IACOPINO, EDS., THE MEDICAL DOCUMENTATION OF TORTURE 3–4 (2002): 
The early history and evolution of torture—from Greek and Roman 
times to the 20th century—is well examined by Peters and Ruthven, 
among other authors. The key understanding of torture during the 
greater part of this period is that it was a part of the legal process, 
embodied in written laws and procedures and not regarded by states 
with any shame. It was viewed as a legitimate tool of investigation. 
This contrasts dramatically with the contemporary practice of torture 
where denial of any illegal acts of torture is routine; at most it may be 
explained away as the practice of ‘rogue elements’ in the police or 
security forces.  
206 2 QUINTUS CURTIUS RUFUS, THE HISTORY OF THE LIFE AND REIGN OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT 393 
(1809) (emphasis added). 
207 E.g., PLAUTUS’S COMEDIES, AMPHITRYON, EPIDICUS, AND RUDENS, MADE ENGLISH: WITH CRITICAL 
REMARKS UPON EACH PLAY 128 (1694) (referencing “Rods being the most usual Punishment for Slaves”). 
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the law of evidence, written by an English barrister, refers to “standing in the pillory” and 
“branding” as “being the usual punishments for the crimen falsi.”208 In one English 
dictionary published in 1706, the entry for “Gantlop, or Gantlope” reads: “as to run the 
Gantlope, an usual Punishment among Soldiers, the Offender being to run with his Back 
naked thro’ the whole Regiment or Company, and to receive a Lash with a Switch from 
every Soldier: It is deriv’d from Gant, a Town of Flanders, where this Punishment was 
invented, and the Dutch Word Lope, i.e., Running.”209 Other sources make reference to 
the “usual Punishment” of whipping inflicted upon thieves210 and the “unusual 
punishment” of manslaughter, that is, being burned in the hand.211  
References to “usual” and “unusual” punishments were also routinely used to 
describe methods of execution, including for acts of treason.212 In one source printed in 
London in 1674, just a few years before the adoption of the English Bill of Rights, the 
following passage appears: 
 
                                                 
208 SAMUEL MARCH PHILLIPPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 23 (2d ed. 1815); see also HENRY 
CAMPBELL BLACK, A LAW DICTIONARY CONTAINING DEFINITIONS OF THE TERMS AND PHRASES OF 
AMERICAN AND ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE, ANCIENT AND MODERN AND INCLUDING THE PRINCIPAL TERMS 
OF INTERNATIONAL, CONSTITUTIONAL, ECCLESIASTICAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW, AND MEDICAL 
JURISPRUDENCE, WITH A COLLECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS, NUMEROUS SELECT TITLES FROM THE ROMAN, 
MODERN CIVIL, SCOTCH, FRENCH, SPANISH, AND MEXICAN LAW, AND OTHER FOREIGN SYSTEMS, AND A 
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS 300 (2d ed. 1910) (“‘Infamous,’ as used in the fifth amendment to the United 
States constitution, in reference to crimes, includes those only of the class called ‘crimen falsi,’ which both 
involve the charge of falsehood, and may also injuriously affect the public administration of justice by 
introducing falsehood and fraud.”). 
209 EDWARD PHILLIPS, COMP., THE NEW WORLD OF WORDS: OR UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (6th ed. 
1706) (unpaginated); see also 2 BULSTRODE WHITLOCKE, A JOURNAL OF THE SWEDISH AMBASSY, IN THE 
YEARS M.DC.LIII. AND M.DC.LIV. FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, AND IRELAND 
18 (1772) (“Presently after this execution was past, two other offenders, for smaller crimes, were brought to 
the same place to suffer the punishment of the law, which they call running the gauntlet; a usuall 
punishment among soldiers.”); ABEL BOYER, THE ROYAL DICTIONARY, FRENCH AND ENGLISH AND 
ENGLISH AND FRENCH 311 (1768) (listing “Gantlop,” or “Gantlope,” as “an usual punishment among 
soldiers”); NATHAN BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1731) (showing the 
combined, unpaginated entry for “Gantlet” and “Gauntlet” references “an Iron Glove” and the next 
combined entry for “Gantlope” and “Gantlop” reads:  “[of Gant, a Town in Flanders, and Loop, a Race, or 
loopen, to run, Belg., because this Punishment was first invented there] an usual Punishment among 
Soldiers.”). 
210 HENRI MISSON, MEMOIRS AND OBSERVATIONS IN HIS TRAVELS OVER ENGLAND 359 (Mr. Ozell trans., 
1719) (“To be whipp’d thro’ the Streets by the Hands of the Hangman, is the usual Punishment inflicted 
upon those that have stolen any Thing under the ancient Value of Twelve-Pence. Oftentimes this 
Punishment is commuted for that of being transported into some of the Plantations in the Indies, upon 
Account of the great Want those new Countries are in of People.”). 
211 1 THE COUNTY MAGAZINE, FOR THE YEARS 1786 AND 1787; PARTICULARLY DEDICATED TO THE 
INHABITANTS OF BERKSHIRE, DORSETSHIRE, HAMPSHIRE, SOMERSETSHIRE, AND WILTSHIRE 80 (1788) 
(referring to “the usual punishment inflicted on persons convicted of manslaughter, that of being burnt in 
the hand”). 
212 2 HENRY DAGGE, CONSIDERATIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW 23 (2d ed. 1774) (“[T]he usual punishment for 
Treason consists only of cutting the body of the criminal into several pieces, ripping up his belly, taking out 
his entrails, and then throwing his carcass into a river or ditch, and this is commonly done to great 
malefactors.”). 
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[F]or Parricides the old Romans had a strange and unusual punishment, in culeum 
dejicere, to put them alive into a great leather Sack, made of an Ox-Hide, with a 
live Dog, a Cock, a Viper, and an Ape, at first it was with Serpents, (after the 
murtherers of Parents had been made bloudy with scourging) then sewed up 
close, and cast into Tiber, or the next River, that whiles alive they might begin to 
want the use of all the Elements, not having the benefit of the Heavens while they 
liv’d, nor the burial of the Earth when dead. This shews how odious this crime 
was in the height of it to meer Heathen men also.213 
 
A history published in 1744 also recites that in Tonquin—an Asian locale 
colonized by the Chinese214—“[b]eheading is the usual punishment for murder and other 
capital crimes, and this is usually performed before the offender’s own door.”215 It also 
notes that in the Sunda Islands “the usual punishment for capital crimes” was revealed by 
the finding of “carcasses of malefactors fixed to crosses.”216 The cultural context—and, 
again, the writer’s own perspective or judgment—thus could be determinative of whether 
a punishment was classified as “unusual” or “usual.” 
In early American cases, the death penalty, imprisonment and fines were each 
categorized at various points in history as a “usual punishment” for particular acts of 
criminality in specific locales.217 For example in the late 1800s, in State v. Warner,218 the 
Supreme Court of Kansas wrote of all three punishments, emphasizing, in the course of 
its opinion, the necessary procedural protections for capital punishment:  
 
                                                 
213 SAMUEL ANNESLEY, A SUPPLEMENT TO THE MORNING-EXERCISE AT CRIPPLE-GATE: OR, SEVERAL MORE 
CASES OF CONSCIENCE PRACTICALLY RESOLVED BY SUNDRY MINISTERS 337 (1674) (quoting from Sermon 
17: “What are the Duties of Parents and Children; and how are they to be managed, according to 
Scripture?”); see also 2 WILLIAM YOUNG, ED., QUINTUS CURTIUS, HIS HISTORY OF THE WARS OF 
ALEXANDER: TO WHICH IS PREFIX’D FREINSHEMIUS’S SUPPLEMENT 182 (John Digby trans., 3d ed. 1747) 
(“[P]erceiving those who were charg’d with the prisoners, to be dilatory in their office, he commanded 
them to drown them in the river bound as they were. Nor did this unusual punishment raise any commotion 
among the soldiers . . . .”).  
214 VIMALIN RUJIVACHARAKUL, ET AL., EDS., ARCHITECTURALIZED ASIA: MAPPING A CONTINENT THROUGH 
HISTORY 89 (2013) (stating that the kingdom of Tonquin, as noted by a Danish geographer in 1804, “once 
belonged to China”).  Tonquin later became part of Vietnam. CATHERINE BETH LIPPERT, EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY ENGLISH PORCELAIN IN THE COLLECTION OF THE INDIANAPOLIS MUSEUM OF ART 172 (1987). 
215 SALMON, supra note 180, at 56. 
216 Id. at 191; see also id. at 348, 352, 441–42 (containing other references to the “usual punishment” for 
particular conduct). 
217 People ex rel. Peabody v. Baker, 110 N.Y.S. 848, 852 (1908) (“[T]he usual punishment for the act . . . is 
death or a long term of imprisonment.”); State v. Foster, 46 A. 833, 837 (R.I. 1900) (“The usual 
punishment for the violation of statutes of this general character is a fine or imprisonment, or both; and 
there is certainly nothing in the punishment here prescribed which strikes one as unusual, oppressive, or 
cruel.”); Ex parte Swann, 9 S.W. 10, 12 (Mo. 1888) (“The usual punishment for the violation of such 
statutes is a fine or imprisonment, or both.”); see also In re Lacov, 142 F. 960, 962 (2d Cir. 1905) (referring 
to “the usual punishment for contempt”); McClung v. McClung, 40 Mich. 493, 496 (Mich. 1879) (referring 
to same); Commonwealth v. Silsbee, 9 Mass. 417 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1812) (reprinting a lawyer’s 
argument that “the usual punishment applied to the act—that of rejecting the party’s vote—is probably all 
that the government thought necessary or convenient”). 
218 55 P. 342, 343 (Kan. 1898). 
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Where the usual punishment for the commission of a felony was death, great 
strictness in charging the offense, as well as in the mode of trial, was, and ought 
to have been, maintained; but in this state, and in this country generally, there is 
no broad distinction between the character of the punishment inflicted for 
misdemeanors and for felonies other than murder.219  
“Fines and imprisonment, with or without hard labor,” the court further stressed, 
“are the penalties usually imposed for both felonies and misdemeanors.”220 The pillory 
and whipping—often inflicted on slaves—have each also been referred to in the past as 
“the usual punishment” for “one convicted of infamous crimes.”221 
Another reference to “usual punishment” also shows up in antebellum America, in 
an 1834 case from North Carolina. In that case, State v. Negro Will, Slave of James S. 
Battle,222 the Supreme Court of North Carolina determined that “[i]f a slave, in defence of 
his life, and under circumstances strongly calculated to excite his passions of terror and 
resentment, kills his overseer, the homicide is, by such circumstances, mitigated to 
manslaughter.”223 In that case, the slave, Will, was described as a “prisoner” and as “the 
property of James S. Battle.”224 Meanwhile, “the deceased, Richard Baxter,” was 
described as “the overseer of said Battle, and entrusted with the management of the 
prisoner at the time of the commission of the homicide.”225 The slave’s job was said to be 
“packing cotton with a screw,” and the deceased man, the evidence showed, had shot the 
slave, Will, with a gun, with “the whole load” from the gun’s discharge reportedly 
“lodged in” that slave’s back, “covering a space of twelve inches square.”226 In an 
ensuing fight between the slave and overseer, the overseer was stabbed with a knife and 
died from loss of blood.227 The slave then surrendered himself to his master, whereupon 
Will, the slave, was charged with murder, found to be guilty of murder, and then 
sentenced to death.228  
On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina found that Will, the slave, was 
guilty of manslaughter instead of murder where he was under an impulse of terror and 
resentment. In the report of that case, which contains the arguments of counsel, there is 
an explicit reference to “[t]he usual modes of correction” and to the idea that 
“[p]unishment short of death serves the end of the master, both as a corrective and as an 
example.”229 The writings of “Baron Montesquieu” were specifically invoked in that 
legal case. In particular, it was noted that Montesquieu, in his Spirit of Laws,  
 
treats of the subject of slavery, and informs us . . . that in governments whose 
policy is warlike, and the citizens ever ready with arms in their hands to quell 
                                                 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
221 Rogers v. Commonwealth, 5 Serg. & Rawle 463, 465 (Pa. 1819). 
222 1834 WL 460, at *3 (N.C. Dec. 1, 1834). 





228 Id. at *2. 
229 Id. at *5. 
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attempts to regain liberty, slaves may be treated with great rigour and severity, 
without the hazard of servile wars; but that in republics, where the policy is 
essentially pacific, and the citizens devoted to the arts of peace and industry, the 
treatment of slaves should be mild and humane: that the power of the master 
should not be absolute, and that the slave should be put within the keeping of the 
law.230  
 
In that case, a reference was also made to “the usual punishment” being inflicted,231 
with other sources from around that time also using the “usual punishment” moniker.232 
 
D. The Ducking-Stool for Scolds: A “Usual” Corporal Punishment Becomes 
an Antiquated, Impermissible One 
 
An 1825 Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, James v. Commonwealth,233 
specifically considered a corporal punishment—the use of the “ducking-stool”—that was 
once designated as the “usual punishment” for “scolds.”234 In that case, Nancy James had 
been convicted of being a common scold and, in 1824, was sentenced in Pennsylvania “to 
be placed in a certain engine of correction, called a cucking or ducking-stool, on 
Wednesday, the third day of November, then next ensuing, between the hours of ten and 
                                                 
230 Id. at *12. 
231 Id. at *17. In particular, it was also argued in that case: 
If the master has no right, then, to take the life of his slave, except 
when he resists him by force, or when the death takes place while the 
usual punishment is inflicting, it is conceived that until the occasion 
occurs which calls for the exercise of this extreme power—until the 
necessity actually exists—the master or person representing him has no 
right to resort to means, or to use weapons likely to produce death, and 
the very moment he does so, he is guilty of an abuse of his power, and 
if he slays the slave under these circumstances, he is guilty of murder. 
While on the other hand, the laws of nature and reason must permit the 
slave under like circumstances to use and call into action the common 
instinct of self-preservation, or at least, if he does resort to it, they will 
not, cannot, esteem him a murderer, if he unfortunately slays his 
oppresser, in obeying the impulse of nature, which is, in this instance, 
too strong to be repressed by any restraints which the laws of man can 
impose.  
Id. 
232 3 General Report of the Emigration Commissioners 5 (H.M. Stationery Office, 1838) (“The usual 
punishment for prison offences, is confinement for a few hours in a solitary cell . . . .”). 
233 1825 WL 1899 (Pa. Jan. 3, 1825). 
234 In A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, the Englishmen William Hawkins—under the heading 
“Cucking Stool”—wrote: “Sometimes called Ducking Stool, the usual punishment for a common scold.” 1 
WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN; OR, A SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS 
RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT, DIGESTED UNDER PROPER HEADS 624 (Thomas Leach ed., 6th ed. 1777); see 
also id. at 352 n.3 (showing that in another section of his treatise, Hawkins also made reference to a “usual” 
punishment, writing in that unrelated context: “The usual mode of punishment at present is by pillory, fine, 
imprisonment, and surety for the good behaviour.”). While men were traditionally punished in the stocks, 
ducking-stools had been used extensively in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to punish women. 
ALFRED CREIGH, HISTORY OF WASHINGTON COUNTY: FROM ITS FIRST SETTLEMENT TO THE PRESENT TIME 
17 (1870). 
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twelve o’clock in the morning, and being so placed therein, to be plunged three times into 
the water.”235 Her counsel asserted the sentence was “illegal” as being violative of both 
the U.S. Constitution and Pennsylvania’s constitution, teeing up a major public 
controversy.236 Finding the Eighth Amendment inapplicable to state legal challenges,237 
the Pennsylvania court—in an era before the incorporation of the Bill of Rights against 
American states238—first found that state courts “are left at liberty to regulate their own 
criminal codes as they may deem proper, without reference to the laws or constitution of 
the United States.”239 
As to Pennsylvania’s constitution, which prohibited “cruel punishments,” James’s 
counsel contended that ducking “was not a common-law punishment,” but had been 
introduced by statute in the reign of Henry III.240 “[E]ven if it were a common-law” 
punishment, counsel contended, “yet it was one of those barbarous customs, which did 
not suit the spirit of the times in which our ancestors migrated to this country.”241 As 
counsel asserted: “It had become nearly obsolete in England, and therefore, according to 
the general rules of colonization, was not included in that part of the common law, which 
the first settlers brought with them.”242 The record reveals a concerted effort by James’s 
counsel to prove, as a factual matter, that ducking—forthrightly described in William 
Hawkins’s A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown as the “usual punishment” for scolds—
was no longer in general use.243 “[D]ucking,” counsel asserted, “is one of those ‘cruel,’ or 
                                                 
235 James, 1825 WL 1899, at *1. A ducking stool was a chair connected to a pulley system where slanderers 
and women, among others, “were restrained and then repeatedly plunged into a convenient body of water.” 
Matthew W. Meskell, The History of Prisons in the United States from 1777 to 1877, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
839, 841–42 (1999). 
236 James, 1825 WL 1899, at *1. Pennsylvania’s 1790 constitution omitted any reference to “unusual,” 
providing “[t]hat excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishments 
inflicted.” PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § XIII. 
237 The Fourteenth Amendment was not ratified until 1868. CHARLES WALLACE COLLINS, THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE STATES: A STUDY OF THE OPERATION OF THE RESTRAINT CLAUSES OF 
SECTION ONE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 7 (1912). 
And the Eighth Amendment was not held applicable to the states until 1962. See Robinson v. California, 
370 U.S. 660 (1962).  
238 The “selective incorporation” doctrine has gradually applied various guarantees of the U.S. Bill of 
Rights against the states. MILTON R. KONVITZ, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: HISTORY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL 
DOCTRINE 84 (2011) (listing constitutional rights, including the right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment, selectively incorporated against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment). 
239 James, 1825 WL 1899, at *2. Elsewhere in the James decision, it was noted: “Common scolding has 
been recognised as an indictable offence in two of our sister states, New York and Massachusetts; and 
though it was in both held to be punishable only by fine and imprisonment, that might be under peculiar 
provisions of their laws or constitutions, which would not affect a decision in Pennsylvania.” Id. at *4. 
240 Id. at *2. 
241 Id. 
242 Id.  
243 Id. The opinion in James describes James’ counsel’s efforts as follows: 
To prove that it was disused, even in England, the counsel referred 
to the case of Regina v. Foxby, 6 Mod. 11, which occurred a few years 
after the first settlement of this state. Lord HOLT there makes a jest of 
the matter, and the defendant was permitted to escape, on promise of 
future good behavior. Later English writers mention ducking as 
existing only in the memory of a few superannuated persons, and speak 
of the mouldering ruins of that formidable engine, the ducking-stool, as 
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barbarous punishments of our British ancestors, the infliction of which is expressly 
forbidden by the constitution.”244 
In contrast, Pennsylvania authorities sought to preserve their right to resort to the 
ducking stool. Pennsylvania’s deputy attorney general thus tried to show “that ducking 
was a common-law punishment for scolding, and the statute of Henry III merely applied 
it to another offence.”245 “Although it was not often carried into execution,” he asserted, 
“it was still in force in England, at the time of the first settlement of Pennsylvania, and 
therefore, he argued, brought over by the colonists with the rest of the common law.”246 
“It is remarkable,” the deputy attorney general specifically pointed out, that 
Pennsylvania’s constitution, “many of the articles of which are copied literally from that 
of the United States, has omitted the word ‘unusual,’ and prescribes only cruel 
punishments.”247  “He submitted to the court,” the record shows, “that the phrase ‘cruel 
punishments,’ here means the torture—the peine forte et dure,248 and such others as 
                                                                                                                                                 
one of the vestiges of a barbarous antiquity. 
But supposing this punishment existed at common law, was in full 
force in England, at the period of William Penn's emigration, and was 
introduced by his followers into the new province: still the counsel 
contended the common law had been altered in this particular by the 
colonists themselves. The attention of the legislature was early attracted 
to this matter, and we find several laws on this subject in the first years 
of the infant colony. In 1682, the first years of the settlement, it was 
enacted by the 34th section of “the great law,” that scolding should be 
punished by “three days' imprisonment.” In 1683, the punishment for 
this offence was changed to “gagging,” or five shillings fine. In 1700, 
the legislature again altered this punishment to “five days' 
imprisonment, or gagging, or five shillings fine.” It is true, that this last 
act was repealed by the queen in council; but that revived the act of 
1683, which never having been repealed since, is now in force, and 
therefore, superseded the provisions of the common law upon this 
subject. 
Id. 
244 Id. James’ counsel also argued his client’s sentence was too severe, especially in light of the cold 
weather. Id. at *3. The record records counsel’s argument as follows: 
[H]e contended that whatever the law might be, there was no precedent 
or authority for that part of the sentence, which directed the prisoner to 
be “plunged three times into the water.” The sheriff would be liable to 
an action of trespass, if he did not execute the sentence exactly; and if 
the old woman should die, in consequence of such severe treatment, at 
this inclement season, the judges who had pronounced the illegal 




247 Id. at *4; see also Ryan, supra note 4, at 609 (“The Pennsylvania Constitution omitted the unusualness 
component of the Clause altogether, providing ‘[t]hat excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel punishments inflicted.’”). 
248 Peine forte et dure was an English practice also known as pressing to death. E.g., 1 T. B. HOWELL, A 
COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND 
MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783, WITH NOTES AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS 
xxxii (1816) (“There is one thing in our Laws which is very singular, and comes the nearest of any thing to 
the Tortures used in other countries, viz. le Peine fort et dure, or, pressing to death: ’Tis true, this is not 
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shock the mind of every man possessed of common feeling.”249 In fact, prominent 
American founders and framers had concluded, decades earlier, that the constitutional 
prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments” was meant to outlaw torture,250 though 
the concept of torture was understood to mean something much different in the 
eighteenth century than it means today.251 
In attempting to defend the use of the ducking stool, Pennsylvania’s deputy 
attorney general argued that it was very difficult to establish that a punishment was 
cruel—especially since the death penalty, a more severe punishment, was then still 
explicitly authorized by law.252 As he asserted before the Pennsylvania court: “In one 
                                                                                                                                                 
used to force the Prisoner to confess, but to plead one way or other; but yet even this seems a needless 
piece of severity.”).  
249 James, 1825 WL 1899, at *4. 
250 Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 131 
(2004) (noting that, after reciting the “cruel and unusual punishments” language of the Virginia Declaration 
of Rights, Patrick Henry asked rhetorically: “What has distinguished our ancestors? – That they would not 
admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment.”); id. (noting that when George Nicholas contended 
that the declaration of rights had not succeeded in preventing torture, George Mason—the drafter of the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights—refuted that, replying: “Another clause of the bill of rights provided that no 
cruel and unusual punishments shall be inflicted; therefore, torture was included in the prohibition.”). 
251 BESSLER, supra note 46, at 11, 146–47. The concept of mental or psychological torture would have been 
quite foreign to America’s founders. The legal concept of mental or psychology torture is of much more 
recent vintage. E.g., PAU PÉREZ-SALES, PSYCHOLOGICAL TORTURE: DEFINITION, EVALUATION AND 
MEASUREMENT 79 (2017) (“Since the Estrella v. Uruguay case (1980) there has been increasing 
jurisprudence from the Human Rights Committee of United Nations, the European Court of Human Rights, 
and especially the Inter-American Court, that supports the concept of psychological torture as a defined 
entity.”). The concept of torture, long prohibited but not necessarily defined or ill-defined, is now expressly 
defined in international law. See, e.g., GAIL H. MILLER, FLOERSHEIMER CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SC. OF LAW, YESHIVA UNIV., DEFINING TORTURE 5–6 (2005),  
https://cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/Defining%20Torture.pdf:   
Myriad international declarations, agreements, and conventions, 
including Article 5 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 
Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on 
Human Rights, and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 
prohibit torture but fail to define it. On December 10, 1984, the U.N. 
General Assembly gave meaning to the term by adopting the CAT, 
which entered into force on June 26, 1987.  With over 135 signatories, 
the CAT contains the most commonly used and widely endorsed 
definition of torture. Explaining the international acceptance of the 
CAT, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
has stated that the CAT torture definition reflects “a consensus . . . 
representative of customary international law.” 
252 The State of Pennsylvania divided murder into degrees in 1794. E.g., DAVID C. BRODY & JAMES R. 
ACKER, CRIMINAL LAW 212 (2010): 
Initially, no discrimination was made between different kinds of 
murder, and that crime automatically was punished by death. 
Pennsylvania legislators thought this approach to be excessively harsh 
and inflexible. In 1794 they passed an innovative statute dividing 
murder into first degree, which remained a capital crime, and second 
degree, which was not punished capitally. 
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sense, death is a cruel punishment, and yet no one doubts of its constitutionality. It must 
be a very glaring and extreme case, to justify the court in pronouncing a punishment 
unconstitutional on account of its cruelty; and this is not such a case.”253 The deputy 
attorney general—seeking to show state practice, much as modern lawyers do in twenty-
first-century Eighth Amendment challenges—also pointed out that “the penalty of 
ducking has actually been inflicted upon scolds in the state of Pennsylvania.”254 “The 
Attorney-General,” the case report reflects, “produced the records of the court of quarter 
sessions of Philadelphia county, by which it appeared that there had been at least three 
instances of conviction of the offence of being ‘a common scold,’ in two of which the 
sentence of ducking had been carried into execution.”255  
The case involving Nancy James attracted considerable interest in Pennsylvania’s 
legal community, especially since state residents thought of themselves as enlightened 
citizens. After counsel for both sides had made their arguments, a “Mr. Duponceau”—a 
prominent local lawyer who, in 1824, had published A Dissertation on the Nature and 
Extent of the Jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States256—addressed the court, 
                                                                                                                                                 
The death penalty, however, remained in use in Pennsylvania. E.g., MITCHEL P. ROTH, CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT: A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 111 (2010). 
253 James, 1825 WL 1899, at *4. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. “These cases,” it was reported, “occurred a few years prior to the year 1790, when the assembly, 
sitting in this city, new-modelled the penal code of the state, and after abolishing many of the common-law 
punishments, concluded by declaring, that ‘every other felony or misdemeanor whatsoever, not specially 
provided for by that act, may and shall be punished as heretofore.’” Id. The case report continued: 
As the offence of “scolding” is not specially provided for by the act of 
1790, the Attorney-General insisted that this was an express legislative 
sanction of the common-law punishment, which had been recently and 
publicly inflicted in the place where the assembly was then sitting. 
Moreover, as this offence is not punishable by fine or imprisonment at 
common law, ducking is the only penalty that can be inflicted in the 
absence of positive enactment. 
Id. In reply, counsel for James argued that “none of the judges who pronounced those sentences” for 
scolding, which had been drawn from the records of the quarter sessions, “were lawyers.” Id. “[T]his 
court,” he insisted, “was not bound to receive as law, their crude and ill-digested opinions on this subject.” 
Id.; compare WILLIAM H. LOYD, THE EARLY COURTS OF PENNSYLVANIA 89 n.1 (1910) (internal citation 
omitted): 
It is a matter of some doubt as to whether the ducking-stool ever was 
actually used in Philadelphia. In 1769 a woman was sentenced to be 
ducked at the end of Market street wharf, but we are not informed 
whether the sentence was carried into execution. In 1779 Ann Mease 
was sentenced to the same punishment but the council remitted the 
ducking January 26, 1780. In 1781 there was another conviction but the 
sentence was not carried out. 
256 PETER S. DU PONCEAU, A DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE 
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, BEING A VALEDICTORY ADDRESS DELIVERED TO THE STUDENTS OF THE 
LAW ACADEMY OF PHILADELPHIA, AT THE CLOSE OF THE ACADEMIC YEAR, ON THE 22ND OF APRIL, 1824 
(1824) (published in Philadelphia by Abraham Small and dedicated “To the Honourable William Tilghman, 
LL.D., Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Patron of the Law 
Academy of Philadelphia”). That dissertation itself distinguished the American prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishments from the earlier one contained in the English Bill of Rights. In his dissertation, Peter 
Du Ponceau wrote of “certain harsh punishments which our modern manners reprove, but which still stain 
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the page of the common law; as for instance the punishment of petty treason in men by drawing and 
quartering, and in women by burning.” Id. at 95. He then wrote this about the difference between American 
and English law: 
But the 10th amendment of our Constitution has sufficiently provided 
that “no cruel and unusual punishment shall be inflicted,” which word 
“unusual” evidently refers to the United States, and the time when the 
Constitution was made, and therefore is not to be confounded with the 
same clause in the English bill of rights, which referring to another 
period and to another country, may have been differently construed. 
The peine forte and dure, and burning in the hand in cases of 
manslaughter are abolished, and milder substitutes provided by our 
national statutes; corruption of blood, trial by battle, all other modes of 
trial, but trial by jury in criminal cases are also abolished; in short the 
common law as modified by our Constitution, by our laws, manners 
and usages, is as wholesome and as harmless a system, in criminal as 
well as in civil cases, as any that can be devised.  
Id. at 95–96. As Du Ponceau’s Dissertation then continued: 
As to offences not capital, cruel and unusual punishments being 
forbidden by our Constitution, there remains none but fine, 
imprisonment and, perhaps, whipping and the pillory. I hope I shall 
hear nothing of the ducking stool and other obsolete remains of the 
customs of barbarous ages. The pillory and whipping, I know, are out 
of use in most of the States, imprisonment at hard labour having been 
substituted in lieu of them. Yet Congress have thought proper to retain 
the latter punishment in their penal code, and we have seen it inflicted 
not long since in our city on an offender against the laws of the United 
States. It is in the power of the national Legislature to alter or amend 
the law in this respect, as they shall think proper; but until they do so, I 
see nothing inhuman in the moderate infliction of either of these 
penalties, nor any reason why we should reject the common law on 
their account. 
It may be said, perhaps, that there is too much left to the discretion 
of the Judges as to the quantum, and even the nature of the punishment 
and sometimes also as to deciding what is or what is not an indictable 
act. As to the quantum of punishment, I know no system of laws in 
which some discretion at least is not left to the Court according to the 
greater or lesser magnitude of the offence. It is impossible to avoid this 
inconvenience by any legislation. The same thing may be said of the 
authority to choose between two or three mild punishments; there may 
be cases in which imprisonment would be death to the party, and when 
a fine may be inflicted upon him with greater effect; others when the 
reverse may be the case. 
Id. at 96–97. The pillory and the whipping post were once usual punishments in colonial and early 
America. PETER C. HOLLORAN, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF NEW ENGLAND 496 (2d ed. 2017) (“Boston 
last used the pillory in 1803.”); HOWARD O. SPROGLE, THE PHILADELPHIA POLICE, PAST AND PRESENT 56 
(1887): 
Fraud sent men to the pillory and workhouse. The last remembered 
exhibition of this kind was that of a storekeeper, who, to build up his 
failing credit, made too free use with other people’s names. He was 
exposed in the pillory, where the populace pelted him with eggs, and, to 
conclude, had his ears clipped by the sheriff, who held up his ghastly 
trophies to the gaze and shouts of the populace. Whipping was the 
usual punishment for larceny and for felonious assaults. 
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having obtained leave “to make a few remarks as amicus curiae.”257 According to the 
report: “He felt interested, he said, in the question before the court, because he thought 
the execution of this sentence would be a disgrace to the state of Pennsylvania, and 
therefore, he trusted, the court would not feel themselves obliged to pronounce it law.”258 
“Whatever might be the common law on this subject,” he argued, urging the court to 
distance itself from Great Britain, “it was not brought to this country by the colonists.”259 
He then referred the court to a state law passed in 1806, “which he thought 
                                                 
257 James, 1825 WL 1899, at *5. Pierre Etienne Du Ponceau (1760–1844), also known as Peter Stephen Du 
Ponceau, was a French-born linguist who learned English as a boy, was educated by Benedictine monks, 
and who sailed for America in 1777 as a secretary for Prussia Baron von Stueben—a soldier Benjamin 
Franklin had recruited to help train and organize the American Continental Army. 9 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, RETIREMENT SERIES 179 (J. Jefferson Looney, ed., 2012) [hereinafter THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON]; PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 411 n.5 (Gregg L. Lint, et al., eds., 2010); FROM LEX 
MERCATORIA TO COMMERCIAL LAW 38 (Vito Piergiovanni, ed. 2005); ROBERT M. RIFFLE, THE MIRACLE 
OF INDEPENDENCE 197 (2009). Du Ponceau was later appointed Assistant Secretary to Robert Livingston, 
George Washington’s Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and became a citizen of Pennsylvania and the U.S., 
anglicizing his forenames to Peter Stephen. THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 179; C. H. 
FORBES–LINDSAY, WASHINGTON: THE CITY AND THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT 389 (1908); Mary Orne 
Pickering, John Pickering: Life of John Pickering, NATION, Sept. 29, 1887, at 255; GEORGE S. BROOKES, 
FRIEND ANTHONY BENEZET 385 n.4 (1937). Du Ponceau lived in Philadelphia for many years, became a 
lawyer and a member of the American Philosophical Society, and then became a founding member of the 
Law Academy of Philadelphia in 1821. THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 179; 1 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 189 n.82 (1985). 
A correspondent of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, and often retained by French nationals, 
diplomats and consuls needing legal representation in American courts, Du Ponceau was admitted to 
practice in the Pennsylvania courts and in the U.S. Supreme Court. 7 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 20 (Maeva Marcus, ed. 2003); THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 179; 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 483 (Maeva Marcus, ed., 1994); ARTHUR E. PALUMBO, THE AUTHENTIC 
CONSTITUTION: AN ORIGINALIST VIEW OF AMERICA’S LEGACY 227, 227 n.1 (2009). Du Ponceau published 
one of his most important works, A Brief View of the Constitution of the United States, in 1834. See PETER 
S. DU PONCEAU, A BRIEF VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, ADDRESSED TO LAW 
ACADEMY OF PHILADELPHIA (1834). That book gave an historical introduction to the Constitution, setting 
out the “prominent features of our excellent constitution,” and ended with its actual text and that of the 
Declaration of Independence. Id. at xi, 51–56, 68–85. Du Ponceau had been elected a member of the 
American Philosophical Society in 1791, the same year the U.S. Bill of Rights was ratified, and from 1828 
until his death served as its President, following in the footsteps of Benjamin Franklin and Thomas 
Jefferson. ANTHONY F. C. WALLACE, JEFFERSON AND THE INDIANS: THE TRAGIC FATE OF THE FIRST 
AMERICANS 319 (1999); DEBRA J. ALLEN, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF U.S. DIPLOMACY FROM THE 
REVOLUTION TO SECESSION 86 (2012); PHILADELPHIA: A GUIDE TO THE NATION’S BIRTHPLACE 288 (1937) 
(compiled by the Federal Writers’ Project Works Progress Administration for the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania). He regularly signed his name “Du Ponceau,” but apparently tolerated his name appearing in 
print as “Duponceau.” 2 JOAN LEOPOLD, ED., THE PRIX VOLNEY: EARLY NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO AMERICAN INDIAN AND GENERAL LINGUISTICS: DU PONCEAU AND RAFINESQUE 1–2 
(2000); see also 2 J. THOMAS SCHARF & THOMPSON WESTCOTT, HISTORY OF PHILADELPHIA, 1609–1888, at 
1532–33 (1884) (“Peter Stephen Du Ponceau was one of the most eminent of the men who came on after 
the Revolution, and he is specially to be commended for the services he rendered in the matter of putting 
the standard of law studies and law literature upon a high eminence . . . .”). 
258 James, 1825 WL 1899, at *5. 
259 Id. 
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conclusive.”260 He emphasized “that this punishment”—speaking of ducking, the once-
decidedly usual English punishment for scolds—“had become obsolete in England,” 
expressing the sincere hope “we would not continue their barbarous customs, after they 
had themselves disused them.”261 
 In James, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court began its opinion by acknowledging 
precisely what was at stake, noting in its decision that Nancy James’s sentence “has 
created much ferment and excitement in the public mind; it is considered as a cruel, 
unusual, unnatural and ludicrous judgment.”262 “[B]ut whatever prejudices may exist 
against it,” the court noted, having separated the words cruel and unusual by commas but 
putting them in a list of very judgmental-sounding words, “still, if it be the law of the 
land, the court must pronounce judgment for it.”263 “But,” it continued, “as it is revolting 
to humanity, and is of that description that only could have been invented in an age of 
barbarism, we ought to be well persuaded, either that it is the appropriate judgment of the 
common law, or is inflicted by some positive law; and that that common law or statutory 
provision has been adopted here, and is now in force.”264 Associate Justice Thomas 
Duncan265—who delivered the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion—stressed at the 
very outset just how much time had been spent by the court researching the punishment 
of ducking: “I have employed some time, not very pleasantly, certainly not very 
profitably, in tracing the punishment ad ludibrium, to its source, and have followed this 
stream until it has sunk in oblivion, in the general improvement of society, and the 
reformation of criminal punishment, and been dried up by time, that great innovator.”266 
                                                 
260 Id. That Act declared: “in all cases where a remedy is provided or a duty enjoined, or anything directed 
to be done by any act or acts of assembly of this commonwealth, the directions of the said acts shall be 
strictly pursued, and no penalty shall be inflicted or anything done agreeably to the provisions of the 
common law, in such cases, further than shall be necessary for carrying such act or acts into effect.” Id. 
261 Id. In response to Du Ponceau’s arguments, the record reflects that counsel for the state argued as 
follows: 
The Attorney-General replied, that only part of “the great law,” had 
been agreed upon in England, and that the provision with respect to 
scolds, among others, was not added until after the arrival in this 
country; as would be seen, by a reference to the printed copy of the 
laws agreed upon in England. As to the act of assembly of 1806, it 
expressly recognises the common law, and depends upon it in cases not 
otherwise provided for; and the present is one of those cases, for 
although it may have been regulated by statutes, they are not now in 
force, and the common law rules must, therefore, prevail. He had 
already referred to some of the latest English elementary writers, to 






265 See 17 THOMAS SERGEANT & WILLIAM RAWLE, EDS., REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME 
COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 459 (3d ed. 1874) (describing Thomas Duncan’s legal career). 
266 James, 1825 WL 1899, at *5. In fact, the use of ducking had a very long history, dating back centuries. 
E.g., ERNEST W. PETTIFER, PUNISHMENTS OF FORMER DAYS 104 (1992) (“The history of the ducking-stool 
goes back, at least, to Norman times, and one of the duties of the Court Leet was to examine the state of 
repair of the ducking-stool, the pillory and the stocks, but it is extremely likely that the history goes back to 
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It was, obviously, very difficult—indeed, impossible—to determine who had actually 
come up with the idea of ducking in the first instance. 
In the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion, Justice Duncan reflected on the 
oddity—and the inherently degrading and discriminatory nature—of the scolding offense. 
“It must strike all, as a peculiar feature of this offence,” he said, “that it is of the feminine 
gender, that it degraded woman to a mere thing, to a nuisance, and does not consider her 
as a person.”267 “But this is not to be wondered at,” he added, “when we reflect on the 
general degraded state of woman, when this punishment was introduced; she was, in 
some respects, the servant or slave of the husband; so that he might correct her with a 
stick as thick as his own thumb.”268 “At the common law,” Duncan emphasized, “women 
were denied the benefit of clergy,269 merely because their sex precluded them from holy 
orders, however learned they might be, while their more ignorant husbands, who could 
with difficulty read even the neck-verse,270 were burnt in the hand with a cold iron, for 
the offence for which they were doomed to die on the gallows.”271 Duncan pointed out 
that, under the authority of Blackstone and others, “[t]he right of the husband” is “to beat 
his wife,” with Duncan noting that “if we add the present instance of partiality, that a 
scolding woman is to be ducked, while the most scandalously abusive and railing man 
goes unpunished, the iniquity and injustice will be very striking.”272 
Before passing on James’ sentence, Justice Duncan—grappling with how to rule at 
the close of the first quarter of the nineteenth century—also gave an extensive history of 
the punishment under review. After focusing on the actual instrumentalities previously 
                                                                                                                                                 
far earlier days.”); STEPHANO SKINNER, ETYMOLOGICON LINGUÆ ANGLICANÆ, SEU EXPLICATIO VOCUM 
ANGLICARUM ETYMOLOGICA EX PROPRIIS FONTIBUS (1671) (referencing “Ducking-stool” in unpaginated 
entry for “Cucking-stool” in Latin text). 
267 James, 1825 WL 1899, at *6. 
268 Id. “There is a tradition,” Justice Duncan offered in his opinion, “that at the publication of Bracton's 
learned work, in which the dimension of this instrument of correction was first stated, the women of the 
town in which he lived, seized him and ducked him in a horse-pond.” Id. Bracton, a thirteenth-century 
English jurist, wrote a long treatise, De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliea (On the Laws and Customs of 
England) that attempted to describe the whole of English law. See Bracton Online, HARV. L. SCH. LIBR., 
bracton.law.harvard.edu (last visited Feb. 26, 2018). In it, Bracton spoke of the “ducking-stool.”  2 HENRY 
DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 290, 299, 340 (Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968).  
269 At common law, benefit of clergy was—as Black’s Law Dictionary puts it—“the privilege of a cleric not 
to be tried for a felony in the King’s Court.” Benefit of Clergy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
“[I]n the Middle Ages,” that source notes, “any man who could recite the ‘neck verse’ was granted the 
benefit of clergy.” Id.; see also id. (citing State v. Bosse, 42 S.C.L. (8 Rich.) 276 (1855)): 
Although clergy includes monks and nuns as well as priests, only in 
rare cases did women claim or receive benefit of clergy. Congress 
outlawed benefit of clergy in federal courts in April 1790. It was 
abolished in England in 1827 but survived even longer in some 
American states, such as South Carolina, where it was successfully 
claimed in 1855. 
270 THE POETICAL WORKS OF SIR WALTER SCOTT 11 n.* (1868): 
The neck-verse was the first verse of Psalm 51. If a criminal claimed on 
the scaffold “benefit of his clergy,” a priest instantly presented him 
with a Psalter, and he read his neck-verse. The power of reading it 
entitled him to his life, which was spared . . . 
271 James, 1825 WL 1899, at *5. 
272 Id. 
Vol. 13:4]  John D. Bessler 
357  
used to inflict the punishment,273 Duncan—writing for the court, and in light of the varied 
kinds of ducking or cucking stools known to have been employed in the past—noted: 
“Thus, in our very outset, we are involved in doubt, and who shall decide, where there is 
such a difference among the learned? The officer would not know what to do, whether to 
fix Nancy James on a stool, or in a bucket, whether she is to be run into the river on 
wheels, or to be soused into a pond, from a beam or rafter.”274 Justice Duncan specifically 
recounted how the punishment of ducking was so antiquated in England that examples of 
the devices used to inflict it could not be readily located.275 Duncan referenced the repeal 
of “two bloody statutes . . . by the voice of humanity,” saying “that it seems most 
probable, that hanging of women as witches and gypsies, and ducking them as scolds, 
ceased about the same time, viz: the time of the restoration, and before the charter to 
                                                 
273 As Justice Duncan noted: 
The punishment of the ducking or cucking-stool, is from the cuckoo, 
“qui odiose jurgat et rixatur,” as Lord COKE has it, in 3 Inst. 219; or, 
as Jacob has it, in his dictionary, the gogen-stool, and by some thought 
to be corrupted from the choke-stool; and the instrument is called in 
Stat. 51 Hen. III., a trebucket, a pitfall, and in law, as Lord COKE says, 
signifies a stool that falls into a pit of water; whereas, the last 
instrument that was seen in England, as Morgan, an editor of Jacob's 
Dictionary mentions, consisted of a beam or rafter, moving on a 
fulcrum, and extending to the centre of a large pond, on which end the 
stool used to be placed; while, on the other hand, Daines Barrington, a 
learned antiquarian, in his Observations on the Statutes 40, says, it is a 
machine anciently used in the siege of towns, and the etymology is 
from the Celtic, tre, that is, ville, and our own bucket, and signifies a 
town-bucket. 
Id. at *6. 
274 Id. at *7. 
275 Justice Duncan, in discussing England’s experience with the punishment, put it this way: 
From the country from which, it is suggested, we have borrowed it, we 
could obtain no information, nor expect a model, for not a vestige of it 
is there to be found; unless, perhaps, alongside of the rack (the Duke of 
Exeter's daughter), which is still shown as a curiosity, by a yeoman of 
the King's guard, as an instrument of punishment, which, like the 
trebucket, was once used in England (Barrington 366); for no poor 
woman, in that country, has suffered under the edge of a law so 
barbarous, for the last century; like unscoured armor, it is hung up by 
the wall; like the law of witchcraft, it has remained unused; for no one 
has suffered under that law, either at the stake or on the gibbet, since 
the reign of Charles II.; although the law stood unrepealed on the 
statute book, until 9 Geo. II., as our own law against the same offence, 
until several years after the revolution; or, like the act against the 
gypsies, which punished those with death, without the benefit of clergy, 
who remained one month within the realm; and Lord HALE, in his 
Pleas of the Crown 671, says, “I have not known these statutes put 
much in execution, only about twenty years since, at the assizes at 
Bury, about thirteen were condemned and executed for this offence. On 
this judgment, BLACKSTONE, 4th vol. 166, remarks, “but to the 
honor of our national humanity, there are no instances more modern.” 
Id. 
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William Penn.”276 “Indeed,” he concluded, “it appears, that at the same period, the race of 
witches and scolds became extinct, when the law ceased to hang the witches and duck the 
scolds.”277 
In the state supreme court’s opinion, Justice Duncan, focusing on the disuse of the 
scolding punishment in spite of its prior statutory authorization, next explained that “[t]he 
instances are numerous of statutes being repealed in fact—a kind of silent legislation.”278 
After considering the evidence, Duncan explained: “As to the abrogation of statutes by 
‘non user,’ there may rest some doubt; for myself, I own, my opinion is, that ‘non user’ 
may be such as to render them obsolete, when their objects vanish or their reason 
ceases.”279 He then turned to the common law, taking it into account as he weighed the 
facts at issue. “The common law (and this is but a customary punishment), what is it, but 
common usage?” Duncan offered. “The long disuetude of any law,” he concluded, 
“amounts to its repeal.”280 A “villeinous judgment, by long disuse,” he concluded of one 
                                                 
276 Id. Charles I was executed in 1649, and England—during the interregnum (1649–1660)—was then 
governed by a commonwealth government headed by Oliver Cromwell, a cavalry officer and a Puritan 
member of the Long Parliament who rose to prominence during the English Civil War (1642–1649). The 
Restoration (1660–1685) began after Charles II, at age 30, claimed his father’s throne after a period of 
exile. 1 THOMAS F. X. NOBLE, BARRY STRAUSS, DUANE J. OSHEIM, KRISTEN B. NEUSCHEL, ELINOR A. 
ACCAMPO, DAVID D. ROBERTS & WILLIAM B. COHEN, WESTERN CIVILIZATION: BEYOND BOUNDARIES 
455–58 (6th ed. 2011). William Penn’s charter for Pennsylvania came in 1682. See PAUL E. DOUTRICH, TO 
FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND PENNSYLVANIA 18 (1986) (“From the 
time of William Penn’s Charter of Liberties in 1682, Pennsylvania had developed a philosophical 
foundation upon which a democratic republic could be established. By the time of independence, the State 
had become one of the foremost proponents of liberty.”). 
277 James, 1825 WL 1899, at *7. 
278 Id. at *8. 
279 Id. Non-user is defined as “neglect to use” or “[t]he neglect to make use of a thing.” BLACK, supra note 
208, at 828; 2 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION: WITH REFERENCES 
TO THE CIVIL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF FOREIGN LAW 303 (1891). See also id. (“Non-user for a great length 
of time will have the effect of repealing an old law. But it must be a very strong one which will have that 
effect.”); RICHARD BURN & JOHN BURN, NEW LAW DICTIONARY: INTENDED FOR GENERAL USE AS WELL AS 
FOR GENTLEMEN OF THE PROFESSION 385 (1792) (“Forfeiture may accrue . . . by . . . non-user . . . . By non-
user; for if one hath liberties, and doth not use them within memory, they are lost.”); O’Hanlan v. Myers, 
44 S.C.L. (10 Rich.) 128, 130–31 (1856) (noting an act may become inoperative through non-user or 
disuse, such as sitting publicly in the stocks). 
280 James, 1825 WL 1899, at *8. Duncan’s opinion was as follows: 
Mr. Woodeson, in his second lecture (vol. 1st, 63) of civil, positive and 
instituted laws, observes, “that the last consideration is the period of 
their existence;” they may be repealed either expressly or by 
implication founded on disuse: he cites this passage from the Digest, 
“rectissime illud receptum est--ut magis non solus suffragio 
legislatorum, sed etiam tacito consensu omnium, per desuetudinem 
abrogatur.” It certainly requires very strong grounds to presume a law 
obsolete, yet as the whole community includes as well the legislative 
power as its subjects, total disuse of any civil institution for ages past, 
may afford just and rational objections against disrespected and 
superannuated ordinances. Judge WILSON (2d Wilson's Works 38, 
39), observes, “that it is the characteristic of a system of common law, 
that it may be accommodated to the circumstances, the exigencies and 
the conveniences of the people by whom it is appointed. Now, as these 
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species of punishment, “has become obsolete, it not having been pronounced for ages.”281 
“The barbarous writ of attaint, which has as strong a foundation as any principle in 
common law,” he added, alluding to bills of attainder that had been abolished by the U.S. 
Constitution, “has been long banished.”282  
Justice Duncan—writing less than thirty-five years after the ratification of the U.S. 
Bill of Rights, but several decades before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment—
thus concluded that once-common punishments, even those still on the statute books, 
could become improper through disuse. “That such crimes and punishments existed at the 
common law,” he acknowledged of certain punishments, “every treatise to the present 
day states; but this does not prove,” he quickly clarified, “that they now exist.”283 In other 
words, punishments previously authorized by law could fade away into oblivion, with the 
common law itself—the very foundation of Anglo-American law—plainly expected to 
evolve over time. “They are nothing more,” he emphasized of antiquated punishments, 
“than the memorials of times that are past, as the usages of our uncivilized ancestors; and 
in nothing is the gradual change of the common law more apparent, and in nothing does it 
accommodate itself more to the change of manners and effect of education, than in the 
silent and gradual disuse of barbarous criminal punishments.”284   
After citing a treatise from 1581 that distinguished between capital and non-capital 
corporal punishments, Justice Duncan then noted the diminishing use of corporal 
                                                                                                                                                 
circumstances, exigencies and conveniences silently change, a 
proportionate change in time and in degree must take place in the 
accommodated system. Time silently and gradually introduces; it 
silently and gradually withdraws its customary laws.” 
Id. 
281 Id. 
282 Id. Bills of attainder—once frequently used by legislators to sentence people to death in the absence of 
judicial proceedings—were outlawed by the U.S. Constitution. As Black’s Law Dictionary summarizes 
their prohibition by law: 
1. Archaic. A special legislative act that imposes a death sentence on a 
person without a trial. 2. A special legislative act prescribing 
punishment, without a trial, for a specific purpose or group. • Bills of 
attainder are prohibited by the U.S. Constitution (art. I, § 9, cl. 3; art. I, 
§ 10, cl. 1).  
Bills of Attainder, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 198 (10th ed. 2014). “At common law,” an attainder was 
“the act of extinguishing a person’s civil rights when that person” was “sentenced to death or declared an 
outlaw for committing a felony or treason.” Id. at 152. “‘The word attainder is derived from the Latin term 
attinctus, signifying stained or polluted, and includes, in its meaning, all those disabilities which flow from 
a capital sentence. On the attainder, the defendant is disqualified to be a witness in any court; he can bring 
no action, nor perform any of the legal functions which before he was admitted to discharge; he is, in short 
regarded as dead in law.’” Id. (quoting 1 JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 
725 (2d ed. 1826)).  
283 James, 1825 WL 1899, at *8. 
284 Id. Such judicial reasoning calls to mind Thomas Jefferson’s own words: “laws and institutions must go 
hand in hand with the progress of the human mind” so that such institutions “keep pace with the times.” 
Letter to Samuel Kercheval, TEACHINGAMERICANHISTORY.ORG, 
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/letter-to-samuel-kercheval/ (last visited Feb. 26, 
2018). As Jefferson wrote in his 1816 letter: “We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which 
fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.” 
Id. 
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punishments and that he could find no evidence of the ducking of scolds for many 
decades.285 Duncan referenced both English authorities286 and Pennsylvania lawyer James 
Wilson—an American Founding Father and an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme 
Court from 1789 to 1798—in support of his conclusion that ducking was an 
impermissible and antiquated punishment.287 Duncan specifically noted that scolds were 
                                                 
285 The opinion in James stated as follows: 
Lambarde, who first published his Treatise on the Office of Justice of 
the Peace, in 1581, lib. i. ch. 12, states that corporal punishments are 
either capital, or not capital; that capital are inflicted “sundrie ways; as 
by hanging, burning, boiling, pressing: not capital, are of divers sorts, 
as cutting off the hand or ear, burning or branding the hand, face, 
shoulders, whipping, imprisonment, stocking, sitting in the pillory, or 
on the cucking-stool.” Of this kind of punishment our old laws had 
more sorts than we now have; as pulling out the tongue for false 
rumors, cutting off the nose, and for adultery, taking away the privy 
parts. So they had more sorts of punishments, when Lambarde wrote, 
than we now have. Blessed be GOD! I feel a conviction (and I have 
examined every book upon which I could lay my hands), that there is 
no judicial record, certainly no report, of this punishment being 
inflicted for more than one hundred years. The case in 2 Strange 849, 
The King v. Taylor, was quashed generally; it was not against her as 
communis vexatrix, but as calumniatrix et communis perturbatrix; and 
in The King v. Margaret Cooper, Id. 1246, the judgment was not 
rendered as for a common scold; and the last of them was as long ago 
as 19 Geo. II., nearly eighty years ago. 
James, 1825 WL 1899, at *8. 
286 Id. at *9: 
In the Queen v. Foxby, 6 Mod. 11, in the second of Anne, the judgment 
was likewise arrested for mistake in the indictment. The note of the 
reporter is, the punishment of a scold is ducking, but the counsel for the 
prisoner said, “he knew no law for ducking of scolds.” Lord HOLT did 
not give any opinion as to the judgment; he only mentioned that it was 
indictable in the Leet, “and that it was better ducking in a Trinity than a 
Michaelmas term;” better in warm than in cold weather. But it was too 
much even for the gravity of the grave and learned Chief Justice of the 
King's Bench, to treat the subject with any solemnity. In page 178, she 
was brought up again (for the sheriff had let her go at large), and the 
court let her run again until the next term. HOLT could not conceal his 
contempt for this farce of ducking; he sneered at the trebucket, 
declaring that ducking would only harden the criminal; and, if she were 
once ducked, she would scold all the days of her life. I think, that the 
trebucket then made its final exit, or afterwards was only heard of in 
the courts of justice, as John Doe and Richard Roe, pledges of 
prosecution; a mere nominal thing. 
287 Id.: 
Judge WILSON, certainly a learned and eminent person, to whom the 
state committed the revision of her laws, in his third volume, page 311, 
treats the trebucket with the same contempt with which Lord HOLT 
had done before him. After giving the judgment against a common 
scold, in a public lecture, he sneeringly says—“so she shall be plunged 
into the water, by way of punishment and prevention;” and thus 
scornfully winds up the trebucket—“our modern men of gallantry 
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once “indictable in the sheriff’s tourn,”288 but ultimately concluded that ducking was no 
longer an authorized punishment for such offenders. “There is no ground, whatever may 
be the antiquated theory of the law,” Duncan explained, “that it now exists, in fact and in 
practice, as a legal punishment.”289 
Justice Duncan—in delivering the state court’s opinion—noted that all of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s members might not agree on everything, but they were 
unanimous as to the question before the court. As Duncan stressed: “I do not know that 
all the members of the court agree with me in the conclusion, as to the abrogation of this 
punishment in England, by disuse; but in the inquiry most important, there is no 
difference of opinion.” “We all agree in this,” Duncan emphasized, “that this customary 
ancient punishment for ducking scolds, was never adopted, and therefore, is not the 
common law of Pennsylvania.”290 After writing that “the ducking-stool, cucking-stool, or 
                                                                                                                                                 
would not surely decline the honor of her company; I therefore humbly 
propose, that in future, the cucking-stool shall be made to hold double.” 
And those only who knew that great man, can form an idea what that 
look of scorn was. This cucking-stool was a species of the tumbrellum; 
Lord COKE laments that there was no good Latin word for the dung-
cart, and says, that the pillory and the trebucket were of the dung-cart 
family. 
288 Id. at *10. Duncan noted that a “cucking-stool” had been defined as “an engine, invented for the 
punishment of scolding and unquiet women.” Id. He then proceeded to explain the rationale in earlier years 
for this instrument of punishment: 
Very possibly, as both men and women were, in those days, rude and 
disorderly, the women were put in the trebucket and the men in the 
pillory, for disturbing or making a noise in this great court; and Lord 
COKE, 3 Inst. 219, says, “furea, pillore et tumbrel appendant al view 
de frank-pledge, and every one who hath a leet or market, ought to have 
a pillory and trebucket to punish offenders; for want whereof, the lord 
may be fined, or his liberty seized.” 
Id. 
289 In support of this proposition, Duncan gave the following recitation of authorities: 
Barrington says, it was a punishment formerly used in this country, for 
female offenders, and not confined to the offence of scolding; and 
Jacob says, the punishment is disused. Mr. Morgan, one of his editors, 
informs us, that he saw the remains of one, on a private estate, in 
Warwickshire; and Mr. Tomlins, in his last edition of this work, 
mentions there had been one, which had lately been removed, at 
Banbury, in Oxfordshire, but that was not a machine for legal 
punishment, but was used to make sport for the mob, in ducking 
common women; for this usage, this propensity to ducking women, was 
pretty inveterate. Old women were generally ducked by the common 
people, by way of primary or experimental trial, before they were 
delivered over to the civil magistrate to be hanged as witches; many of 
the accused died under the experiment. This does not depend on a work 
of fiction (many of which, in the present day, present the real manners 
and habits of the times in which they lay the scenes), but on authentic 
history. 
Id. 
290 Id. In 1828, Noah Webster, citing Blackstone, defined “DUCKING-STOOL” as “[a] stool or chair in 
which common scolds were formerly tied and plunged into water.”  1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN 
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choking-stool,” as well as “the pillory, the collisstrigium, or neck-stretch, are 
punishments ejusdem generis, of the same family,” Duncan cited authorities for the 
notion that putting someone “in the pillory” was intended to “disgrace” the offender.291 
“[I]t is very certain,” Duncan explained, “that the legislature never considered the 
ducking-stool a legal punishment, which could be inflicted by the sentence of the law, or 
when they abolished the pillory and whipping-post, &c., they would have included it.”292 
                                                                                                                                                 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828); see also Ducking stool, DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 99 
(Henry Pratt Fairchild ed., 2014): 
A stool or chair in which common scolds were formerly tied and 
plunged into water.  It is mentioned in the Doomsday Book, and was 
extensively used throughout Great Britain from the 15th to the 
beginning of the 18th century.  The last recorded instance of it was in 
England in 1809. 
38 ABRAHAM REES, THE CYCLOPÆDIA; OR, UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY OF ARTS, SCIENCES, AND LITERATURE 
(1819) (noting in the entry for “WOOTTON-BASSET” that in a “town-hall” there was lately preserved “a 
machine, called a ‘cucking or ducking-stool,’ formerly used for the punishment of female scolds”); 
PETTIFER, supra note 266, at 106: 
There seems to be some conflict as to when the ducking-stool was last 
used in England.  Horsfall Turner says he cannot find any record in 
Yorkshire after 1745: another writer thinks its use persisted until 1770, 
but William Andrews gives two instances in the nineteenth century, at 
Plymouth in 1808, and in 1809 at Leominster. In 1817, a woman was 
sentenced to be ducked at Leominster, and was wheeled round the town 
in the chair, but was not ducked, as the water, luckily for her, was too 
low. 
291 James, 1825 WL 1899, at *10. James Wilson, the American founder, spoke in his law lectures of the 
varied language used to describe the devices used to punish common scolds, even using a little satire in 
discussing the very idea of the punishment.  3 BIRD WILSON, ED., THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES 
WILSON, L. L. D.: LATE ONE OF THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
AND PROFESSOR OF LAW IN THE COLLEGE OF PHILADELPHIA 110–11 (1804): 
A common scold, says the law, is a publick nuisance to her 
neighbourhood: as such she may be indicted, and, if convicted, shall be 
placed in a certain engine of correction, called the trebucket, 
castigatory, or cucking stool; which, in the Saxon language, signifies 
the scolding stool; though now it is frequently corrupted into ducking 
stool; because the residue of the sentence against her is, that when she 
is thus placed, she shall be plunged in the water—for the purpose of 
prevention, it is presumed, as well as of punishment. 
Our modern man of gallantry would not surely decline the honour 
of her company.  I therefore propose humbly, that, in future, the 
cucking stools shall be made to hold double. 
The language Wilson used to describe the ducking stool came in part from Sir William Blackstone.  See 
infra text accompanying note 342. 
292 James, 1825 WL 1899, at *10. The practice of ducking had a long history, though it eventually passed 
from the scene. As one English source notes, the ducking-stool “was in use in the parish and town of 
Liverpool” “[a]s recently as the beginning of the eighteenth century.” JOHN HARLAND & T. T. WILKINSON, 
LANCASHIRE LEGENDS, TRADITIONS, PAGEANTS, SPORTS, &C. WITH AN APPENDIX CONTAINING A RARE 
TRACT ON THE LANCASHIRE WITCHES, &C. &C. 167 (1873); see also id. at 169 (“The ducking-stool, 
according to Mr Richard Brooks’ ‘Liverpool from 1775 to 1800,’ was in use in 1779, by the authority of 
the magistrates, in the House of Correction, which formerly stood upon Mount Pleasant, in that town.”). 
Pennsylvania’s abolition of the whipping post and the pillory—a historical fact referenced by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court—was praised around the same time as that decision as having put a stop to 
 
Vol. 13:4]  John D. Bessler 
363  
Pennsylvania had, by statute, actually begun moving away from draconian corporal 
punishments decades earlier. In 1790, the Pennsylvania legislature had adopted “An Act 
to reform the Penal Laws of this state.”293 Among other things, that law substituted prison 
sentences and hard labor for “whipping” and other previously authorized common-law 
punishments, listed in the act as “burning in the hand,” “cutting off the ears,” “nailing the 
ear or ears to the pillory,” and “placing in and upon the pillory.”294 “The object of the 
framers of the act of 1790,” Justice Duncan opined in the Nancy James’s appeal, “was the 
abolition of all infamous, disgraceful, public punishments—all cruel and unnatural 
punishments—for all the classes of minor offences and misdemeanors, to which they had 
been before applied.” “This was the object of the author of our humane penal code,” 
Duncan said, adding, “I need not mention the name of Mr. Bradford, to whom the 
civilized world is so much indebted.”295 William Bradford—a prominent lawyer and a 
                                                                                                                                                 
cruelty. See MICHAEL MERANZE, LABORATORIES OF VIRTUE, PUNISHMENT, REVOLUTION, AND AUTHORITY 
IN PHILADELPHIA, 1760–1835, at 1 (1996): 
On May 22, 1823, Roberts Vaux—Philadelphia gentleman, merchant, 
and philanthropist—addressed a crowd assembled to mark the laying of 
the cornerstone of the Eastern State Penitentiary. Vaux praised his state 
and its legislators for breaking the fetters of penal tradition and 
abolishing the pillory, the whipping post, and the chain—“those cruel 
and vindictive penalties which are in use in the European countries”—
and substituting “milder correctives” for crime. In the place of public 
corporal punishments that, he argued, “were not calculated to prevent 
crime, but to familiarize the mind with cruelty, and consequently to 
harden the hearts of those who suffered, and those who witnesses such 
punishments” would stand the penitentiary. 
293 Act of Apr. 5, 1790, reprinted in 3 LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 440–54 (1803).  
294 Id. Prior to 1790, Pennsylvania law explicitly authorized ear cropping, public whipping, and the pillory. 
See, e.g., Act of Mar. 21, 1772, reprinted in 2 LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 55–56 
(1803) (stating that any person or persons breaking and entering a house at night “shall stand in the pillory 
during the space of one hour, have his, her or their ears cut off, and nailed to the pillory, be publicly 
whipped with thirty-nine lashes on the bare back, well laid on”); Act of Feb. 26, 1773, reprinted in 2 LAWS 
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 82–83 (1803) (counterfeiters “shall be sentenced to the 
pillory, and have both his or her ears cut off, and nailed to the pillory, and be publicly whipped on his or 
her bare back, with thirty-one lashes, well laid on”); Act of Mar. 10, 1780, reprinted in 2 LAWS OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 255–56 (1803) (any person or persons guilty of stealing a horse “for 
the first offence, shall stand in the pillory for one hour, and shall be publicly whipped on his, her or their 
backs with thirty-nine lashes, well laid on, and at the same time shall have his, her or their ears cut off, and 
nailed to the pillory; and for the second offence shall be whipped and pillored in like manner, and be 
branded on the forehead, in a plain and visible manner, with the letters H. T.”); Act of Mar. 16, 1785, 
reprinted in 3 LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 24–25 (1803) (counterfeiters “shall be 
sentenced to the pillory, and to have both his or her ears cut off, and nailed to the pillory”). 
295 Justice Duncan noted: 
[T]he wisdom, humanity, and policy of our Pennsylvania plan, has 
crossed the Atlantic. England, attached as she is to her own system, has 
adopted ours; and very lately, by stat. 56 Geo. III., has abolished pillory 
in all cases but perjury and subornation of perjury. Long before, to the 
honor of her humanity, in the case of punishments inflicted for 
clergyable offences, she had extended the benefit of clergy to women, 
provided that the whipping should be in private, and in the presence of 
the female sex alone, 19 Geo. II., ch. 26; and I believe the punishment 
of whipping, as to females, has been altogether abolished. 
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close friend of James Madison from their days together at the College of New Jersey296—
had published An Enquiry How Far the Punishment of Death Is Necessary in 
Pennsylvania (1793), an influential essay advocating the curtailment of death 
sentences.297  
Outdated punishments were, in fact, referred to in many ways in the early 
nineteenth century. Along with crediting William Bradford’s work, Justice Duncan’s 
opinion also referred to the efforts of Jared Ingersoll, a prominent jurist.298 “The late 
Judge INGERSOLL,” Duncan noted, “a name respected and honored, when attorney-
general, in his report to the legislature, in 1813, stated that by several acts of assembly, 
‘cruel and unnatural punishments, which tended only to harden and confirm the criminal, 
had been abolished for all inferior offences.’”299 “It is apparent,” Duncan emphasized, 
referring to Bradford and Ingersoll, “that those two distinguished men were of opinion 
that all infamous corporal punishments, and disgraceful public spectacles, ad ludibrium, 
were abolished; and that the legislature so considered it when they passed the several acts 
reforming the penal laws, I think, we have the most conclusive evidence.”300 The 
reference to “cruel and unnatural punishments” instead of “cruel and unusual 
punishments” shows that people at that time referred to archaic, barbaric or cruel 
punishments in varying ways.301 
                                                                                                                                                 
James, 1825 WL 1899, at *10. 
296 David Nordquest, Madison and Philosophy: His Coursework and His Statesmanship, in JOHN R. VILE, 
WILLIAM D. PEDERSON & FRANK J. WILLIAMS, EDS., JAMES MADISON: PHILOSOPHER, FOUNDER, AND 
STATESMAN 3 (2008) (discussing James Madison’s studies at the College of New Jersey, now Princeton, 
and his friendship with William Bradford). 
297 BESSLER, supra note 7, at 85. 
298 Jared Ingersoll served as Pennsylvania’s attorney general from 1790 to 1799 and also from 1811 to 
1817. Robert J. Lukens, Jared Ingersoll’s Rejection of Appointment as One of the “Midnight Judges” of 
1801: Foolhardy or Farsighted?, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 189, 203–05 (1997). In 1821, Ingersoll became the 
presiding judge of the District Court for the City and County of Philadelphia, but died a year later. Id. 
299 James, 1825 WL 1899, at *11. 
300 Id. Noting the Quaker heritage of Pennsylvania, Justice Duncan added: 
The sanguinary code of England could be no favorite with William 
Penn and his followers, who fled from persecution. Cruel punishments 
were not likely to be introduced by a society who denied the right to 
touch the life of man, even for the most atrocious crime. For had they 
brought with them the whole body of the British criminal law, then we 
should have had the appeal of death, and the impious spectacle of a trial 
by battle in a Quaker colony; and it is worthy of remembrance, that the 
charter of William Penn empowered him with the advice and assent of 
the freemen, to make laws for their own government, and until this was 
done, the laws of England, in respect to real and personal property, and 
as to felonies were to continue the same. Thus, as to misdemeanors, the 
common-law punishments were not brought over by the first settlers. 
Id. 
301 See also Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 447, 450 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1824): 
When this Bill of Rights was declared . . . we knew that the best heads 
and hearts of the land of our ancestors, had long and loudly declaimed 
against the wanton cruelty of many of the punishments practised in 
other countries; and this section in the Bill of Rights, was framed 
effectively to exclude these, so that no future Legislature, in a moment 
perhaps of great and general excitement, should be tempted to disgrace 
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Anglo-American judges, as they always have, almost reflexively look to past 
practice and precedents by virtue of their legal training. Justice Duncan himself spent a 
lot of time recounting the history of laws punishing scolding, whether by fine, gagging, 
or confinement at hard labor.302 After referencing seventeenth-century laws passed in 
1682 and 1683 that punished scolding, Duncan emphasized that those laws “continued in 
force until 1700, when another act against scolding passed, inflicting the same penalty of 
imprisonment, five days at hard labor, or to be gagged and stand at some convenient 
place, at the discretion of the magistrate.”303 “The act of 1700 was repealed by the Queen 
in council, but I have not been able to find the repeal of the acts of 1682 and 1683,” 
Duncan added long before the days of electronic legal research.304 “Whatever be the 
fact,” he ruled, “the conclusion is the same—that the common-law punishment of 
ducking was not received nor embodied by usage so as to become a part of the common 
law of Pennsylvania.”305 As Duncan emphasized: “It was rejected, as not accommodated 
to the circumstances of the country, and against all the notions of punishment entertained 
by this primitive and humane community; and, though they adopted the common-law 
doctrines as to inferior offences, yet they did not follow their punishment.”306 In other 
words, the corporal punishment at issue—ducking—was seen as an inhumane one. 
In the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling, Justice Duncan specifically spoke of 
the common law and its evolving nature. “I do not find the rule on this subject,” he noted, 
“more satisfactorily laid down than by the Chief Justice.”307 “Every country, he 
observed,” Duncan recounted of Chief Justice William Tilghman’s prior decision in The 
Guardians of the Poor of Philadelphia v. Greene,308 “had its common law—ours is 
composed partly of the common law of England, and partly of our own usages.”309 
Duncan then emphasized how Americans chose not to adopt English law in a wholesale 
fashion: 
 
Our ancestors, when they emigrated, took with them such of the English 
principles as were convenient for the situation in which they were about to place 
themselves. By degrees, as circumstances demanded, we adopted the English 
                                                                                                                                                 
our Code by the introduction of any of those odious modes of 
punishment.  




306 Id. “It is not true,” Duncan held, “that our ancestors brought with them all the common-law offences; for 
instance, that of champerty and maintenance, this court decided in Stoever v. Whitman’s Lessee, 6 Binn. 
416, did not exist here.” Id. at *12. 
307 Id. William Tilghman served as the Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court from 1806 until 
his death in 1827. PETER STEPHEN DU PONCEAU, EULOGIUM IN COMMEMORATION OF THE HONOURABLE 
WILLIAM TILGHMAN, LL.D.: CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, AND PRESIDENT 
OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY, HELD AT PHILADELPHIA, FOR PROMOTING USEFUL 
KNOWLEDGE 23 (1827) (“Mr. Tilghman was appointed to the office of Chief Justice, on the 26th of 
February, 1806, and held it during the space of 21 years, to the time of his death.”); 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A 
COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY, ADDRESSED TO STUDENTS AND THE PROFESSION GENERALLY 646 (1836) (noting 
that William Tilghman was born in 1756 and died in 1827). 
308 5 Binn. 554, 558 (Pa. 1813). 
309 James, 1825 WL 1899, at *12. 
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usages, or substituted others better suited to our wants; until, before the 
revolution, we had formed a system of our own, founded, in general, on the 
English constitution, but not without considerable variation; and in nothing was 
the variation greater, than in the trial and punishment of crimes.310 
 
The English Bill of Rights, with its 1689 prohibition against “cruel and unusual 
punishments,” was, of course, considered part of the “English constitution.”311 
In considering the prior practice of ducking scolds, Duncan wrote that “all our 
legislation has been opposed to this punishment; judicial decisions there are none.”312 “I 
cannot give to the two precedents from the quarter sessions of Philadelphia,” he said, 
distinguishing a couple of examples he viewed as outliers, “the weight of decisions.”313 
As Duncan reasoned in rejecting reliance on those precedents: “The two instances in the 
quarter sessions, which are principally relied upon to sustain the judgment, are too slight 
a foundation on which to rest a sentence, so hostile to all the policy and humanity of our 
penal code, and so much opposed to the sense of the community.”314 “Common-law 
rights,” Duncan emphasized, “are to be found in the opinions of lawyers, delivered by 
axioms; or in judicial decisions, well considered and established; or to be collected from 
                                                 
310 Id. Jurist Samuel Chase, in United States v. Worrall, 2 Dall. 384 (Pa. 1798), on the same subject, 
expressed himself in this fashion:  
When the American colonies were first settled by our ancestors, it was 
held, as well among the settlers, as by the judges and lawyers of 
England, that they brought hither, as their birthright and inheritance, so 
much of the common law as was applicable to their local situation and 
change of circumstances; but each colony judged for itself what part of 
the common law was applicable to its new condition, and by various 
modes—by legislative acts, by judicial decisions, or by constant 
usage—adopted some parts and rejected others. 
Id. at 394. 
311 1 KARA E. STOOKSBURY ET AL., EDS., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 80 
(2d ed. 2017): 
The English Bill of Rights of 1689, also called the Declaration of 
Right, was a product of the Glorious, or Bloodless, Revolution of 1688 
and marked a significant development in English constitutional history. 
William III’s acceptance of the declaration and its passage by 
Parliament officially subjugated the English monarch to parliamentary 
law. In addition, the declaration contains some provisions protecting 
individual civil rights. Like the Magna Carta, it remains one of the core 
documents of the English constitution. 
312 James, 1825 WL 1899, at *12. 
313 Id. 
314 Id. As Judge Duncan wrote of the work of the court of quarter sessions and the absence of ducking being 
inflicted as punishment: 
The court of quarter sessions was, when this judgment was given, 
composed entirely of men who (however high their standing in society, 
and however intelligent) were unversed in law. Since 1782, until the 
last case in the mayor's court, forty years ran round, and there has been 
no instance of this punishment. There has been one of an acquittal; that 
case, therefore, proves nothing. 
Id. 
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the universal usage through the country.”315 In other words, one could look to the 
frequency of a practice throughout America to help determine its legitimacy—and to 
assess whether that practice was a common, or usual, one. 
At the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, Justice Duncan thus took a 
pragmatic, non-rigid approach by looking at the facts themselves before writing the 
court’s judicial decision, as any good judge would do. “What is the evidence here?” 
Duncan asked, looking for facts before announcing the few instances he could locate of 
women being ordered ducked for the offense of scolding.316 In one notorious case from 
the 1781–1782 time period, Duncan wrote, a sentence of ducking was only “most 
reluctantly” given before being “humanely” suspended.317 In that case, the court—
“doubtful of the sentence to be given”—instead ordered the woman, by agreement and 
with her consent, to simply leave the neighborhood in which she had engaged in the 
conduct in question.318 The decision-makers in that case, Justice Duncan editorialized, 
“were glad, as well as the neighborhood, to get rid of her.”319 “Mr. Bradford was then 
attorney-general,” Duncan added, saying that “most probably, all was transacted under 
his advice; we can thus readily account for this unusual judgment.”320  
While he discussed the common law in some detail, Justice Duncan was clearly not 
willing to blindly follow ideas—or legal customs—laid down decades earlier. “I must 
confess,” he said of the punishment of ducking, “I am not so idolatrous a worshipper, as 
to tie myself to the tail of this dung-cart of the common law.”321 “I am far from 
professing the same reverence for all the degrading and ludicrous punishments of the 
early days of the common law,” he wrote, adding of ducking: “I am far from thinking, 
that this is an unbroken pillar of the common law, or that to remove this rubbish, would 
                                                 
315 Id. 
316 Id. Judge Duncan described what he found as follows: 
In 1769, eighty years after the settlement of the colony, in The King v. 
Mary Conway, the indictment was against her as a common scold; she 
pleaded guilty; the sentence was, that she should be publicly ducked at 
the end of Market street wharf, in the Delaware; all this passed without 
debate, and we may presume, without the assistance of counsel for the 
woman. In 1779, ten years after, there was a trial and conviction (The 
State v. Ann Maize), and the same sentence. In 1781, there was an 
indictment for the same offence, against Mary Swann; verdict guilty; 
continued for advisement; continued from March 1781, to June 1782, 
when there is this most extraordinary entry: “defendant having 
demeaned herself peaceably, kept under further advisement; and in the 
next term, on motion of Mr. Bankson, the defendant was recognised, 






320 Id. William Bradford was Pennsylvania’s Attorney General from 1780 to 1791, when he was appointed 
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In 1794, Bradford become the Attorney General of the United States, 
serving in that position until his death in 1795. William Bradford (1755-1795), U. PA.: U. ARCHIVES & 
RECS. CTR., http://www.archives.upenn.edu/people/1700s/bradford_wm.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2018). 
321 James, 1825 WL 1899, at *13. 
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impair a structure, which no man can admire more than I do.”322 “In coming to the 
conclusion, that the ducking-stool is not the punishment of scolds,” Duncan wrote, “I do 
not take into consideration the humane provisions of the constitutions of the United 
States and of this state, as to cruel and unusual punishments, further than they show the 
sense of the whole community.”323 In other words, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
made the common law—not the U.S. Constitution or Pennsylvania’s constitution—the 
basis of its decision. 
In alluding to, but not expressly relying on, Pennsylvania’s constitution or the 
Eighth Amendment’s proscription against “cruel and unusual punishments,” Justice 
Duncan’s opinion instead focused on the barbarous and undignified nature of ducking as 
a punishment. As Duncan reasoned, “If the reformation of the culprit, and prevention of 
the crime, be the just foundation and object of all punishments, nothing could be further 
removed from these salutary ends, than the infliction in question.”324 “It destroys all 
personal respect,” he explained, emphasizing that “the women thus punished would scold 
on for life, and the exhibition would be far from being beneficial to the spectators.”325 
“What a spectacle would it exhibit!” he emphasized, worried about “a congregation of the 
idle” and the disorderly and the lack of any persuasive penological justification.326 “[T]he 
day would produce more scolding,” he said, “in this polite city, than would otherwise 
take place in a year.”327  
By ruling that the ducking-stool was an instrument of the past, not the present, 
Justice Duncan reversed the judgment of the court of quarter sessions.328 In so doing, 
Duncan recognized that the change in the law wrought over time was beneficial to society 
as a whole. “The city is rescued from this ignominious and odious show, and the state 
from the opprobrium of the continuance of so barbarous an institution,” Duncan wrote, 
noting that his ruling was in line with those of other states.329 “The courts of our sister 
states of New York and Massachusetts, governed by the same common law as we are,” 
                                                 
322 Id. 
323 Id. 
324 Id. Writers like William Bradford had, following Beccaria, emphasized that the sole purpose of 
punishments was to prevent crimes. See, e.g., SHARON M. HARRIS, EXECUTING RACE: EARLY AMERICAN 
WOMEN’S NARRATIVES OF RACE, SOCIETY, AND THE LAW 66 (2005): 
William Bradford, the conservative Federalist attorney general under 
President Washington, subscribed to the anti-capital punishment 
philosophy of Montesquieu and Beccaria. In excerpts from his tract 
published in The New-York Magazine in 1793, he defined the principles 
of opposition: the sole purpose of punishment was the prevention of 
crime; any punishment which is not absolutely necessary constitutes “a 
cruel and tyrannical act”; and penalties must be appropriate to the act. 
These principles, Bradford asserted, “protect the rights of humanity, 
and prevent the abuses of government.” Though murder was still seen 
as a capital crime by many opponents, including Bradford and 
Jefferson, Bradford pondered whether it should be, since he doubted its 
effectiveness as a deterrent. 
325 James, 1825 WL 1899, at *13. 
326 Id. 
327 Id. 
328 See id. at *14. 
329 Id. at *13. 
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he emphasized, looking beyond the borders of Pennsylvania, “have declared that this 
strange and ludicrous punishment no longer exists with them.”330 “[T]he common law 
punishment of ducking not being received here,” Duncan concluded of Pennsylvania law, 
“I join in the hope of a learned antiquarian and jurist of our own country, ‘that we shall 
hereafter hear nothing of the ducking-stool, or other remains of the customs of barbarous 
ages.’”331  
In the wake of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision, another case—that of a 
sixty-year-old woman in Washington, D.C.—came into the public eye.332 Anne Royall 
(also referred to as Ann Royal) was indicted in 1829 as a “common scold” and as a 
“common slanderer and a disturber of the peace . . . .”333 She had allegedly “falsely and 
maliciously” slandered “good citizens,” with the grand jury’s indictment saying she had 
                                                 
330 Id. Ducking was clearly authorized and in use, at least to some degree, in colonial times. Compare 
EMERY E. CHILDS, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER: FROM THE DISCOVERY 
OF AMERICA IN 1492 TO THE YEAR 1885, INCLUDING NOTICES OF MANUFACTURERS AS THEY WERE 
INTRODUCED; OF OTHER INDUSTRIES; OF RAILROADS, CANALS, TELEGRAPHS, AND OTHER IMPROVEMENTS; 
OF INVENTIONS, IMPORTANT EVENTS, ETC. 18 (1885) (noting that, in 1692, “[a] whipping-post, pillory, and 
ducking-stool were established in the city of New York”), with HENRY COLLINS BROWN, GLIMPSES OF OLD 
NEW-YORK 310 (1917) (noting that, in 1691, “[a] ducking stool (for punishment of criminals)” was 
“erected in front of City Hall”); see also KIRSTEN FISCHER, SUSPECT RELATIONS: SEX, RACE, AND 
RESISTANCE IN COLONIAL NORTH CAROLINA 234 n.12 (2002) (“In 1662 the Virginia legislature allowed 
that ‘brabling women’ whose slander involved their husbands in ‘vexatious suites’ could be ducked in lieu 
of paying fines.”); 2 J. THOMAS SCHARF, HISTORY OF MARYLAND: FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE 
PRESENT DAY 41 (1879) (“The ducking-stool . . . for scolding women, was peculiarly a Puritan 
punishment. It was probably very seldom resorted to in the colony—at any rate, the Act providing for it 
was abolished in 1676, chapter XXI., together with a great many other Acts of the Puritan regime.”). The 
ducking stool had a long history in America’s mother country. E.g., 2 THE HISTORICAL MAGAZINE, AND 
NOTES AND QUERIES CONCERNING THE ANTIQUITIES, HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY OF AMERICA 90 (1858): 
THE DUCKING STOOL.—The singular punishment of women in England 
for the too free use of the tongue, by immersing them in water through 
the instrumentality of an apparatus called the “ducking stool,” was early 
introduced into this country. Towns were required, in some instances, 
to provide themselves with this instrument, and women indicted and 
convicted of being “common scolds,” were taken to a neighboring pond 
or stream, and subjected to that ignominious but legal punishment. 
331 James, 1825 WL 1899, at *14 (citing DU PONCEAU, supra note 256, at 96). In a “NOTE” that followed 
the opinion itself, it was added that an act of Henry VIII was once passed for the punishment of a cook who 
poisoned a bishop’s family members. Id. As the note stated: “[B]y an ex post facto law, this was made 
treason, and he was ordered to be thrown into boiling water; the idea of which punishment, as Barrington 
suggests, was because he was a cook.” Id. (citation omitted). “Such were the barbarous institutions of the 
age,” the note concluded, adding: “This punishment accorded with the savage cruelty of the monarch, and 
was recommended by its quaintness; to boil a cook, was quite a royal joke; as the Duke of Clarence was 
drowned in a butt of Malmsey, a favor granted him by the King; a whimsical choice, says Hume, which 
implied that he had an extraordinary passion for that liquor.” Id. 
332 JEFF BIGGERS, THE UNITED STATES OF APPALACHIA: HOW SOUTHERN MOUNTAINEERS BROUGHT 
INDEPENDENCE, CULTURE, AND ENLIGHTENMENT TO AMERICA 103, 105 (2006) (noting that Anne Royall, 
“a demure, squat, graying woman in her sixties,” was born in 1769 and tried as “a common scold” in 1829); 
see also ELIZABETH J. CLAPP, A NOTORIOUS WOMAN: ANNE ROYALL IN JACKSONIAN AMERICA (2016); 
SARAH HARVEY PORTER, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ANNE ROYALL (1909); GEORGE STUYVESANT JACKSON, 
UNCOMMON SCOLD: THE STORY OF ANNE ROYALL (1937). 
333 H.S. Boutell, United States vs. Ann Royal, 9 GEO. L.J. 30, 32 (1921). 
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engaged in such conduct “in the open and public streets of the city of Washington.”334 
Described as “an evil disposed person,” she was accused of being “a common brawler 
and sower of discord among her quiet and honest neighbors” and of acting “against the 
peace and government of the United States.”335 In an era when ducking as a punishment 
was still under debate and consideration,336 her trial took place before a jury on July 18, 
1829, with Judge William Cranch presiding.337 A local newspaper, the National 
Intelligencer, reported on the trial, noting that “[t]he examination and cross examination 
of the numerous witnesses occupied nearly five hours.” After retiring for just a few 
minutes, the jury returned a guilty verdict, leaving only her punishment in question.338 
Although Anne Royall was never actually subjected to the punishment of ducking, 
it was a punishment that might have been imposed had the judge so ruled. In a motion to 
arrest the judgment that was argued on July 28th, Royall’s counsel, Richard Coxe, 
reportedly “suggested to the Court that according to the authorities, there was no 
discretion in the court to adjudge any other punishment to a common scold than the 
ducking stool.” Because Coxe believed that ducking was an impermissible punishment, 
he thus sought the Court’s intervention. “[A] learned English judge,” Coxe argued, 
“respited judgment in a case of this description because he was of the opinion that a 
ducking would only have the effect of hardening the offender.” As a report of counsel’s 
argument emphasized: 
 
There was another consequence of this punishment to which he called attention of 
the country, which was the privilege, according to legal writers, that it conferred 
upon the delinquent of ever afterward scolding with impunity. He begged the 
court to weigh the matter and not be the first to introduce the ducking stool which 
had been obsolete in England since the time of Queen Anne, reminding him that 
the very introduction of such an engine of punishment might have the effect of 
increasing the crimes of this class.339   
                                                 
334 Id. at 33. 
335 Id. at 32–33, 43. 
336 E.g., 8 THE PERCY ANECDOTES: ORIGINAL AND SELECT 29, 32–33 (1826): 
How long the ducking-stool has been in disuse in England, does 
not appear; but that it was not always effectual, is proved from the 
records of the King’s Bench, where we find, that in the year 1681, Mrs. 
Finch, a most notorious scold, who had been thrice ducked previously, 
for scolding, was a fourth time convicted for the offence, when the 
court sentenced her to pay a fine of three marks, and to be imprisoned 
until it was paid. 
In the United States of America, where many English customs, 
now forgotten in this county, are retained, the ducking-stool is still the 
punishment inflicted on a common scold, by the law of Baltimore, and 
some other states of the Union; and in one of the American papers for 
1818, there is a mention of one Mary Davis, who had been indicted for 
the offence, and found guilty by the jury, after a consultation of an hour 
and a half.  She was sentenced to be publicly ducked. 
337 Boutell, supra note 333, at 34. 
338 Id. 
339 Id.; JEFF BIGGERS, THE TRIALS OF A SCOLD: THE INCREDIBLE TRUE STORY OF WRITER ANNE ROYALL 
125 (2017) (noting that Richard Coxe was Royall’s appointed defense counsel). 
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In her case, Judge William Cranch was thus forced to confront a plea by Anne 
Royall’s counsel, Mr. Coxe, for an arrest of judgment of the “common scold” charge. As 
Judge Cranch said in summarizing the arguments of counsel: “In support of the motion to 
arrest the judgment, it is contended, that the law for the punishment of common scolds is 
quite obsolete in England, and never was in force in this country; that it is a barbarous 
and unusual punishment, and therefore is prohibited by the bill of rights, annexed to the 
constitution of Maryland under whose supposed common law this indictment is 
framed.”340 Cranch’s ultimate conclusion was that Coxe’s argument—that the scolding 
“offence was no longer indictable” because the “only punishment which could be 
inflicted” was “obsolete”—“rests upon the proposition that ducking was the only 
punishment which could be inflicted for the offence of being a common scold; and that 
proposition is supported only by uncertain inferences, drawn from a few loose 
expressions in the books . . . .”341 Sir William Blackstone, Cranch pointed out, had 
written: 
 
[A] common scold . . . is a public nuisance to her neighborhood. For 
which offence she may be indicted; and if convicted, shall be sentenced to 
be placed in a certain engine of correction called the trebucket, 
castigatory, or cucking stool which in the Saxon language is said to signify 
the scolding stool: though now it is frequently corrupted into ducking 
stool, because the residue of the judgment is, that, when she is placed 
therein, she shal[l] be plunged into the water for her punishment.342  
 
“The authorities . . . cited by Blackstone,” Judge Cranch found, “do not indicate 
any opinion that ducking is the only punishment, nor even that it is an indispensable part 
of the punishment.”343 While Cranch, in discussing Blackstone, wrote that “[i]t is true 
that the court, in its discretion, might sentence the offender to be ducked only,”344 he 
went on to rule: 
 
If a part of the common law punishment of the offence has become 
obsolete, the only effect is that the discretion of the court is so far limited. 
The offence is not obsolete, and cannot become obsolete so long as a 
common scold is a common nuisance. All the elementary writers upon 
criminal law admit that being a common scold, to the common nuisance of 
the neighborhood, is an indictable offence at common law.345 
 
“The Court is therefore of opinion,” Cranch determined, “that although punishment 
                                                 
340 Boutell, supra note 333, at 35; BIGGERS, supra note 339, at 1, 124–25, 129–30, 159–60, 163–64 
(recounting the history of ducking in colonial and early America, and discussing the debate in 1829 over 
whether 60-year-old Anne Royall, a journalist, should be subjected to the punishment of ducking). 
341 Boutell, supra note 333, at 36–37. 
342 Id. at 37 (quotations and citations omitted). 
343 Id. 
344 Id. at 40. 
345 Id. 
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by ducking may have become obsolete, yet, that the offence still remains a common 
nuisance, and, as such, is punishable by fine and imprisonment like any other 
misdemeanor at common law; and that therefore the motion in arrest of judgment must be 
over-ruled.”346 Anne Royall was ultimately ordered to pay a fine of ten dollars, plus 
costs, and to put up $250 to guarantee her “good behavior for one year.”347 
 
III. THE ADMINISTRATION OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY 
 
 
A. The Death Penalty’s English Roots and the Abolitionist Movement 
 
The American death penalty has deep roots. It existed in colonial times as an 
import from Great Britain, just like the punishment of ducking, and it was used during 
and after the Revolutionary War.348 Although William Penn, a Quaker, restricted the 
death penalty’s use in Pennsylvania in the seventeenth century, it was only after the 
publication of Cesare Beccaria’s landscape-changing On Crimes and Punishments that a 
broad swath of society began to question the death penalty’s legitimacy, efficacy and 
morality.349 Scores of public executions took place on American soil from colonial times 
                                                 
346 Id. at 40–41; accord BIGGERS, supra note 339, at 165. 
347 Boutell, supra note 333, at 42; BIGGERS, supra note 339, at 166. 
348 John D. Bessler, Capital Punishment Law and Practices: History, Trends, and Developments, in 
AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION (James R. Acker et al. eds., 3d ed. 2014); compare ALICE MORSE 
EARLE, COLONIAL DAMES AND GOOD WIVES 96 (1895): 
      One of the last indictments for ducking in our own country 
was that of Mrs. Anne Royall in Washington, almost in our own day. 
She was a hated lobbyist, whom Mr. Forney called an itinerant virago, 
and who became so abusive to congressmen that she was indicted as a 
common scold before Judge William Cranch . . . . She was, however, 
released with a fine.  
Women curst with a shrewish tongue were often punished in 
Puritan colonies. In 1647 it was ordered the ‘common scoulds’ be 
punished in Rhode Island by ducking, but I find no records of the 
punishment being given. In 1649 several women were prosecuted in 
Salem, Mass., for scolding; and on May 15, 1672, the General Court of 
Massachusetts ordered that scolds and railers should be gagged or “set 
in a ducking-stool and dipped over head and ears three times,” but I do 
not believe that this law was ever executed in Massachusetts. Nor was 
it in Maine, though in 1664 a dozen towns were fined forty shillings 
each for having no “coucking-stool.” 
349 See generally JOHN D. BESSLER, THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW: AN ITALIAN PHILOSOPHER AND THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2014) (describing the profound influence of Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and 
Punishments on America’s founders); see also JOHN D. BESSLER, THE CELEBRATED MARQUIS: AN ITALIAN 
NOBLE AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD (2018) (describing Cesare Beccaria’s global influence, 
including in colonial and early America); Kathryn Preyer, Cesare Beccaria and the Founding Fathers, in 
BLACKSTONE IN AMERICA: SELECTED ESSAYS OF KATHRYN PREYER 239–51 (Mary Sarah Bilder, Maeva 
Marcus & R. Kent Newmyer, eds., 2009) (describing the printing and dissemination of Beccaria’s book and 
his ideas in America). 
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to the 1930s, when the last public executions took place in the United States.350 From the 
1830s to the 1930s, widely attended public, midday executions gradually gave way to 
much more secretive executions, often at night. The Anglo-American habit of state-
sanctioned executions, however, did not die as public executions simply gave way to 
more private affairs behind thick prison walls.351  
The anti-death penalty movement, once known as the anti-gallows campaign, has 
been active in American life since the appearance of Beccaria’s book.352 In fact, 
eighteenth-century American political leaders articulated their opposition to, or their 
skepticism of, capital punishment around the time of the ratification of the U.S. Bill of 
Rights. In 1792, Dr. Benjamin Rush—a Philadelphia physician, a signer of the 
Declaration of Independence, and an adamant death penalty foe—wrote Considerations 
on the Injustice and Impolicy of Punishing Murder by Death.353 And in 1793, William 
Bradford—James Madison’s friend and a prominent Pennsylvania attorney—wrote An 
Enquiry how Far the Punishment of Death is Necessary in Pennsylvania, in which he 
studied, and then questioned the need for, capital punishment.354 It was only later, though, 
that states did away with capital punishment entirely. The first states to abolish the death 
penalty for murder were Michigan (1846), Rhode Island (1852), and Wisconsin (1853),355 
with lots of anti-gallows advocates—from Wisconsin legislator Marvin Bovee to poet 
Walt Whitman—stepping forward in the nineteenth century.356 The long history of anti-
death penalty activism by prominent Americans—indeed, dating back to colonial times—
is often overlooked by modern observers. 
 
B. The Modern Death Penalty’s Administration 
 
 The administration of the modern American death penalty begins—as it always 
has—with laws authorizing the death penalty. At present, the death penalty is authorized 
by the federal government and the U.S. military, as well as by thirty-one American 
states.357 Although nineteen American states and the District of Columbia no longer 
authorize capital punishment,358 the death penalty’s use is still a reality, although death 
                                                 
350 See generally JOHN D. BESSLER, DEATH IN THE DARK: MIDNIGHT EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 23–31 
(1997). 
351 Id. at 41–67. 
352 See generally STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY (2002); JOHN CYRIL 
BARTON, LITERARY EXECUTIONS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND AMERICAN CULTURE, 1820–1925 (2014). 
353 BENJAMIN RUSH, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE INJUSTICE AND IMPOLICY OF PUNISHING MURDER BY DEATH 
(1792). 
354 WILLIAM BRADFORD, AN ENQUIRY HOW FAR THE PUNISHMENT OF DEATH IS NECESSARY IN 
PENNSYLVANIA (1793). 
355 ALAN W. CLARKE & LAURELYN WHITT, THE BITTER FRUIT OF AMERICAN JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL AND 
DOMESTIC RESISTANCE TO THE DEATH PENALTY 78 (2007). 
356 MARVIN H. BOVEE, CHRIST AND THE GALLOWS; OR, REASONS FOR THE ABOLITION OF CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT (1870); PAUL CHRISTIAN JONES, AGAINST THE GALLOWS: ANTEBELLUM AMERICAN WRITERS 
AND THE MOVEMENT TO ABOLISH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 95–133 (2011) (Chapter 4 of this book is titled 
“Walt Whitman’s Anti-Gallows Writing: The Appeal to Christian Sympathy”). 
357 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 1 (2017), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf. 
358 The stories about how some states did away with the punishment of death are reported elsewhere. See, 
e.g., JOHN F. GALLIHER, LARRY W. KOCH, DAVID PATRICK KEYS & TERESA J. GUESS, AMERICA WITHOUT 
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sentences and executions—even in places where they were once firmly entrenched—are 
being meted out less and less in modern American life.359 This raises a question of 
considerable public importance: Is the death penalty, once a usual punishment, now an 
unusual one? If one recalls the history of the punishment of ducking, other subsidiary 
questions also recur: Is capital punishment inherently barbaric? And has the death penalty 
become obsolete? 
The facts show that America’s death penalty is now only rarely used and is, in fact, 
inhumane, barbaric, and unnecessary in modern life. The number of American death 
sentences fell from more than 300 per year in 1995 and 1996360 to less than fifty per year 
in 2015 and 2016.361 And in recent years, the number of executions has fallen from a high 
of ninety-eight in 1999 to twenty in 2016.362 Even in Harris County, Texas, known as the 
“Capital of Capital Punishment,” the death penalty is dying. Over the years, that county 
has produced many death sentences and executions—more than 125 of the latter since the 
U.S. Supreme Court, in Jurek v. Texas,363 upheld the constitutionality of Texas’s death 
penalty statute in 1976. Yet, no one was sentenced to death or executed from Harris 
County in 2017.364 Newly-elected Harris County District Attorney Kim Ogg, the 
Houston-area chief prosecutor, unabashedly views that “as a positive thing.”365 “I don’t 
think that being the death penalty capital of America is a selling point for Harris County,” 
she said.366 
 To understand the true nature of the death penalty’s administration in today’s 
America, one must actually look beyond statute books and do a county-by-county 
examination and study local practice. “The vast majority of counties do not use the death 
penalty at all,” explains law professor Robert J. Smith in the Boston University Law 
Review.367 After conducting a granular, county-by-county analysis of the distribution of 
death sentences and executions from 2004 to 2009, Smith found that “[j]ust 10% of 
                                                                                                                                                 
THE DEATH PENALTY: STATES LEADING THE WAY (2002); LARRY W. KOCH, COLIN WARK & JOHN F. 
GALLIHER, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY: STATES STILL LEADING THE WAY (2012). 
359 FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., DEADLY JUSTICE: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF THE DEATH PENALTY 
(2018) (showing the declining usage of death sentences and executions in Table 16.1). 
360 John D. Bessler, The American Enlightenment: Eliminating Capital Punishment in the United States, in 
LILL SCHERDIN, ED., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A HAZARD TO A SUSTAINABLE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM? 93 
(2016). 
361DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 357, at 3. 
362 Id. at 1. 
363 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
364 No Executions in the ‘Capital of Capital Punishment’ for First Time in 30 Years, DEATH PENALTY INFO. 
CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6940 (last visited Feb. 26, 2018) (citing Keri Blakinger, For First 
Time in More Than 30 Years, No Harris County Death Row Inmates Executed, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 4, 
2017; Michael Graczyk, US Executions Increase Slightly in 2017, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 2, 2017); see 
also Jordan Smith, For the First Time in Three Decades, the ‘Death Penalty Capital of America’ Goes 
Without an Execution, INTERCEPT (Dec. 22, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/12/22/death-penalty-
harris-county-texas/ (“Indeed, 2017 marked the third year in a row that Harris County did not send any new 
defendants to death row. Even more dramatic, it was the first year in more than three decades that no one 
from the county was executed.”). 
365 Blakinger, supra note 364. 
366 Id.  
367 Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and its Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. REV. 227, 227 
(2012). 
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counties nationally returned even a single death sentence during this time period,” and 
that “fewer than 1% of counties in the country sentenced anyone to death (at any point 
since 1976) whom their respective states executed from 2004 to 2009.”368 With death 
sentences clustered and concentrated in just a few jurisdictions, Smith emphasized that, in 
2009, just “five states—Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, and Texas—accounted for 
two-thirds of death sentences nationally.”369 The vast majority of executions take place in 
the so-called Death Belt: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South 
Carolina, and Texas.370 
In fact, only a handful of American counties have produced the bulk of death 
sentences and executions, with 2% of U.S. counties accounting for the majority of 
modern-day death row inmates and recent death sentences.371 In his 2015 dissent in 
Glossip v. Gross,372 Justice Stephen Breyer pointedly stressed: “Often when deciding 
whether a punishment practice is, constitutionally speaking, ‘unusual,’ this Court has 
looked to the number of States engaging in that practice. In this respect, the number of 
active death penalty States has fallen dramatically.”373 Justice Breyer’s dissent stressed 
that, in addition to the nineteen states that had already abolished capital punishment, in 
eleven of American death penalty states “no execution has taken place for more than 
eight years,” meaning that “30 States have either formally abolished the death penalty or 
have not conducted an execution in more than eight years.”374 “Of the 20 States that have 
conducted at least one execution in the past eight years,” Breyer pointed out, “9 have 
conducted fewer than five in that time, making an execution in those States a fairly rare 
event.”375 
 It is thus only a handful of individual prosecutors who actively choose to seek 
death sentences. Capital charging decisions, which amount, in essence, to pre-trial threats 
of death against the criminal defendant (and which may, themselves, prompt false 
confessions), begin with the prosecutor’s notice of intent to seek the death penalty. For 
example, under federal law, if the government’s attorney “believes that the circumstances 
of the offense are such that a sentence of death is justified,” the attorney “shall, a 
reasonable time before the trial or before acceptance by the court of a plea of guilty, sign 
                                                 
368 Id. at 228. 
369 Id. at 230. 
370 Id. at 230, 230 n.6 (citing Charles Ogletree, Black Man’s Burden: Race and the Death Penalty in 
America, 81 OR. L. REV. 15, 19 (2002) (listing states in the Death Belt as Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia). 
371 See generally RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE 2% DEATH PENALTY: HOW A 
MINORITY OF COUNTIES PRODUCE MOST DEATH CASES AT ENORMOUS COSTS TO ALL (2013), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/TwoPercentReport.pdf. 
372 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[R]ather than try to patch up the death penalty’s wounds 
one at a time, I would ask for full briefing on a more basic question: whether the death penalty violates the 
Constitution.”). 
373 STEPHEN BREYER, AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY 91–92 (John D. Bessler ed., 2016) (this book was 
published by Brookings Institution Press, and reprints, contextualizes, and annotates Justice Breyer’s 
dissent in Glossip v. Gross). 
374 Id. at 92. 
375 Id. According to Justice Breyer’s dissent: “That leaves 11 States in which it is fair to say that capital 
punishment is not ‘unusual.’ And just three of those States (Texas, Missouri, and Florida) accounted for 
80% of the executions nationwide (28 of the 35) in 2014.” Id.  
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and file with the court, and serve on the defendant, a notice . . . stating that the 
government believes that the circumstances of the offense are such that, if the defendant 
is convicted, a sentence of death is justified under this chapter and that the government 
will seek the sentence of death.”376 At the state level, prosecutors in locales that retain 
capital punishment may also file notices of intent to seek the death penalty but—it turns 
out—only a fraction of such cases ever receive death sentences or, ultimately, result in 
actual executions.377  
 For capitally-charged cases that do go to trial, the death-qualification process 
thereafter ensures that death penalty opponents—an increasing number, according to 
public opinion surveys378—are systematically excluded from jury service.379 In a process 
authorized by the U.S. Supreme Court380 and that, very problematically, results in more 
conviction-prone juries, a disproportionate number of women and African-Americans and 
other groups are purged from jury venires.381 And that occurs even as overt racial 
                                                 
376 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a)(1). 
377 E.g., Sherod Thaxton, Disciplining Death: Assessing and Ameliorating Arbitrariness in Capital 
Charging, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 137, 168 (2017): 
During the period under investigation (1993-2000), there were 1,238 
cases resulting in a murder conviction that were eligible for the death 
penalty under Georgia’s capital statute. Prosecutors filed a notice of 
intent to seek the death penalty in 400 cases and 54 defendants 
ultimately received the death penalty. Of the 395 capitally charged 
cases in which the method of disposition in known, 59% were 
ultimately resolved by plea and 41% were resolved by trial. 
378 “‘Americans’ support for the death penalty has dipped to a level not seen in 45 years,” reported an 
October 26, 2017 Gallup poll. Gallup Poll: Support for Death Penalty in U.S. Falls to a 45-Year-Low, 
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/Gallup-
Support_for_Death_Penalty_Falls_in_2017 (last visited Feb. 26, 2018) (citing Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Death 
Penalty Support Lowest Since 1972, GALLUP NEWS SERV., Oct. 26, 2017; Jeff Jones & Lydia Saad, Gallup 
Poll Social Series: Crime, GALLUP NEWS SERV., Oct. 26, 2017). In Gallup’s nationwide survey of 1,028 
adults, 55% of survey respondents said that they were “in favor of the death penalty for a person convicted 
of murder,” down from the 60% level reported in October 2016. Id. 
379 E.g., Nancy M. Marder, Foster v. Chatman: A Missed Opportunity for Batson and the Peremptory 
Challenge, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1137, 1186 n.316 (2017) (citing Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176–78 
(1986): 
A “death qualified” jury is one in which jurors who are staunchly 
opposed to the death penalty have been removed for cause. If they say 
they can consider applying the death penalty, then they can be seated as 
jurors. If they say they could never apply the death penalty, then they 
will be removed for cause. The Supreme Court has held that death 
qualification does not violate the fair cross-section requirement of the 
Sixth Amendment. 
380 See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Wainwright v. Witt, 470 U.S. 1039 (1985); Lockhart 
v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 (2007). 
381 E.g., Ann M. Eisenberg, Removal of Women and African Americans in Jury Selection in South Carolina 
Capital Cases, 1997–2012, 9 NE. U. L. REV. 299, 304–5 (2017): 
[D]eath-qualified juries are more inclined to return convictions and 
death sentences, undermining defendants’ rights to an impartial jury. 
Processes that siphon women and black venire members off of juries 
undermine juries’ fairness and effectiveness in numerous other ways as 
well: more diverse juries are likelier to “engage in wider-ranging 
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discrimination remains a major problem in the capital jury selection process, as the U.S. 
Supreme Court itself has found in recent cases.382 Most notoriously, in Foster v. 
Chatman,383 the Supreme Court found that Georgia prosecutors discriminated against 
black prospective jurors during the defendant’s 1987 capital trial. The prosecutors’ files 
included a list of black venire members’ names highlighted in green with the letter “B” 
written next to them, and prosecutors struck all four black prospective jurors, resulting in 
an all-white jury.384 
 
C. Discrimination, Arbitrariness, and Rampant Errors 
 
 In McCleskey v. Kemp,385 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a death row inmate’s 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge, ultimately leading to the execution of 
Warren McCleskey.386 But it is clear from cases such as Foster v. Chatman that the 
American death penalty—long administered in a racially discriminatory fashion387—
continues to be infected with significant racial prejudice and bias.388 Multiple studies, in 
fact, have shown that the race of the victim plays a material, statistically significant role 
in the outcome of capital cases, with those who kill whites much more likely to receive 
the punishment of death than those who kill blacks.389 Not only has the death penalty 
been administered in a racially discriminatory manner throughout America’s history,390 
but because of the gross inequity in its administration,391 the concurrent geographic 
                                                                                                                                                 
deliberations,” to address issues of race in their deliberations, and to 
counterbalance other jurors’ biases. 
382 E.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005); Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008); Foster v. 
Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016). 
383 136 S. Ct. 1737. 
384 Eisenberg, supra note 381, at 301. 
385 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
386 SAMUEL WALKER, CASSIA SPOHN & MIRIAM DELONE, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND 
CRIME IN AMERICA 397 (6th ed. 2016) (“After a series of last-minute appeals, requests for clemency, and 
requests for commutation were denied, Warren McCleskey was strapped into the electric chair at the state 
prison in Jacksonville, Georgia. He was pronounced dead at 3:13 a.m., September 26, 1991.”). 
387 BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY 123 (Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003) (“There is no 
question that the death penalty in this country historically was sought and imposed in a racially 
discriminatory manner. The ‘distorting effects of racial discrimination’ in the administration of the death 
penalty are in truth as old as our Republic.”). 
388 E.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE: HOW KILLING THE DEATH PENALTY CAN REVIVE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 82–86 (2017) (discussing the racial disparity in capital sentencing, race-of-the-victim 
discrimination, the racial bias in the selection of jurors, and the systematic exclusion of blacks from capital 
juries); see also Scott Phillips, Continued Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment: The 
Rosenthal Era, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 131 (2012); Scott Phillips, Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital 
Punishment, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 807 (2008). 
389 ROGER J. R. LEVESQUE, THE PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESSES 332–33 (2006) 
(discussing studies). 
390 JAMES R. ACKER, QUESTIONING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 197 (2014) (“The 
death penalty in the United States historically has been intertwined with the nation’s ignoble legacy of 
racial discrimination. Capital punishment was employed by Whites in several states as a harsh mechanism 
for repressing slaves in antebellum America.”). 
391 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 required that blacks and whites be subjected to “like punishment,” and the 
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to constitutionalize the protections of that landmark legislation. John 
D. Bessler, The Inequality of America’s Death Penalty: A Crossroads for Capital Punishment at the 
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disparities now so closely associated with death sentences, and the infrequency or rarity 
with which executions are carried out, state-sanctioned killing in the U.S. now resembles 
a corrupted, state-sponsored lottery system.392 The nature of the crime has little or no 
relationship to whether an offender lives or dies; instead, it is the locale of the crime and 
the race of the victim—along with the defendant’s poverty or the effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness of the defendant’s counsel393—that largely determines who gets 
condemned to death.394 
 In his 2015 dissent in Glossip v. Gross, Justice Stephen Breyer specifically 
emphasized that “use of the death penalty has become increasingly concentrated 
geographically.”395 As Justice Breyer, in an opinion joined by Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, wrote: “County-level sentencing figures show that, between 1973 and 1997, 66 
of America’s 3,143 counties accounted for approximately 50% of all death sentences 
imposed.”396 “By the early 2000s,” Breyer added, “the death penalty was only actively 
practiced in a very small number of counties: between 2004 and 2009, only 35 counties 
imposed 5 or more death sentences, i.e., approximately one per year.”397 In tracking the 
most recent figures, Breyer also emphasized: “And more recent data show that the 
practice has diminished yet further: between 2010 and 2015 (as of June 22), only 15 
counties imposed five or more death sentences.”398 As Breyer concluded: “In short, the 
number of active death penalty counties is small and getting smaller. And the overall 
statistics on county-level executions bear this out. Between 1976 and 2007, there were no 
executions in 86% of America’s counties.”399 
                                                                                                                                                 
Intersection of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 487, 515, 525–26 
(2016). The American death penalty, from the era of slavery to the modern era, has always been used in a 
discriminatory manner, and the American death penalty has never been carried out in a non-discriminatory 
way. Id. at 542–64. 
392 Corinna Barrett Lain, Following Finality: Why Capital Punishment is Collapsing Under its Own Weight, 
in FINAL JUDGMENTS: THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE 49 (Austin Sarat ed., 2017) 
(“In 1972, the Supreme Court invalidated the death penalty because it was arbitrary and capricious as then 
administered. A sentence of death was like being struck by lightning, Justice Stewart famously lamented—
and today that is literally true. In 2016, 20 people were executed; 36 were struck by lightning.”). 
393 A recent study found widely different success rates for ineffective assistance of counsel claims by 
circuit. See KENNETH WILLIAMS, MOST DESERVING OF DEATH?: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S 
DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE 29 (2012). Whereas inmates in the Ninth Circuit had a 52.6% success 
rate with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the five years after Wiggins v. Smith, 539 
U.S. 510 (2003), the success rate in other circuits—Fourth Circuit (0%), Fifth Circuit (3.8%), and Eleventh 
Circuit (4.5%)—was much lower. Id. 
394 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 692 (1984), held that a defendant must show that his or her 
attorney performed deficiently—and that the deficient performance was prejudicial—to establish 
ineffective assistance of counsel. It is also largely men, the poor, and the mentally ill who end up on 
America’s death rows. See generally Stephen B. Bright, The Role of Race, Poverty, Intellectual Disability, 
and Mental Illness in the Decline of the Death Penalty, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 671 (2015); Stephen B. Bright, 
Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE 
L.J. 1835 (1994). 
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 Not only is capital punishment meted out arbitrarily and incredibly sporadically, 
but the process by which it is meted out is error-ridden. In a recent book, Deadly Justice: 
A Statistical Portrait of the Death Penalty, the authors make the point that “[t]he ‘old’ 
death penalty died with Furman” while “the new one rose following Gregg.”400 While 
Gregg v. Georgia, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1976 decision allowing capital 
punishment’s continuance, insisted on improvements in death penalty laws in an attempt 
to make America’s capital punishment system less capricious, the authors of Deadly 
Justice note that more than 150 people have been exonerated from death row in the 
modern era—an error rate of approximately 4%.401 “[I]t is clear,” they write, “that the 
death penalty harbors serious flaws,” with the authors emphasizing that “more than 60 
percent” of death sentences are overturned and that “only 16 percent of condemned 
inmates” are actually executed.402 With all the judicial reversals and recurring 
miscarriages of justices, it is apparent that, if anything, the arbitrariness and unfairness of 
America’s death penalty has only reached new, unsurpassed heights. The Supreme Court 
may have insisted on various substantive and procedural protections when it comes to the 
administration of the punishment of death, but the death penalty remains horrifyingly 
arbitrary and discriminatory—a total affront to the notion of equal protection of the laws. 
 
D. Threats of Death and Dead Men Walking 
 
 Like highly discretionary capital charges, the penalty phases of capital trials aim 
to focus the jury’s attention403 on whether convicted offenders should live or die. And the 
penalty phase determinations that ultimately conclude in death sentences result in, in 
effect, state-sanctioned threats of death (as executions, of course, do not immediately 
follow the imposition of such sentences). Not all people who are sentenced to death will 
be executed (not by a long shot), but it is still the case that at least some will be, so these 
threats of death must be taken extremely seriously by those sentenced to death and their 
lawyers.404 In early America, offenders were regularly told by judges that they would be 
“hanged by the neck” until dead.405 And in modern American courtrooms, criminal 
                                                 
400 BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 359, at 4. 
401 Id. at 185; see also National Academy of Sciences Reports Four Percent of Death Row Inmates are 
Innocent, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Apr. 28, 2014), https://www.innocenceproject.org/national-academy-of-
sciences-reports-four-percent-of-death-row-inmates-are-innocent/ (“In a study released today, the National 
Academy of Sciences reports that at least 4.1% of defendants sentenced to death in the United States are 
innocent.”). 
402 BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 359, at 192. 
403 The U.S. Supreme Court has now made clear that, under the U.S. Constitution’s Sixth Amendment, 
death penalty determinations are to be made by juries. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016). 
404 PERSPECTIVES ON HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 322 n.33 (Sofia Gruskin et al. eds., 2005) (“A recent 
statistical study that reviewed capital appeals in the United States from 1973 to 1995 found the ‘overall 
Prejudicial error rate in the American capital punishment system was 68%.’”) (citing James S. Liebman et 
al., A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 15, 2000)). 
405 E.g., 1 RECORDS OF THE COURT OF ASSISTANTS OF THE COLONY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY 1630–
1692, at 320 (1901); A MEMBER OF THE NEW YORK BAR, HANGED BY THE NECK UNTIL YOU BE DEAD: OR 
WHY THE DEATH SENTENCE SHOULD BE ABOLISHED 20 (1877); JAMES JEFFREY PAUL, NOTHING IS 
STRANGE WITH YOU: THE LIFE AND CRIMES OF GORDON STEWART NORTHCOTT 225 (2008); HARRY M. 
WARD, PUBLIC EXECUTIONS IN RICHMOND, VIRGINIA: A HISTORY, 1782–1907, at 178 (2012). 
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defendants are—at least occasionally—still sentenced to death, though the method of 
execution has changed.406 Executions in the United States are now carried out by lethal 
injection instead of hanging, but the state-issued threats of death that precede executions 
are plainly designed—as they were in yesteryears—to put individuals on notice that the 
government plans to intentionally take the lives of such individuals. 
 In the lead-up to executions, death row inmates are confined in small cells and 
often spend twenty-three hours a day in those cells.407 Inmates are also subjected to the 
torment and uncertainty of the capital litigation process, which can go on for years, 
frequently decades.408 Given that wrongful convictions and miscarriages of justice occur 
with considerable frequency, both the guilty and (until exonerated) the innocent must 
endure such conditions, with death warrants—highly credible and specific threats of 
death—setting very real execution dates for those condemned to death. For example, in 
his book, The Wrong Man: A True Story of Innocence on Death Row, Michael Mello 
described how execution dates for inmates were “triggered by the governor’s signing of 
death warrants.”409 “Unless a stay is obtained prior to a specified execution date,” Mello 
explained, “the subject of the warrant will be put to death, even though his conviction 
may rest upon legal or factual error of constitutional magnitude.”410 
 In her bestselling memoir, Dead Man Walking: An Eyewitness Account of the 
Death Penalty in the United States, the anti-death penalty activist, Sister Helen Prejean, 
writes of her own first-hand encounters with America’s system of capital punishment.411 
In one telling passage, she describes a conversation with C. Paul Phelps, the head of the 
Louisiana Department of Corrections, after the electric-chair execution of Patrick 
Sonnier, a man for whom she served as a spiritual advisor. “Pat Sonnier was tortured, Mr. 
Phelps,” she recounted of her conversation.412 As Sister Prejean recalled what she’d said 
to Mr. Phelps, the man who designed the execution process and then supervised the 
executions: “I’m not sure what he felt physically when the nineteen hundred volts hit 
                                                 
406 WILLIAM S. MCFEELY, PROXIMITY TO DEATH 27, 50, 74, 113 (2000). Sometimes, modern American 
judges—echoing a phrase commonly used in early America—declare in open court: “May God have mercy 
on your soul.” Id. at 82; see also EDWARD BAUMANN, MAY GOD HAVE MERCY ON YOUR SOUL: THE STORY 
OF THE ROPE AND THE THUNDERBOLT (1993). 
407 The harsh conditions on death row have been summarized elsewhere and will not be repeated here. See, 
e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A DEATH BEFORE DYING: SOLITARY CONFINEMENT ON DEATH ROW 
(2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/deathbeforedying-report.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, UNIV. OF 
TEX. SCH. OF LAW, DESIGNED TO BREAK YOU: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ON TEXAS’ DEATH ROW 
(2017), https://law.utexas.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2017/04/2017-HRC-DesignedToBreakYou-
Report.pdf. 
408 In 2016, Justice Stephen Breyer dissented from a denial of certiorari in the case of Henry Sireci, a man 
“tried, convicted of murder, and first sentenced to death in 1976.”  Sireci v. Florida, 137 S. Ct. 470, 470 
(2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). As Breyer wrote of Sireci: “He has lived in prison 
under threat of execution for 40 years. When he was first sentenced to death, the Berlin Wall stood firmly 
in place. Saigon had just fallen.” Id. Justice Breyer then cited In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890), 
which, referring to a death row inmate’s four-week period of uncertainty before execution, held that such 
uncertainty is “one of the most horrible feelings to which he can be subjected.” Id. 
409 MICHAEL MELLO, THE WRONG MAN: A TRUE STORY OF INNOCENCE ON DEATH ROW 89 (2001).  
410 Id.  
411 HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1993). 
412 Id. at 105. 
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him, but certainly he agonized emotionally and psychologically—preparing to die, 
anticipating it, dreaming about it.”413 “Amnesty International,” she pointed out in her 
conversation, “defines torture as an extreme physical and mental assault on a person who 
has been rendered defenseless.”414 “That is what happened to Patrick Sonnier, isn’t it, Mr. 
Phelps?” she queried, with Phelps nodding in response.415 “Dead man walking,” the 
phrase popularized by Sister Prejean, refers to someone—in the death penalty context, a 
condemned inmate—who is walking or heading towards death.416 
 In fact, the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment defines “torture” as “any act by which severe pain 
or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person,” for, 
among other things, “punishing him for an act he . . . has committed . . . .”417 That 
convention, ratified by the United States, provides that torture “does not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.”418 For 
centuries, the death penalty has been considered a permissible and lawful sanction—one 
used by many countries time and time again at various points in world history. But today, 
the death penalty is no longer lawful in many countries and in nineteen American 
states,419 even though death sentences and executions—while declining in number420—
are still in use in select locales.421 Most importantly for assessing whether the death 
penalty is cruel and unusual, death sentences and executions—though long characterized 
as lawful sanctions—have the immutable characteristics of torture,422 the aggravated form 
of cruelty.423  
Death sentences are, at bottom, credible threats of death, and as an inmate’s 
execution date approaches, the inmate is fully aware of his or her impending death but is 
utterly helpless to prevent that death.424 The classic definition of psychological torture 
is—as even jurists in death penalty states freely acknowledge—an awareness of one’s 
                                                 
413 Id. 
414 Id. 
415 Id. at 101, 105. The death penalty’s use, of course, affects more than just death row inmates; its use also 
impacts the family members of such inmates. E.g., Rachel King, No Due Process: How the Death Penalty 
Violates the Constitutional Rights of the Family Members of Death Row Prisoners, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 
195 (2007). 
416 LISA BRUCE, REVIVING THE DEAD: 10 KEYS TO UNLOCK PURPOSE AND DESTINY 20 (2011); JAMES 
GARBARINO, LISTENING TO KILLERS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM MY TWENTY YEARS AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
EXPERT WITNESS IN MURDER CASES 57 (2015). 
417 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 1, 
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987). 
418 Id.  
419 E.g., SANGMIN BAE, WHEN THE STATE NO LONGER KILLS: INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS AND 
ABOLITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 24–28, 53–55 (2007) (discussing the death penalty’s abolition in 
Europe, South Africa and elsewhere); see also THOMAS S. MOWLE, ALLIES AT ODDS?: THE UNITED STATES 
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 102–07 (2004) (discussing the history of the divergence of approach to the 
death penalty in Europe versus the United States).  
420 See generally GARRETT, supra note 388. 
421 See generally ANDREA D. LYON, THE DEATH PENALTY: WHAT’S KEEPING IT ALIVE (2015). 
422 BESSLER, supra note 46, at xxiv–xxv, 225–26, 316. 
423 David Weissbrodt & Cheryl Heilman, Defining Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment, 
29 LAW & INEQ. 343, 375 (2011). 
424 BESSLER, supra note 46, at 87, 89, 91, 154, 225. 
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impending death but a helplessness to prevent that death.425 As a result, death sentences 
and executions—when fairly considered—should be classified under the rubric of torture 
as they bear all the characteristics and indicia of torture.426 To aggravate and exacerbate 
the torment further, the average time inmates spend on death row between sentencing and 
execution is now more than fifteen years. It is, certainly, an extremely cruel and unusual 
act—indeed, a torturous one—to subject a person to a continuous threat of death by 
unnatural means for years, even multiple decades, at a time.427 
  
IV. THE LINE BETWEEN “USUAL” AND “UNUSUAL” PUNISHMENTS, AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY AS A CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
 
 
A. The Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
 
Notions of cruelty and unusualness long pre-date the English Bill of Rights (1689), 
the predecessor of the U.S. Constitution’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Before 
the English safeguard against the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments” was put 
in place, British writers frequently used the words “cruel” and “unusual.” One 
seventeenth-century dictionary associated cruel with “anger,” “wrath,” and “[h]atred,”428 
while another defined cruel, a commonly used word, simply as “cruel.”429 Other books 
published before the Glorious Revolution of 1688 also liberally used the words “cruel” 
                                                 
425 Ex parte Deardorff, 6 So.3d 1235, 1240 (Ala. 2008) (“‘Psychological torture can be inflicted where the 
victim is in intense fear and is aware of, but helpless to prevent, impending death. Such torture ‘must have 
been present for an appreciable lapse of time, sufficient enough to cause prolonged or appreciable 
suffering.’”) (quoting Norris v. State, 793 So.2d 847, 861 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999); and Ex parte Key, 891 
So.2d 384, 390 (Ala. 2004)); Smith v. State, 122 So.3d 224, 241 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011); id. at 242 (“After 
the initial gunshots rendered Smith helpless to prevent her death she suffered great psychological torture as 
she listened to her abductors discuss how they were going to kill her and dispose of her body while she 
begged for medical attention.”); State v. Bell, 603 S.E.2d 93, 121 (N.C. 2004) (describing killings 
involving “psychological torture where the victim is left to her ‘last moments aware of but helpless to 
prevent impending death’”) (quoting State v. Hamlet, 321 S.E.2d 837, 846 (N.C. 1984)); State v. Mann, 
560 S.E.2d 776, 788 (N.C. 2002) (“An example of psychological torture is when the victim is left ‘in [her] 
last moments aware of but helpless to prevent impending death.’”) (quoting Hamlet, 321 S.E.2d at 846).  
426 BESSLER, supra note 46, at 217–37. 
427 See, e.g., Angela April Sun, “Killing Time” in the Valley of the Shadow of Death: Why Systematic 
Preexecution Delays on Death Row are Cruel and Unusual, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1585, 1586–89, 1615–18 
(2013); see also Caycie D. Bradford, Waiting to Die, Dying to Live: An Account of the Death Row 
Phenomenon from a Legal Viewpoint, 5 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. L. 77, 93–94 (2011) (noting that death 
row inmates are subjected to the mental torture of not knowing when their sentences will be carried out, 
that “[t]he sentencing of individuals to long drawn-out incarcerations under the conditions of death row has 
been shown to have prolonged psychological effects on the inmates,” and that the right to life “does not 
allow for the psychological implications of the death row phenomenon, which are affecting the inmates’ 
right to life”). 
428 THOMAS WILSON, A COMPLETE CHRISTIAN DICTIONARY: WHEREIN THE SIGNIFICATIONS AND SEVERAL 
ACCEPTATIONS OF ALL THE WORDS MENTIONED IN THE HOLY SCRIPTURES OF THE OLD AND NEW 
TESTAMENT ARE FULLY OPENED, EXPRESSED, EXPLAINED 132 (1661). 
429 Cruel, GUY MIÈGE, A SHORT DICTIONARY ENGLISH AND FRENCH ACCORDING TO THE PRESENT USE AND 
MODERN ORTHOGRAPHY (1684) (unpaginated). In other entries, that dictionary also associated “cruel” with 
words such as “barbarous,” “Bloudy,” “Hard-hearted,” “Incompassionate,” “inhumane,” “pitiless,” and 
“sanguinary.” Id. (unpaginated).  
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and “unusual,” with one source speaking, for example, in terms of “unusual cruelty.”430 
In addition, the words “cruel” and “unusual”—commonplace terms in English-speaking 
societies—appear in a number of religious431 and non-religious tracts.432 
In one history published in London in 1678, the word “cruel” appears literally 
dozens of times.433 There are references to “cruel disposition,” “cruel severity,” “cruel 
death,” “cruel trade,” “cruel Prisons,” “cruel Creditors,” “cruel Persecutor,” “cruel 
Massacres,” “cruel sentence,” “cruel Father,” “cruel wife,” “cruel Tyrant,” “cruel 
torments,” “cruel tortures,” and “cruel execution.”434 In one passage, there is a 
description of a man condemned to die for writing this rhyme about King Richard III: 
“The Cat, the Rat; and Lovel our Dog / Rule all England under the Hog.”435 That man, 
the history reported, “was put to a most cruel death; for being hang’d and cut down alive, 
his bowels rip’t out and cast into the fire, when the executioner put his hand into the bulk 
of his body, to pull out his heart.”436 In another passage, there is a reference to the “cruel 
custom” of another country’s king “to put to death every Tenth Stranger, that came into 
his Dominions.”437 In that history alone, there are also multiple references to “unusual.” 
                                                 
430 E.g., NATHANIEL WANLEY, THE WONDERS OF THE LITTLE WORLD: OR, A GENERAL HISTORY OF MAN 
22, 54–55, 418 (1678). 
431 A CONTINUATION OF MORNING-EXERCISE QUESTIONS AND CASES OF CONSCIENCE, PRACTICALLY 
RESOLVED BY SUNDAY MINISTERS, IN OCTOBER, 1682, at 109 (Samuel Annesley ed., 1683); RICHARD 
BAXTER, THE REASONS OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 145 (1667); FRANCIS ROBERTS & CLAVIS BIBLIORUM: 
THE KEY OF THE BIBLE, UNLOCKING THE RICHEST TREASURY OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES 148, 211 (1675); 
THE WORKS OF THE REVEREND AND LEARNED JOHN LIGHTFOOD D.D., at 797 (George Bright ed., 1684); 
see also JOSEPH HALL, THE SHAKING OF THE OLIVE-TREE: THE REMAINING WORKS OF THAT 
INCOMPARABLE PRELATE JOSEPH HALL, D.D. LATE LORD BISHOP OF NORWICH 13 (1660) (referencing 
“cruell” and “unusuall”). 
432 CORNELIUS NEPOS, THE LIVES OF ILLUSTRIOUS MEN 123 (2d ed. 1685); THE WORKS OF SIR WILLIAM 
D’AVENANT 9 (1673). 
433 See generally WANLEY, supra note 430.   
434 Id. at 55, 89, 116, 149, 152, 157–58, 206, 233, 364, 369, 377–78, 383–84, 401, 438, 458, 609, 620, 629. 
435 Id. at 206. 
436 Id. 
437 Id. at 169; see also THE WORKS OF FRANCIS OSBORNE, ESQ. 90, 280, 304, 314 (8th ed. 1682) (making 
reference to “cruel Contention,” “cruel death,” “cruel examples,” and “cruel Family”). The word “cruel” 
was an especially popular work in the wake of the Glorious Revolution of 1688. E.g., GUY MIÈGE, THE 
NEW STATE OF ENGLAND UNDER THEIR MAJESTIES K. WILLIAM AND Q. MARY 3 (1691) (“After the Saxons 
came the Danes, the next considerable, and the most cruel Actors on the Stage of England.”); id. at 10 
(“How could he answer the late cruel Burnings and Devastations the French made in Germany, contrary to 
the Rules of War, and the very Practice of the most barbarous Nations?”); id. (“The Breaking on the Wheel, 
and other like torturing Deaths, are lookt upon here as too cruel for Christians to use. Neither are the 
Criminals, who with their Lives have expiated their Crimes before the World, denied Christian Burial, 
except in particular Cases.”); id. (“All this shews a great deal of Moderation, and averseness from 
Cruelty.”); id. at 40 (“Cock-fighting shews the Courage of their Cocks . . . . Throwing at Cocks is not only 
rude, but cruel.”); id. at 72 (“The Popish Massacre of the French Protestants in the Reign of Charles IX, as 
cruel and bloody as it was, was nothing to the late refined Persecution.”); id. at 76 (“Men had as good live 
in a state of Anarchy, as ly at some Princes Mercy, whose unlimited Power serves only to make them 
furious and outrageous. And where lies the Advantage, when the King proves a cruel Tyrant, to be Robbed 
or Murdered by a Royal, or a common Robber?”); id. at 125–26 (describing the punishment of “a 
Traytor”—“to be drawn upon a Hurdle or Sledge to the Gallows, and there to be hanged by the Neck,” and 
to be “cut down alive, his Entrals pulled out of his Belly and burnt before his Face, his Head cut off, and his 
Body divided into four Parts”—as follows: “This Punishment indeed, considering all its Circumstances, 
 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY [2018 
 384 
Among many others, one encounters “unusual Diseases,” “unusual means,” “unusual 
manner,” “unusual horrors,” and “unusual cruelty.”438 Chapter XXXVI is itself titled “Of 
the different and unusual ways, by which some men have come to their deaths.”439 
 The “cruel and unusual punishments” prohibition in the English Bill of Rights 
was seen from an early date as restricting the discretionary sentencing authority of 
abusive judges.440 For example, in On the Powers and Duties of Juries, and on the 
Criminal Laws of England, Sir Richard Phillips—the former sheriff of London and 
Middlesex—wrote: “The practice of banishing persons convicted of misdemeanors to 
distant prisons, is evidently contrary to the tenth clause of the Bill of Rights, which 
prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments.”441 As Phillips explained: “Of 
course this clause had reference only to discretional punishments, and not to those 
defined by law, and consequently applies particularly to punishments inflicted for 
misdemeanors, and still more particularly to discretionary punishments in regard to 
liberty, the only punishments in which a sound discretion would ever be likely to be 
abused.”442 After reciting that view, Phillips then argued: 
 
I contend then, that the sending or banishing a man to a prison distant from the 
place where he committed the crime, is contrary to law, simply because it is 
unusual. In former times, when communication was difficult, it would have been 
impracticable, and therefore could not have been exercised; it is also 
unreasonable, inasmuch as a distant county is mulcted in the expence of 
                                                                                                                                                 
seems cruel to such as do not narrowly consider the nature of the Crime.”); id. at 245 (“[A] long and cruel 
Civil War was ended.”); id. at 268 (“[W]ho sometimes proves magget-headed, cruel, or tyrannical.”). 
438 WANLEY, supra note 430, at 2, 15–16, 18, 20–21, 23, 36, 39, 54–57, 91, 106, 112, 165, 214, 239, 240–
41, 270, 418, 459–61, 510, 515, 594, 600. 
439 Id. at 59. 
440 See supra text accompanying notes 149–50 (discussing William Blackstone’s view of the English 
prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments”). 
441 RICHARD PHILLIPS, ON THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF JURIES, AND ON THE CRIMINAL LAWS OF ENGLAND 
298 (2d ed. 1813). Exile, banishment or transportation were once usual punishments in various locales. 
E.g., 1 THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME 145 (2010) (“Exile was the usual 
punishment for murder.”); 3 THE AMERICAN ECLECTIC: OR SELECTIONS FROM THE PERIODICAL 
LITERATURE OF ALL FOREIGN COUNTRIES 506 (1842) (“Capital punishment has become exceedingly rare, 
exile to Siberia being now the usual punishment.”); THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE COURT AND CABINET OF 
ST. CLOUD 112 (4th Am. ed. 1807) (“[T]ransportation was an usual punishment.”); CARL PETER 
THUNBERG, TRAVELS IN EUROPE, AFRICA, AND ASIA: PERFORMED BETWEEN THE YEARS 1770 AND 1779, at 
138 (1793) (“[T]he usual punishment, which is transportation to Batavia.”). Those punishments are no 
longer used. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630, 630 (2d Cir. 1926) (“However 
heinous his crimes, deportation is to him exile, a dreadful punishment, abandoned by the common consent 
of all civilized peoples.”); see also Saad Gul, Return of the Native? An Assessment of the Citizenship 
Renunciation Clause in Hamdi’s Settlement Agreement in the Light of Citizenship Jurisprudence, 27 N. ILL. 
U. L. REV. 131, 145 (2007) (“[F]ederal courts have held that banishment is prohibited as cruel and unusual 
punishment.”); see also Michael F. Armstrong, Banishment: Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 111 U. PA. L. 
REV. 758 (1963) (arguing that banishment is a cruel and unusual punishment). 
442 RICHARD PHILLIPS, ON THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF JURIES, AND ON THE CRIMINAL LAWS OF ENGLAND 
298–99 (2d ed. 1813). The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause itself makes no 
distinction between felonies and misdemeanors. Every punishment is subject to scrunity under the Eighth 
Amendment’s broad and plain language, and the death penalty’s constitutionality—like the 
constitutionality of non-lethal corporal punishments—must thus be scruntized by modern American judges. 
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maintaining the prisoner; and it is inexpedient, because, as punishments are 
inflicted as a warning to others, such remote punishments serve as no warning 
either at the place where the crime was committed, or at that where the 
punishment takes place—Those who contend, that the King’s Bench has a 
universal jurisdiction, are right—but they forget that this jurisdiction is universal 
only for lawful purposes: I agree with them that it is universal, for the purpose of 
correcting the mal-administration of Gaolers and Sheriffs; that it is universal for 
the purpose of referring a man by sentence back again to his native county for a 
crime committed there—but not universal for imposing the novel punishment of 
banishment for a misdemeanor, which is unusual—therefore contrary to the Bill 
of Rights—therefore contrary to law.443 
 
The former sheriff then expanded upon his assertions about the “cruel and unusual 
punishments” prohibition. As Richard Phillips wrote in an extended argument: 
 
On a point in which the feelings of the people of England are at present 
deeply interested, I beg leave to urge some other considerations which 
may probably have weight with the Judges. Their Lordships are aware, 1. 
That they are not empowered to order any punishment, or pass any 
sentence, except such as are directed or sanctioned by the statute or 
common law; 2. That there is no law which empowers them in terms to 
send persons convicted of misdemeanors or libels to distant prisons; 3. 
That to carry into execution the legal sentences of the Courts of Law, is 
the province of the Executive Government; 4. That to prescribe the place 
of imprisonment when it is not prescribed by law, is to assume the powers 
of the Executive, and to combine the judicial authority with the executive 
power; 5. That this can only be legally done under those statutes which 
especially prescribe particular punishments in houses of correction, or in 
common gaols; 6. That where a statute or the common law directs 
imprisonment generally as the punishment, the Judges have no legal 
power to prescribe to the Executive Government in regard to the mode, 
manner, or place of imprisonment; and, 7. That Judges are legally 
restricted in the sentences they pass, by the very terms of the statutes, and 
by the ascertainable usage of the ancient common law, and have no liberty 
to pass sentences which prescribe the particular execution of general 
punishments to the Executive Government, nor which exceed, vary, or 
differ from the terms of the penal laws. 
 
In regard to the duty of the Executive, it is bound by the Bill of Rights, in 
executing the judgments of the Courts, to conform to immemorial usage, 
and to inflict no punishment in a cruel or unusual manner; and 
consequently to inflict imprisonment in the common gaol, except in cases 
in which the law has specially conferred a discretionary power on the 
                                                 
443 Id. at 299–300; see also id. at 391 (showing an index entry reads: “Banishment for misdemeanours an 
unusual punishment.”). 
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Judges, and these have thought it necessary and proper to exercise that 
discretion.444 
 
The mid-1680s punishment of Titus Oates—the clergyman convicted of perjury 
and notoriously sentenced by Lord Chief Justice George Jeffreys to be defrocked, fined, 
whipped and then to be pilloried for every year for life—was itself described in that era as 
“cruel” and “unusual.”445 In 1685, Oates—a Protestant cleric—had been tried and 
convicted of perjury before the King’s Bench.446 He had falsely accused, and caused the 
execution of, fifteen prominent Catholics for allegedly organizing, in 1679, a “Popish 
Plot” to overthrow King Charles II.447 Oates’s actual crime, which at one time had been 
treated as murder and been punishable by death but which was not then a capital offense, 
was “bearing false witness against another, with an express premeditated design to take 
away his life, so as the innocent person be condemned and executed.”448 At Oates’s 
sentencing, Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys had complained that death was not available as a 
penalty and lamented that “a proportionable punishment of that crime can scarce by our 
law, as it now stands, be inflicted upon him.”449 According to Jeffreys, the judges who sat 
in judgment unanimously agreed that “crimes of this nature are left to be punished 
according to the discretion of this court, so far as that the judgment extend not to life or 
member.”450 One justice, taunting Oates, told him “we have taken special care of you,” 
with Oates fined “1000 marks upon each indictment,” “stript of [his] Canonical Habits,” 
and ordered to be whipped by “the common hangman” “from Aldgate to Newgate” and 
then “from Newgate to Tyburn,” and also imprisoned for life and ordered to stand in the 
pillory annually at certain specified times and places.451 
                                                 
444 Id. at 300–02. Phillips, the ex-sheriff, added: 
I know that many persons of the highest influence in the British 
Government are solicitous for some change in our code of punishments, 
and that even our heads of the law are no sticklers for many of the 
present practices. The enormous expence of transportations to Botany 
Bay, the cruel and crying injustice of sending persons to the Antipodes 
for terms short of life, the want of moral reform in the hulks, and the 
barbarity as well as inutility of hanging for so great a variety of 
offences, are faults of our penal code felt and deplored by many 
Statesmen; and I am not without hopes that a radical change will be one 
of the glorious achievements of this enlightened age. 
Id. at 302–03. 
445 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 972 (1991); see also LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS 236 (2001) (noting that the provision of the English Bill of Rights of 1689 prohibiting cruel and 
unusual punishments “derived mainly from the reaction to the case of Titus Oates”). 
446 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 969. 
447 Id. at 969–70. 
448 Id. at 970. 
449 Id. 
450 Id. 
451 Id. According to a prominent English historian, Thomas Macaulay, “[t]he judges, as they believed, 
sentenced Oates to be scourged to death.” 2 LORD MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 67 (1880) (quoted in 
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 970). But Oates did not die and four years later petitioned the Parliament to set aside 
his sentence as illegal. 6 THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 138–41 (1899) (quoted 
in Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 970). As that historian wrote of the deliberations of the House of Lords: “Not a 
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After the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the adoption of the English Bill of 
Rights,452 Oates petitioned Parliament for relief from his sentence, asserting that it 
violated the newly promulgated English Bill of Rights.453 Although the House of Lords 
rejected his petition, a minority of Lords dissented, asserting that his sentence violated 
the “cruel and unusual punishments” provision of the Bill of Rights.454 The House of 
Commons voted to annul Oates’ sentence, and also issued a report detailing its 
position.455 One portion of the dissenting statement by the House of Lords described 
Oates’ sentence as “contrary to the declaration on the twelfth of February last . . . that 
excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel nor 
unusual punishments inflicted.”456 The dissenting Lords, writing when whipping was still 
lawful, described Oates’ punishment as “barbarous, inhuman, and unchristian,” with the 
report of the House of Commons emphasizing that “it was illegal, cruel, and of dangerous 
Example, That a Freeman should be whipped in such a barbarous manner, as, in 
Probability, would determine in Death.”457 The House of Commons further stressed that 
“[i]t was of ill Example, and unusual, That an Englishman should be exposed upon a 
Pillory, so many times a Year, during his Life.”458  
Titus Oates was sentenced when bodily punishments, such as executions and 
whipping, were still in widespread use in England. But it was the combination (and 
extent) of punishments imposed on Oates that attracted so much public attention and that 
drew the ire of British MPs. Sir William Williams, in the House of Commons, 
                                                                                                                                                 
single peer ventured to affirm that the judgment was legal: but much was said about the odious character of 
the appellant.” Id. at 140 (quoted in Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 970). 
452 Jency Megan Butler, Shocking the Eighth Amendment’s Conscience: Applying a Substantive Due 
Process Test to the Evolving Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 48 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 861, 864–
85 (2016): 
In 1689, the English Bill of Rights was created by Parliament, 
affirming that “cruel and unusual punishments” ought not to be 
inflicted. The Titus Oates case is a famous example of the first 
application of the English Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 
Titus Oates, an Anglican cleric, was convicted of lying in court. 
Oates’s lies resulted in the execution of fifteen innocent people. Oates 
was sentenced to imprisonment, annual pillory, and one day of 
whipping. What offended the English Members of Parliament was that 
the pillory would occur annually, and the repetition of pillory made the 
punishment excessive and disproportionate. 
453 In framing the English Bill of Rights of 1689, the House of Commons later indicated that it had a 
“particular regard” to Oates’s sentence, “amongst others,” when the English prohibition against “cruel and 
unusual punishments” was first made. The House of Commons asserted the “ancient Right of the People of 
England that they should not be subjected to cruel and unusual Punishments.” The Original Meaning of 
“Unusual”, supra note 24, at 1762. William Blackstone, in an apparent reference to the case of Titus 
Oates, himself indicated that the English prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments” came about 
because of “some unprecedented proceedings in the court of king’s bench, in the reign of king James the 
Second.” The Original Meaning of “Cruel”, supra note 23, at 478. 
454 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 970. 
455 Id. at 971. 
456 Id. 
457 Id. at 973. 
458 2 THE HISTORY OF KING WILLIAM THE THIRD 101–02 (1702) (printed for “A. Roper”); see also id. at 82 
(referring to “strange and unusual Cruelties”). 
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specifically protested: “There may be a precedent for whipping, but for all these parts in 
one Judgment, let any man give us a Precedent to square with that Judgment.”459 In its 
report on the Titus Oates affair, the House of Commons criticized, in these words, the 
discretion exercised by Lord Chief Justice Jeffrey and his fellow judges: “That as soon as 
they had set up this Pretence to a discretionary Power, it was observable how they put it 
in Practice, not only in this, but in other Cases, and for other Offences, by inflicting such 
cruel and ignominious Punishments, as will be agreed to be far worse than Death itself to 
any Man who has a sense of Honour or Shame.”460 In The History of England, Thomas 
Macaulay offered his own telling historical commentary on the high-profile Titus Oates 
case and the English Bill of Rights.461 Infamous and degrading punishments, especially 
among the elite, were clearly seen by some as a fate worse than expiating one’s crimes on 
the gallows.  
 
B. The Characteristics of the American Death Penalty 
 
The American death penalty has, of course, been a discretionary punishment for 
some time. In 1971 in McGautha v. California,462 the Supreme Court rejected a due 
process challenge to the death penalty, holding that “committing to the untrammeled 
discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death” is not “offensive to anything 
in the Constitution.” As the Court ruled in McGautha: “To identify before the fact those 
characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death 
penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood 
and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present 
                                                 
459 LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 236–37 (2001); Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, 
Cruel and Unusual Federal Punishments, 98 IOWA L. REV. 69, 91–94, 94 n.156 (2012); see also Rethinking 
Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, supra note 11, at  970 (“Parliament 
condemned the punishment inflicted on Titus Oates as ‘contrary to Law and ancient Practice.’”). 
460 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 973 (quoting 10 Journal of the House of Commons 247 (Aug. 2, 1689)). 
461 1 LORD MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND: FROM THE ACCESSION OF JAMES THE SECOND 238 
(1871): 
[T]he punishment which was inflicted upon [Oates] cannot be justified. 
In sentencing him to be stripped of his ecclesiastical habit and 
imprisoned for life, the judges exceeded their legal power. They were 
undoubtedly competent to inflict whipping; nor had the law assigned a 
limit to the number of stripes . . . . That the law was defective is not a 
sufficient excuse: for defective laws should be altered by the 
legislature, and not strained by the tribunals; and least of all should the 
law be strained for the purpose of inflicting torture and destroying life. 
That Oates was a bad man is not a sufficient excuse; for the guilty are 
almost always the first to suffer those hardships which are afterwards 
used as precedents against the innocent. Thus it was in the present case. 
Merciless flogging soon became an ordinary punishment for political 
misdemeanours of no very aggravated kind. Men were sentenced, for 
words spoken against the government, to pain so excruciating that they, 
with unfained earnestness, begged to be brought to trial on capital 
charges, and sent to the gallows. Happily the progress of this great evil 
was speedily stopped by the Revolution, and by that article of the Bill 
of Rights which condemns all cruel and unusual punishments. 
462 402 U.S. 183 (1971). 
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human ability.”463 Just a year later, in 1972, Furman v. Georgia struck down then-
existing death penalty laws, effectively putting a moratorium on executions.464 But death 
penalty statutes—ones bifurcating the guilt/innocence and penalty phases and often 
asking juries to weigh “aggravating” versus “mitigating” factors—got passed in more 
than thirty states in Furman’s wake.465 That, in turn, led to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Gregg v. Georgia, a ruling once again giving the judicial green light to 
executions.466 Though provisions of law authorizing the death penalty’s infliction can 
now be found in the United States Codes and in various state statute books, the 
mandatory death penalty has already been declared to be unconstitutional by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.467 What remains of death penalty laws are the so-called “guided 
discretion” statutes that leave life-or-death decisions in the hands of juries.468 
In late seventeenth-century England, Titus Oates was singled out for a set of 
punishments (a fine, imprisonment, flogging, and the pillory) that, while each lawful 
under English law at the time, were not inflicted on others in the particular manner that 
Oates had been made to suffer. Something quite similar is, in effect, playing out in 
modern America with the administration of capital punishment. While the death penalty 
is still authorized by statutes in American jurisdictions, just as whipping and the pillory 
were authorized in Titus Oates’s time, American executions are being imposed in a 
manner that arbitrarily singles out particular individuals, whether at random, in a racially 
discriminatory fashion, or based on some factor that runs afoul of the doctrine of equal 
protections of the laws. These days, it is race, geography, gender, or other factors, such as 
the poor quality of a legal counsel, that largely determines who lives and who dies—and 
that determines who gets treated in a grossly disparate and disproportionate manner.  
The American death penalty is rife with discrimination and arbitrariness, something 
that, in truth, has long been the case. Racial discrimination—the discriminatory treatment 
of minorities—is rampant in America’s criminal justice system, with the consequences of 
that prejudice particularly pronounced in death penalty cases.469 Most executions take 
place in the South, where lynchings were once so common,470 and only a small handful of 
                                                 
463 Id. at 208. 
464 CHARLES F. MANSKI, PUBLIC POLICY IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: ANALYSIS AND DECISIONS 49 (2013). 
465 LOUIS FISHER & KATY J. HARRIGER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 681 (2009). 
466 LeBeau v. State, 337 P.3d 254, 275 (Utah 2014). 
467 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
468 DAVID SCHULTZ, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 205 (2002) (“Guided discretion statutes require 
juries and judges to consider various aggravating and mitigating circumstances when deciding whether a 
defendant should receive the death penalty.”). 
469 E.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Opening Remarks: Race and the Death Penalty Before and After 
McCleskey, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 34, 38 (2007): 
Between 1930, when nationwide official statistics began, and 1972, 
when the Supreme Court of the United States decided Furman v. 
Georgia, almost exactly half of the persons executed for murder in the 
United States and about 90% of those executed for rape were African-
American, although African-Americans never constituted more than 
11% of the nation’s population during this period. Unofficial figures 
running from 1864 to 1972 paint the same picture. 
470 PAUL KAPLAN, MURDER STORIES: IDEOLOGICAL NARRATIVES IN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 54 n.3 (2012) 
(“During the contemporary era, the South accounts for 81% of executions while the northeast accounts for 
0.05 percent executions.”). The region where executions most often occur is the same region where 
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jurisdictions produce death sentences. It is overwhelmingly men who are slated to be put 
to death—and who are put to death.471 As Victor Streib, Sam Kamin and Justin Marceau 
summarize the current state of affairs in Death Penalty in a Nutshell: “[T]he hapless few 
who are actually executed tend not to be the ‘worst of the worst’ of all of killers. Too 
often those against whom the penalty is imposed are distinguishable only on the basis of 
race, sex, poverty, or the luck of the draw with regard to the judge, jury, and defense 
counsel assigned to their case.”472 The death penalty’s administration—and the judicial 
system’s handling of capital punishment cases—is the direct opposite of a model system 
of justice that aims to rationally and equally protect each individual’s human rights.  
 
C. The Death Penalty as a Highly Unusual Punishment 
 
There was an awareness, even centuries ago, that what might be considered “usual” 
at one time might be deemed “unusual” later. Through the centuries, many 
punishments—from fines to imprisonment to exile or banishment—were described as 
usual punishments. “Fine and Imprisonment,” one 1750 law dictionary recited, “is the 
usual Punishment at this Day on Indictment for Conspiracy.”473 “[T]he usual punishment 
of death inflicted upon deserters,” another source reported in 1784, “was changed in 1775 
to an order for all future deserters to work as slaves on the public roads.”474 Yet another 
source reported that “[t]he usual Punishment . . . for Non-Payment” of monies owed was 
“chang’d from Imprisonment, into perpetual Banishment.”475 On occasion, some 
                                                                                                                                                 
lynchings were once so prominent. MARGARET VANDIVER, LETHAL PUNISHMENT: LYNCHINGS AND LEGAL 
EXECUTIONS IN THE SOUTH 9 (2006) (“The great majority of mob killings took place in the South; 
lynchings in the eleven states of the former Confederacy accounted for 74% of all lynchings in the United 
States between 1882 and 1968.”). 
471 E.g., Andrea Shapiro, Unequal Before the Law: Men, Women and the Death Penalty, 8 AM. U. J. 
GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 427 (2000); Victor L. Streib, Rare and Inconsistent: The Death Penalty for 
Women, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 609 (2006); Elizabeth Rapaport, The Death Penalty and Gender 
Discrimination, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 367 (1991); Steven F. Shatz & Naomi R. Shatz, Chivalry is Not 
Dead: Murder, Gender, and the Death Penalty, 27 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 64 (2012); Harry 
Greenlee & Shelia P. Greenlee, Women and the Death Penalty: Racial Disparities and Differences, 14 WM. 
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 319 (2008); see also Elizabeth Rapaport, Equality of the Damned: The Execution 
of Women on the Cusp of the 21st Century, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 581, 588 (2000) (“Throughout American 
history, from early colonial times until the pre-Furman moratorium period during which no executions took 
place, women have been executed; females account for approximately 3% of all executions, or 556 women, 
from 1632 until the execution of Elizabeth Duncan in California in 1962.”). 
472 VICTOR STREIB, SAM KAMIN & JUSTIN MARCEAU, DEATH PENALTY IN A NUTSHELL 19 (5th ed. 2017). 
473 Conspiracy, GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW-DICTIONARY: CONTAINING, THE INTERPRETATION AND 
DEFINITION OF WORDS AND TERMS USED IN THE LAW (6th ed. 1750). 
474 A GENERAL INDEX TO THE ANNUAL REGISTER: OR, A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF EUROPE, 
DOMESTIC OCCURANCES, STATE PAPERS, PROMOTIONS, MARRIAGES, BIRTHS, DEATHS, CHARACTERS, 
NATURAL HISTORY, USEFUL PROJECTS, ANTIQUITIES, LITERARY AND MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS, POETRY, 
AND ACCOUNT OF PRINCIPAL BOOKS PUBLISHED, FROM THE YEAR 1758 TO THE YEAR 1780, BOTH 
INCLUSIVE (2d ed. 1784) (unpaginated chapter on the “History of Europe”). 
475 D’BLOSSIERS TOVEY, ANGLIA JUDAICA: OR THE HISTORY AND ANTIQUITIES OF THE JEWS IN ENGLAND, 
COLLECTED FROM ALL OUR HISTORIANS, BOTH PRINTED AND MANUSCRIPT, AS ALSO FROM THE RECORDS IN 
THE TOWER, AND OTHER PUBLICK REPOSITORIES 198 (1738). 
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offenders were said to have avoided “the usual Punishment” through acts of mercy.476 It 
was thus not just ducking that was described as a “usual” punishment. 
Yet, the societal abandonment or the declining frequency of a punishment—or, 
perhaps, the simple lack of necessity for it—might, as some sources and authorities have 
recognized, change a “usual” punishment into an “unusual” one.477 For example, the 
stocks, the pillory, and peine forte et dure—or pressing to death—are no longer in use 
and have long been considered to be cruel punishments that civilized societies can—and 
should—do without.478 Once usual punishments, ones that have historical precedent, may 
even be classified later as torturous ones. By way of example, in discussing acts of 
“torture” previously used in England, a 1796 treatise wrote of everything from the 
punishment of pressing to death (the practice known as peine forte et dure),479 to 
criminals’ thumbs being tied together to force them to plead, to the rack.480 Over time, 
customary punishments once widely accepted by societies thus become unthinkable acts 
of torture.   
                                                 
476 2 CALEB D’ANVERS, THE CRAFTSMAN: BEING A CRITIQUE ON THE TIMES 10–11 (1731) (noting that a 
man “received a Sentence somewhat uncommon in this Country; where Death, thou knowest, is the usual 
Punishment of such Offenders; which this Man escaped, more by the Lenity of his Accusers and the 
Indulgence of his Royal Master, than his own Deserts; being only dismissed from all his Employments; and 
render’d incapable of holding any Office for the future; his Goods confiscated, and his Person banish’d for 
Life to a little Province on the Confines of Russia”). 
477 The cruelty of a punishment may itself be indicative of its unusualness (just as the unusualness of a 
punishment may reflect its cruelty). HUGO ADAM BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT: STUDIES IN THE 
MORALITY, LAW, AND POLITICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 97 (1987) (“Were we to try to isolate the 
unusualness of a punishment from its cruelty, we would focus on a property of punishments that has little 
or nothing to do with moral condemnation.”); see also id. (“[A] mode of punishment may be unusual today 
even though it was common in an earlier, less civilized age”; “[i]n such cases describing the punishment as 
‘unusual’ may well imply not only that it is no longer widely used, but that its use is now intolerable.”). A 
punishment that has become an “unusual” one can be—and has been—judged to be unconstitutional. 
People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 883 (Cal. 1972) (noting that “the California Constitution prohibits 
imposition of the death penalty if, judged by contemporary standards, it is either cruel or has become 
unusual”). 
478 J. THOMAS SCHARF, HISTORY OF MARYLAND: FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT DAY 41 
(1879) (calling the stocks, the pillory, the whipping-post and “the gallows, the ugliest spectacles”—“the 
active employment” of which occurred “[a]bout the central date of 1770”—“cruel punishments,” but noting 
that “[t]he stocks, the pillory and the gibbet did not pass out of vogue in Maryland, in fact, until about 
1810, when, following the impulse given to the science of punishment by Bentham and his school, we 
adopted the penitentiary system and thus began to build the Maryland penitentiary”).  “Previous to the 
construction of that building, and after the War of Independence had necessarily done away with the sale of 
white convicts into labor,” the historian J. Thomas Scharf wrote of the construction of Maryland’s 
penitentiary, “the usual punishment of convicts, after the preliminary whipping and pillorying was done, 
consisted in putting them in the chain-gang to work on the public roads, or, as it was popularly called, 
‘sending them to the wheelbarrow.’” Id. 
479 Peine forte et dure refers to pressing to death or to what has been called “[t]he strong and hard pain.” 
PETTIFER, supra note 266, at 124; see also 2 POLITICAL DICTIONARY; FORMING A WORK OF UNIVERSAL 
REFERENCE, BOTH CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL; AND EMBRACING THE TERMS OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATION, 
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS, AND OF ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT STATISTICAL 
DEPARTMENTS OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE 500 (1846) (describing peine forte et dure as “[t]he ‘strong 
and hard pain’” as “a species of torture used by the English law to compel persons to plead, when charged 
with crimes less than treason, but amounting to felony”). 
480 DAINES BARRINGTON, OBSERVATIONS ON THE MORE ANCIENT STATUTES FROM MAGNA CHARTA TO THE 
TWENTY-FIRST OF JAMES I, at 81, 85–86, 88 (5th ed. 1796). 
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In that particular treatise, the Hon. Daines Barrington pointed out that Lord Chief 
Justice Hale had said that “the punishment of pressing to death . . . was anciently inflicted 
by the common law.”481  But, Barrington wrote, editorializing a bit, “whatever this 
punishment might have been by the common law,” it had been “superseded” by statute.482 
“[H]aving recourse to this severity, when the criminal stands mute and will not plead,” he 
wrote, “is very unnecessary,”483 with Barrington, taking a measure of historical practice, 
also noting that the rack—“with all its attendant terrors”—“was formerly not unknown in 
this country.”484 “It is not pretended by this,” that instances of torture “were frequent,” 
Barrington qualified, emphasizing that “fortunately this most horrid practice hath been 
discontinued, so that there cannot be the least legal pretence ever to revive it.”485 “The 
usual punishment for refusing to plead was the ‘peine forte et dure,’ of pressing to death,” 
one history emphasized, taking note of the long-abandoned practice.486 In a book 
published in London in 1719 one also finds a reference to “the usual punishment” at the 
end of an “account of the Peine forte et dure, or pressing to death.”487 
                                                 
481 Id. at 81. 
482 Id. at 87, 92. 
483 Id. at 87. 
484 Id. at 88. “Torture,” Barrington noted, “was used by the ancient Germans, from whom we are supposed 
to have derived our laws.” Id. Barrington also detailed other instances where torture was either used or 
contemplated. Id. at 92 (referring to “the actual proofs of torture having been formerly, at least in some 
instances, used in this country”); id. (“King James, in his Works, mentions, that the rack was shewn to Guy 
Fawkes during his examination.”); id. at 92–93 (“Upon the murder of the duke of Buckingham by Felton, 
the judges were asked whether he could be tortured in order to extort a confession? They answered indeed 
to their honour in the negative; but their being thus consulted shews, that, in the apprehension of some of 
the king’s counsellors, they might have inflicted this punishment.”). 
485 Id. at 93. A footnote after Barrington’s use of the word “frequent” read in part as follows: “It may 
likewise perhaps surprize the read to find, by the 39 th Eliz. cap.iv. published at length by Rastal, that the 
gallies of this realm seem to have been not an unusual punishment; and Lord Coke mentions it in his 3d 
Inst. cap. 40. without taking notice of its being uncommon.” Id. 
486 2 WILLIAM PAGE, ED., THE VICTORIA HISTORY OF THE COUNTY OF WARWICK 182 (1908). 
487 The account of peine forte et dure in that source was as follows: 
When a Felon, punishable with death, takes a resolution not to make 
any answer to his Judges, after the second calling upon, he is carry’d 
back to his dungeon, and is put to a sort of rack called peine forte et 
dure. If he speaks, his indictment goes on in the usual forms; if he 
continues dumb they leave him to die under that punishment. He is 
stretched out naked upon his back, and his arms and legs drawn out by 
cords and fasten’d to the four corners of the dungeon; a board or place 
of iron is laid upon his stomach, and this is heap’d up with Stones to a 
certain weight. The next day they give him at three different times, 
three little morsels of barly bread, and nothing to drink: the next day 
three little glasses of water and nothing to eat: and if he continues in his 
obstinacy, they leave him in that condition ’till he dies. This is practis’d 
only upon felons, or persons guilty of petty Treason. Criminals of High 
Treason in the like case, would be condemned to the usual punishment; 
their silence would condemn them. 
3 C. H. EVELYN WHITE, ED., THE EAST ANGLIAN; OR, NOTES AND QUERIES ON SUBJECTS CONNECTED WITH 
THE COUNTIES OF SUFFOLK, CAMBRIDGE, ESSEX & NORFOLK 280 (1889–1890) (quoting Mission, Memoirs 
and Observations in His Travels through England, London (1719)). 
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This naturally raises the question of what factors, or criteria, American jurists 
should use in making the judgment of when a usual punishment has crossed over into an 
unusual one. One lawyer, Joshua Shapiro, notes the importance of this inquiry in the 
University of Memphis Law Review, observing at the outset that “capital punishment is—
at least arguably—inherently cruel.”488 As he explains: “If one accepts the view that the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is ‘a mandate for recognition and protection of 
human dignity,’ then it is hard to find a punishment that is more antithetical to this norm 
than the death penalty. As Justice William Brennan remarked in Furman v. Georgia, 
‘[t]he calculated killing of a human being by the State involves, by its very nature, a 
denial of the executed person’s humanity.’”489 “If a cruel punishment is one that is an 
affront to human dignity,” Shapiro observes, “then surely a punishment that ends human 
life—that ultimately denies a person his or her humanity by literally extinguishing it—
would be the most cruel punishment possible.”490 
In his law review article, Joshua Shapiro—using a different analysis than Akhil 
Amar, who focused on the cumulative population of states that bar or outlaw a particular 
practice491—concludes that “the number of state legislatures that have (or do not have) 
capital punishment provisions may be indicative of whether a punishment is unusual.”492 
Almost needless to say, the very structure of America’s republic, with power divided 
between the federal and state systems, will always mean that some jurisdictions will 
punish certain crimes more harshly than others.493 That is, after all, the inherent nature 
and very character of a system of federalism. However, Shapiro—aware that the U.S. 
Supreme Court sometimes sets a constitutional floor, beneath which no state may go 
without running afoul of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments—goes on in his article 
to propose a bright-line test. “[T]he appropriate benchmark for determining whether a 
punishment is unusual,” he asserts, “is when three-fourths of states forbid its 
imposition.”494 “Until no more than one-fourth of the states allow for capital 
punishment,” he claims, “the death penalty cannot, as a constitutional matter, be 
unusual.”495 In laying out his preferred interpretive approach to the Constitution’s Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause, Shapiro specifically argues that a three-fourths rule—
or benchmark—is necessary to avoid results-oriented Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence.496  
                                                 
488 Shapiro, supra note 92, at 465–66. 
489 Id. at 466 (citations omitted). 
490 Id. 
491 See supra text accompany notes 28–29. 
492 Shapiro, supra note 92, at 471. 
493 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 282 (1980) (“Absent a constitutionally imposed uniformity inimical to 
traditional notions of federalism, some State will always bear the distinction of treating particular offenders 
more severely than any other State.”). 
494 Shapiro, supra note 92, at 471–72. 
495 Id. at 472. 
496 Id. at 477–78 (“[A]lthough using the number of states that outlaw a punishment must arguably be an 
objective measure of the ‘evolving standards of decency,’ the problem is that the Court uses such statistics 
in a results-oriented and undisciplined manner without imposed some measurable or quantifiable ceiling, 
such as the three-fourths rule, to clearly indicate when a given form of punishment actually satisfies 
evolving decency standards.”); see also id. at 484 (“The most appropriate numbers is three-fourths of the 
states, which is the number required to amend the Constitution.”); id. (“When at least thirty-eight states 
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But at least when it comes to the death penalty, the creation of a three-fourths-of-
the-states rule is far too simplistic and ignores important human rights—and the 
underlying constitutional values, including the protection of human dignity—at stake. 
First, the U.S. Constitution absolutely prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments” and, 
therefore, if a punishment is cruel and unusual, it is unconstitutional, regardless of how 
many laws are passed that purport to authorize the punishment.497 Second, the right to life 
is a fundamental right,498 and the arbitrary deprivation of that right has long been 
condemned by international499 and domestic law.500 The lottery-like quality of death 
                                                                                                                                                 
remove capital punishment from their sentencing arsenal, only then should that punishment become 
effectively rare and unusual. That thirty-eight states agree with the Court would give legitimacy to any 
pronouncement from the bench.”). 
497 Obviously, the more states that abolish the death penalty through legislative means only makes the 
country’s death penalty more unusual. E.g., Meghan J. Ryan, Judging Cruelty, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 81, 
81 (2010): 
Constitutionally, states may be forced to surrender the punishment if it 
is considered cruel, and, as a result of a large number of states 
renouncing it, the punishment also becomes unusual. If a punishment is 
thus found to be both cruel and unusual, it will be proscribed under the 
Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 
498 Panetti, 551 U.S. at 957 (referring to the “‘fundamental right to life’”) (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. 399); see 
also Furman, 408 U.S. at 359 n.141 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citations omitted): 
The concepts of cruel and unusual punishment and substantive due 
process become so close as to merge when the substantive due process 
argument is stated in the following manner: because capital punishment 
deprives an individual of a fundamental right (i. e., the right to life), the 
State needs a compelling interest to justify it. Thus stated the 
substantive due process argument reiterates what is essentially the 
primary purpose of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment—i. e., punishment may not be more severe than is 
necessary to serve the legitimate interests of the State. 
499 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6, Dec. 19, 1966, 990 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered 
into force Mar. 23, 1976) (“Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected 
by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”). 
500 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884): 
The fourteenth amendment, in declaring that no state ‘shall deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ 
undoubtedly intended not only that there should be no arbitrary 
deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property, but that 
equal protection and security should be given to all under like 
circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and civil rights; . . . 
and that in the administration of criminal justice no different or higher 
punishment should be imposed upon one than such as is prescribed to 
all for like offenses. 
See also Hodgson v. Vermont, 168 U.S. 262, 272–73 (1897) (“We concede the proposition . . . that by the 
fourteenth amendment it is made the right and the consequent duty of this court, when a case has been duly 
brought before it, to inquire whether, in the enactment and administration of the criminal laws of a state, it 
is sought to arbitrarily deprive any person of his life . . . or to refuse him the equal protection of the laws.”); 
Jones v. Brim, 165 U.S. 180, 182 (1897) (“[T]he clause of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution 
referred to was undoubtedly intended to prohibit an arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitration 
spoliation of property.”); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 586 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(“The Court’s opinion, which I join, explains why we have concluded that this award, in this case, was 
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sentences and executions is, in fact, directly contrary to due process and equal protection 
values.501 Third, Shapiro’s proposed three-fourths-of-the-states rule, which focuses 
exclusively on what laws are on the statute books, does not take into an account whether 
those laws are being actively enforced or are dormant or inactive. In that vein, Shapiro’s 
proposal does not take into consideration the practices of states, be they jury verdicts, 
gubernatorial actions, or prosecutorial decisions not to seek the death penalty in the first 
place. Only by gauging the actual practices of states, juries and public officials—as well 
as by considering if a punishment squares with human dignity and other human rights 
values, such as the right to be free from torture—can the U.S. Supreme Court, or any 
other court, fully gauge whether the infliction of a punishment such as the death penalty 
is or has become truly unusual.502 
The criteria for gauging the death penalty’s unusualness should include (1) an 
assessment of how widely it is used, and in fact just how sporadically it is used, 
throughout the country; (2) the viability of any viable alternatives to it (i.e., life without 
parole or life sentences) and whether it is truly necessary; (3) how arbitrary, 
discriminatory, and error-prone the punishment has proven to be; (4) whether death 
sentences and executions bear the indicia or immutable characteristics of acts of torture 
(which they do); and (5) what is actually at stake (i.e., the fundamental right to life), 
including whether the use of the punishment comports with human dignity (it does not). 
Punishments falling short of death do not necessarily raise the same considerations as 
capital punishment, but as noted earlier, even non-lethal corporal punishments have, from 
time to time, already been adjudged—and properly so—to be cruel and unusual. 
Executions, though, irrevocably deprive people of their fundamental rights and the most 
basic right of all: the right to life. Those who are executed are stripped of that right and, 
by definition, all other rights, including their right to use the privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus to prove, if possible, that they are not guilty of the crimes they were 
convicted of. When the five criteria set forth above are carefully weighed and examined 
in light of the evidence and the text and values of the U.S. Constitution, the conclusion is 
inescapable: death sentences and executions should be declared to be unconstitutional. 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘grossly excessive’ in relation to legitimate punitive damages objections, and hence an arbitrary deprivation 
of life, liberty, or property in violation of the Due Process Clause.”). 
501 Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1327 n.27 (2016) (“Laws narrow in scope, including ‘class 
of one’ legislation, may violate the Equal Protection Clause if arbitrary or inadequately justified.”); see also 
Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (citations omitted): 
Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought 
by a “class of one,” where the plaintiff alleges that she has been 
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that 
there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. In doing so, we 
have explained that “‘[t]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State’s 
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether 
occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution 
through duly constituted agents.’” 
502 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted.”); see also Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 426–27 (1885) (“Infamous 
punishments cannot be limited to those punishments which are cruel or unusual, because . . . ‘cruel and 
unusual punishments’ are wholly forbidden, and cannot therefore be lawfully inflicted even in cases of 
convictions upon indictments duly presented by a grand jury.”). 
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The law has, through the centuries, changed dramatically, and a twenty-first 
century declaration by the U.S. Supreme Court that capital punishment is unconstitutional 
would be a welcome, long-overdue development. Language from the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s own decision in Trop v. Dulles,503 the 1958 case that established the “evolving 
standards of decency” test, itself supports such a change in the law. In that case, which 
declared the decidedly non-lethal punishment of denationalization to be an Eighth 
Amendment violation, the Supreme Court justified its ruling by emphasizing the 
punishment at issue would lead to “the total destruction of the individual’s status in 
organized society.”504 “It is,” the Court ruled of denationalization, “a form of punishment 
more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political existence that 
was centuries in the development.”505 “In short,” the Court concluded, “the expatriate has 
lost the right to have rights.”506 If the Eighth Amendment prohibits stripping an offender 
of the right to have rights (and Trop held that it does), the death penalty (which, of 
course, does just that) should not be permitted by the U.S. Constitution or American 
society, especially since the death penalty bears all the characteristics of an act of torture. 
Whether any punishment is usual or unusual is, in truth, a fact that is readily 
capable of adjudication.507 In the past, when a punishment or some particular treatment 
was described as either usual or unusual, it was frequently a characterization of the 
writer’s or the speaker’s view or judgment of the severity or frequency of the punishment 
or treatment—or an expression as to whether the punishment or treatment comported 
with societal values or was traditionally authorized or not. For example, in 1898, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit emphasized that “three men claimed that they 
were justified in leaving the ship by the unusual and cruel treatment” to which “they had 
been subjected.”508 In an even earlier case, one pre-dating the Civil War, the Supreme 
Court of Alabama noted that the plaintiff had sought to ask the following question: 
“whether the use of a cowhide in punishing a slave, so as to produce wales on the arms 
two or three inches long, and as large as his finger, which could be seen on him a year 
afterwards, was not an unusual and cruel whipping”?509 
                                                 
503 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
504 Id. at 101. 
505 Id. 
506 Id. at 102. 
507 Whether a punishment is cruel or unusual, or both, is something that judges may be called upon to 
adjudicate not just in the Eighth Amendment context, but in other contexts as well. For example, the U.S. 
Code of Military Justice prohibits the infliction of “cruel or unusual punishment”—a prohibition that, on its 
face, already encompasses flogging and branding. 10 U.S.C. § 855 (“Punishment by flogging, or by 
branding, marking, or tattooing on the body, or any other cruel or unusual punishment, may not be 
adjudged by any court-martial or inflicted upon any person subject to this chapter. The use of irons, single 
or double, except for the purpose of safe custody, is prohibited.”) (emphasis added); see also Rich 
Federico, The Unusual Punishment: A Call for Congress to Abolish the Death Penalty Under the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice for Unique Military, Non-Homicide Offenses, 18 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 4–5 
(2013) (“The last service member executed for a unique military offense was Private Eddie D. Slovik, who 
was executed by firing squad on January 31, 1945 for desertion during a time of war.”). 
508 The W. F. Babcock v. The W. F. Babcock, 85 F. 978, 979–80 (2d Cir. 1898). 
509 Hall v. Goodson, 32 Ala. 277, 279 (Ala. 1858); see also State v. Maner, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 453, 454–55 
(S.C. 1834) (citations omitted): 
The criminal offence of assault and battery cannot at common law 
be committed on the person of a slave. For notwithstanding for some 
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Life sentences are now the common, or usual, punishment for particularly heinous 
crimes, including first-degree murder.510 According to a 2013 report of Washington, 
D.C.’s The Sentencing Project, as of 2012, 159,520 people were serving life sentences in 
the United States, an 11.8% rise since 2008. That report further noted that “[t]he 
population of prisoners serving life without parole (LWOP) has risen more sharply than 
those with the possibility of parole: there has been a 22.2% increase in LWOP since just 
2008, an increase from 40,174 individuals to 49,081.”511 And that number has only 
increased over time. According to the latest report of The Sentencing Project, titled Still 
Life: America’s Increasing Use of Life and Long-Term Sentences, as of 2016, 161,957 
people were serving life sentences, or “one of every nine people in prison.” An additional 
44,311 individuals are serving “virtual life” sentences (i.e., sentences of 50 years or 
more), bringing the total number of people serving a life or virtual life sentence up to 
206,268, or 13.9% of America’s prison population (i.e., approximately one of every 
seven prisoners). As of 2016, 53,290 people were serving LWOP sentences.512 
In contrast, there are now fewer than 3,000 people on American death rows, many 
of whom have been languishing there for years or even decades. As of July 1, 2017, per 
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund’s report, “Death Row USA,” there were 2,817 inmates 
                                                                                                                                                 
purposes a slave is regarded in law as a person, yet generally he is a 
mere chattel person, and his right of personal protection belongs to his 
master, who can maintain an action of trespass for the battery of his 
slave. There can be therefore no offence against the State for a mere 
beating of a slave, unaccompanied by any circumstances of cruelty or 
an attempt to kill and murder . . . . 
But notwithstanding these may be regarded as common law 
principles in this State in relation to slaves, yet our statute law has 
made some important provisions for the punishment of the more 
aggravated offences against their persons. The Act of 1740 . . . makes 
any unusual and cruel treatment of a slave an indictable offence. It 
provides that “in case any persons shall wilfully cut out the tongue, put 
out the eye, castrate or cruelly scald, burn, or deprive any slave of any 
limb or member, or shall inflict any other cruel punishment, other than 
by whipping or beating with a horsewhip, cowskin, switch, or small 
stick, or by putting irons on, or confining or imprisoning such slave, 
every person shall, for every such offence, forfeit the sum of one 
hundred pounds current money.” I think, under this act, the shooting a 
slave might be indicted as a cruel punishment. 
510 Confinement within a prison, even for one’s natural life, has long been described as a usual punishment. 
E.g., Vera v. United States, 288 F.2d 25, 26 (8th Cir. 1961) (describing confinement as a “usual 
punishment”); see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980) (“We . . . hold that the mandatory life 
sentence imposed upon this petitioner does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.”); People v. Williams, No. 241427, 2003 WL 22928768, at *4 (Mich. Ct. 
App. Dec. 11, 2003) (noting that the Michigan Supreme Court held in People v. Hall, 242 N.W.2d 377 
(Mich. 1976), that life sentences without the possibility of parole do not constitute cruel and unusual 
punishments). 
511 ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE GOES ON: THE HISTORIC RISE IN LIFE SENTENCES IN 
AMERICA 1 (2013), https://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Life-Goes-On.pdf. 
512 ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, STILL LIFE: AMERICA’S INCREASING USE OF LIFE AND 
LONG-TERM SENTENCES 1, 5, 9 (2017), available at https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/still-
life-americas-increasing-use-life-long-term-sentences/. 
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then housed on death row.513 The largest death row in the United States—at 746 
inmates—is in the State of California, but California has not actually carried out an 
execution in more than a decade.514 While life sentences, which have emerged as the 
standard punishment for heinous offenses, are necessary to protect the public and to 
prevent dangerous offenders from posing a future risk or danger to society,515 putting 
inmates to death cannot be seen as a legitmate or necessary—let alone an absolutely 
necessary—criminal sanction.516 Going back all the way to the eighteenth century, a well-
known maxim of the Enlightenment—one publicized and promoted by Montesquieu, 
Beccaria, and early American political leaders—was that any unnecessary punishment is 
“tyrannical.”517 
Through the years, American courts have frequently had to grapple with whether a 
specific punishment constitutes a “cruel and unusual punishment.” For example, in 
People v. Mire,518 the Supreme Court of Michigan held in 1912 that a term of 
imprisonment between fifteen and thirty years for a burglary accompanied with the use of 
high explosives was not a cruel and unusual punishment. In the course of so ruling, the 
state’s highest court held: “The punishment prescribed in the act in question is 
imprisonment, a most common and usual method of punishment the world over.”519 In 
upholding the punishment provided for by statute, the court stressed: “That class of cruel 
and now unusual punishments at one time sanctioned and prevalent under the common 
law of England, such as burning at the stake, drawing and quartering, mutilation, 
starvation, and lesser forms of physical torture, to which the constitutional prohibitions 
were primarily directed, is not involved here.”520 “Approaching the dividing line,” the 
court ruled, “the inquiry as to what does in any particular case constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment under the constitutional provisions, turns, not only upon the facts, 
                                                 
513 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY (2018), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf. 
514 Maura Dolan, Pace of Executions in California may be up to Gov. Jerry Brown, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 25, 
2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-prop-66-executions-20171125-story.html (“Gov. 
Jerry Brown’s administration has yet to finalize an execution protocol, which is necessary to resolve a 
federal court case that has blocked lethal injection in California for nearly 12 years.”).  
515 ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG & JOHN P. CONRAD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A DEBATE 218 (1983): 
Incarceration became a standard punishment in the nineteenth century. The first American prison was the 
Walnut Street Jail in Philadelphia, which accepted its first prisoner in 1790. Its example was not generally 
followed until well into the nineteenth century. Since that time the physical punishments, except for the 
gallows, have gradually disappeared. They are no longer allowed, even for the discipline of prisoners, and 
capital punishment has been discarded—with no apparent ill effects—in fourteen states. In those states in 
which it is still authorized by law, it has certainly become an unusual punishment. 
516 Under the Rome Statute, which set up the International Criminal Court, a life sentence is now the 
maximum punishment for the worst of the worst offenses of international law: genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 
ON THE ROME STATUTE 1159 (2d ed. 2017); ANDREW S. THOMPSON, IN DEFENCE OF PRINCIPLES: NGOS 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN CANADA 114 (2010). 
517 BESSLER, supra note 349, at 43, 171–72, 246, 288, 378, 439; BESSLER, supra note 46, at 37, 80–81, 255, 
303. 
518 138 N.W. 1066 (Mich. 1912). 
519 Id. at 1067. 
520 Id. 
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circumstances, and kind of punishment itself, but upon the nature of the act which is to be 
punished.”521 
Ordinarily, the impulse of American courts to defer to legislative prerogative is a 
healthy one.522 After all, a representative democracy gets its legitimacy from the people, 
and people choose their own legislative representatives to express their will.523 But since 
Marbury v. Madison,524 American courts have properly claimed the power of judicial 
review525—and the U.S. Supreme Court must remain the final arbiter of what the U.S. 
Constitution means.526 English subjects were concerned about the infliction of cruel or 
novel punishments, as reflected in early writings,527 and it is certainly true that, in modern 
                                                 
521 Id. 
522 See, e.g., JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO THE CONSTITUTION: HOW THE SUPREME 
COURT HAS RULED ON ISSUED FROM ABORTION TO ZONING 295 (1999) (“Those who find judicial rejection 
of legislative enactments problematic point to its anti-majoritarian nature: unelected judges overturn 
policies of elected legislators and chief executives in apparent contradiction to the sovereignty of the 
people.”); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL 
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 6 (1980) (noting in Chapter 1 that when U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices “exercise the power of judicial review to declare unconstitutional legislative, 
executive, or administrative action—federal, state, or local—they reject the product of the popular will by 
denying policies formulated by the majority’s elected representatives or their appointees”). 
523 In early American jurisprudence, and especially before the Eighth Amendment was first applied against 
the states in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)—which held that a statute making it a crime to be 
addicted to narcotics violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments—courts expressed great reluctance to 
overturn a legislative enactment. E.g., People ex rel. Bradley v. Superintendent of Ill. State Reformatory, 36 
N.E. 76, 79 (Ill. 1894): 
When the legislature has authorized a designated punishment for a 
specific crime, it must be regarded that its action represents the general 
moral ideas of the people, and the courts will not hold the punishment 
so authorized as either cruel and unusual or not proportioned to the 
nature of the offense, unless it is a cruel or degrading punishment, not 
known to the common law, or is a degrading punishment which had 
become obsolete in the state prior to the adoption of its constitution, or 
is so wholly disproportioned to the offense committed as to shock the 
moral sense of the community. 
524 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
525 ALAN AXELROD & CHARLES PHILLIPS, WHAT EVERY AMERICAN SHOULD KNOW ABOUT AMERICAN 
HISTORY: 225 EVENTS THAT SHAPED THE NATION 67 (3d ed. 2008) (“[T]he Founding Fathers had expected 
the courts to have some control over the executive and legislative branches of government. The decision 
reached in Marbury v. Madison, however, formalized that control, and the high court has exercised that 
power since 1803.”). 
526 HARLOW GILES UNGER, JOHN MARSHALL: THE CHIEF JUSTICE WHO SAVED THE NATION 293 (2014) 
(“Together with Marbury v. Madison, the decisions from 1819 to 1832 firmly established the Supreme 
Court of the United States as the third pillar of America’s federal government and final arbiter of the 
nation’s legal matters.”). 
527 Saturday, February 18, 1769, N. BRITON, reprinted in THE NORTH BRITON, FROM NO. I. TO NO. XLVI. 
INCLUSIVE 556–57 (1769) (“‘We recommend that you exert your utmost endeavours, that the proceedings 
in the case of libels, and all other criminal matters, may be confined to the rules of law, and not rendered 
dangerous to the subject by forced constructions, new modes of enquiry, unconstitutional tribunals, or new 
and unusual punishments, tending to take away or diminish the benefit of trial by juries.’”); id. at 557:  
And of new and unusual punishments, it may be sufficient to observe, 
that the publisher of the North Briton has suffered and is now suffering 
a very new and unusual kind of punishment; for he has been and is now 
imprisoned, not in execution for any offence he has committed, but to 
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America, there can be shades of gray when it comes to evaluating whether a particular 
punishment runs afoul of the Eighth Amendment prohibition. But the bar on “cruel and 
unusual punishments” sets forth a moral imperative that is not only subject to 
adjudication but that is capable of more than just restricting lawless or newly devised 
punishments or forms of cruelty. Indeed, the Eighth Amendment does not restrict “new 
and unusual punishments” or “unauthorized and unusual punishments,” it restricts “cruel 
and unusual punishments.”528  And the very idea behind the U.S. Bill of Rights—and the 
Eighth Amendment in particular—was to protect individual rights in the face of laws 
passed by legislative majorities.529 
It is true that, when the U.S. Constitution and its Bill of Rights were framed, the 
death penalty was still a ubiquitous presence in American life. Every American state still 
made use of death sentences, and Congress, in its Crimes Act of 1790, specifically 
authorized capital punishment along with the use of the pillory.530 And it is also true that 
American courts, through the centuries, have allowed executions to be carried out, 
finding no constitutional impediment to their infliction. In State v. Woodward,531 the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia raised this fundamental, long-asked question 
back in 1910: “What is meant by the provision against cruel and unusual punishment?” 
“It is hard to say definitely,” the court conceded.532 As that court then wrote of that legal 
prohibition at that point in time: “Here is something prohibited, and in order to say what 
this is we must revert to the past to ascertain what is the evil to be remedied. Within the 
pale of due process, the Legislature has power to define crimes and fix punishments, 
great though they may be, limited only by the provision that they shall not be cruel or 
unusual or disproportionate to the character of the offense.”533 
                                                                                                                                                 
compel him to subject to a species of inquisition, which, whatever may 
be the practice of courts, he is credibly informed, is absolutely 
inconsistent with the laws of the land. In a word, if these arbitrary and 
despotic modes of proceeding are suffered to continued, the trials by 
juries, in the case of libels, will be very soon abolished; for it will 
always be in the power of any time-serving or prostitute set of judges to 
construe any paper into a libel upon themselves, and then, by exercising 
the distinct and incompatible provinces of party, accuser, evidence, 
jury, and judge, they will at once try, condemn, and inflict upon any 
person whatever punishment they please. 
528 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
529 EVAN J. MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE: THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN 
AMERICA 23 (2013) (“If the Eighth Amendment only prohibited punishments already condemned by public 
opinion, then it would be a ‘dead letter,’ since these punishments would already have been abolished by the 
legislature. ‘The Eighth Amendment was intended as a counter-majoritarian limitation on government 
action,’ [Justice Arthur] Goldberg wrote.”). 
530 Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (1790) (making treason, murder, murder or robbery on the high 
seas, piracy, mutiny, hostilities against the United States, and being an accomplice to murder, robbery or 
piracy, counterfeiting, assisting in a prison break anyone “found guilty of treason, murder, or any other 
capital crime” punishable by death; making larceny, accessory after the fact to larceny, and corruption of 
judicial records punishable, among other things, by up to “thirty-nine stripes”; and making perjury and 
subornation of perjury punishable, among other things, by standing in the pillory for one hour). 
531 69 S.E. 385 (W. Va. 1910). 
532 Id. at 387. 
533 Id. Due process has both procedural and substantive components. In his 1972 concurrence in Furman v. 
Georgia, Justice Thurgood Marshall emphasized that an analysis under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and 
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At a distance of more than 100 years ago, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia, found that a law closing saloons on Sunday—and penalizing those who violated 
it—was not unconstitutional as imposing a cruel and unusual punishment. In the course 
of that ruling, the court had this to say about legislative prerogative: “This matter falls 
under the rule that the Legislature is clothed with power well-nigh unlimited to define 
crimes and fix their punishment. So its enactments do not deprive of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law and the judgment of a man’s peers, its will is 
absolute. It can take life, it can take liberty, it can take property, for crime.”534 In that 
case, which upheld a jury’s guilty verdict and a judgment that the defendant pay a $50 
fine for opening a saloon on Sunday and lose his liquor license for one year, the court 
emphasized: “How can we say that the statute before us inflicts cruel punishment when 
our statutes have punished with death, lifelong imprisonment, and fines, and forfeiture of 
instruments of crime through centuries? Nobody can question their validity.”535 
“Inflicting death by electricity,” the court observed, citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in In re Kemmler,536 “is unusual, in a sense, a new mode, but held not contrary 
to the probibition; not as cruel as hanging, which is surely not prohibited.”537 
But that was in 1910, before notions of human rights (and our understanding of 
universal human rights) matured after the horrors of World War I and World War II. And 
the fact that punishments such as branding and the pillory and ducking and hanging were 
once in use in the young, newly forged republic,538 vestiges of America’s colonial 
heritage,539 does not mean that their use is, or would be, legitimate or morally defensible 
                                                                                                                                                 
Unusual Punishments Clause “parallels in some ways the analysis used in striking down legislation on the 
ground that it violates Fourteenth Amendment concepts of substantive due process . . . .” Furman, 408 U.S. 
at 359 n.141 (Marshall, J., concurring). As Justice Marshall wrote: 
The concepts of cruel and unusual punishment and substantive due 
process become so close as to merge when the substantive due process 
argument is stated in the following manner: because capital punishment 
deprives an individual of a fundamental right (i.e., the right to life), the 
State needs a compelling interest to justify it. Thus stated, the 
substantive due process argument reiterates what is essentially the 
primnary purpse of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment—i.e., punishment may not be more severe than is 
necessary to serve the legitimate interests of the State. 
Id. (citations omitted).  
534 Woodward, 69 S.E. at 386. 
535 Id. at 388.  
536 136 U.S. 436 (1890). 
537 Woodward, 69 S.E. at 388. 
538 CYNDI BANKS, PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 9–12 (2005) (discussing the history 
of corporal punishments, including flogging, mutilation, branding, the stocks and the pillory, and the use of 
the ducking stool for “village scolds and gossips”). 
539 EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN HEROES: PROFILES OF MEN AND WOMEN WHO SHAPED EARLY 
AMERICA 70 (2009) (noting that, for Puritans, “[t]he usual punishment” for adultery was “a whipping or a 
fine, or both, and perhaps a branding, combined with a symbolical execution in the form of standing on the 
gallows for an hour with a rope about the neck”); see also Douglas Litowitz, The Trouble with ‘Scarlet 
Letter’ Punishment: Subjecting Criminal to Public Shaming Rituals as a Sentencing Alternative Will Not 
Work, 81 JUDICATURE 52, 53 (1997) (“In Colonial days, the courts favored primitive methods of 
punishment such as the whipping post, the pillory, stocks, branding, banishment, the dunking stool, and a 
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now. The United States is a representative democracy. But it is also a constitutional 
democracy, one with a written constitution that sets forth the rights to due process and 
equal protection and the bar against cruel and unusual punishments. And the U.S. 
Supreme Court has the solemn responsibility of enforcing the provisions of the U.S. 
Constitution, which protects the rights of every American citizen. In performing its 
duties, the Supreme Court should not allow a wholly arbitrary, long discriminatory, and 
torturous punishment, such as the death penalty, to endure. 
 The fact that a punishment, even one so deeply rooted in history, was once a usual 
punishment is not a legitimate or morally sufficient justification for continuing that 
punishment’s use. Punishments such as the pillory, the stocks, and the use of the public 
whipping post were, the record shows, once considered usual punishments. Yet civilized 
societies now recoil from the knowledge that such punishments were once in use. For 
decades, the Eighth Amendment has wisely been read in a non-static manner. And the 
Supreme Court should continue to take that dynamic, flexible approach in the Eighth 
Amendment context, one that allows it to assess and re-assess the legality of particular 
punishments under the U.S. Constitution as societal understandings of human rights 
evolve. That approach, employed to gauge everything from conditions of confinement540 
to the conduct of prison officials541 to methods of execution, has already been used to 
restrict the death penalty’s use for—among other groups—juveniles542 and the 
intellectually disabled.543 
When the Eighth Amendment is seen through the lens of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it may actually make little difference whether a modern-day court adopts 
academic John Stinneford’s view of the proper interpretation of “unusual” (i.e., 
punishments not of long or immemorial usage) or continues to use, as it long has, the 
standard dictionary definition of “unusual” (i.e., punishments that are rare or uncommon). 
Before the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, the courts did not have to concern 
themselves with equality of treatment in interpreting the U.S. Constitution’s Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause.544 After the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, 
                                                                                                                                                 
device known as the ‘brank,’ a metal mask that wrapped around the face of a woman who talked too 
much.”). 
540 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (“No static ‘test’ can exist by which courts determine 
whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for the Eighth Amendment ‘must draw its 
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”) (quoting 
Trop, 356 U.S. at 101). 
541 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (the gratuitous beating or rape of one inmate by another is 
not consistent with the evolving standards of decency). 
542 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (barring the imposition of death sentences for those under 
the age of eighteen) (abrogating Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)). 
543 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002) (finding that the Eighth Amendment must draw its 
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society, and barring 
the execution of intellectually disabled offenders) (abrogating Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 314, 321 
(1989), which found that the death penalty was not a cruel and unusual punishment for that category of 
offenders). 
544 AUSTIN SARAT & PATRICIA EWICK, EDS., THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND SOCIETY 214 (2015): 
Before 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, there was 
no mention of the term equality in the US Constitution. In fact, before 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the US Constitution explicitly encouraged 
and perpetuated inequality among people through its pro-slavery 
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however, every American court must—both as a matter of fairness and justice and 
because the Fourteenth Amendment’s text and history require it545—concern itself with 
whether a particular punishment is being meted out in a discriminatory fashion.546 In 
short, no matter whether a particular punishment is of ancient heritage, of recent vintage, 
or is now common or uncommon, a punishment (especially one as severe and as 
arbitrarily and discriminatorily applied as the death penalty) cannot be applied in an 
unequal fashion.547 
A punishment that is administered in a lottery-like or unequal fashion would, 
almost by definition, seem to be an “unusual” one in the post-Equal Protection Clause era 
                                                                                                                                                 
provisions, found in several sections of the Constitution. It was not 
until after the ratification of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments that the Constitution established the right of equality 
regardless of race. 
545 The Fourteenth Amendment was specifically designed, in part, to equalize punishments between people 
of different races. Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities 
in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 111 (1984) (after noting that 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the denial of “equal protection,” recounting that “[t]he sponsors of the 
fourteenth amendment unquestionably intended this language to prohibit unequal punishments for 
defendants of different races”); see also Stan Robin Gregory, Capital Punishment and Equal Protection: 
Constitutional Problems, Race and the Death Penalty, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 257, 268–69 (1992) (“The 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to prohibit unequal punishments for defendants of all races. 
As the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly illuminates, one of their main goals was to 
‘constitutionalize’ the provision of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, to embrace the requirement that in every 
state ‘inhabitants of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or 
involuntary servitude . . . shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and no other.’”). 
546 MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE THE PEOPLE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT 51 
(1999) (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment and how it constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
which required that “white citizens” and others be subject to “like punishment”); see also Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948): 
The historical context in which the Fourteenth Amendment became a 
part of the Constitution should not be forgotten. Whatever else the 
framers sought to achieve, it is clear that the matter of primary concern 
was the establishment of equality in the enjoyment of basic civil and 
political rights and the preservation of those rights from discriminatory 
action on the part of the States based on considerations of race or color. 
Seventy-five years ago this Court announced that the provisions of the 
Amendment are to be construed with this fundamental purpose in mind. 
547 E.g., Vest v. Lubbock Cty. Comm’rs Court, 444 F. Supp. 824, 833–34 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (stating 
procedures in meting out mass punishment to entire cell-blocks, holding inmates in solitary confinement, 
and imposing other forms of punishment without any hearing or impartial determination of a particular 
inmate’s participation in infraction of rules “are contrary to the mandates of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the unequal manner in which punishment is imposed among the various 
classes of prisoners denies equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment”). Under existing law, an 
inmate must show that a government official “acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate” to state a 
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 
Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing cases). But even in the absence of 
intentional discrimination in a given capital case, the fact that the death penalty has a long, well-
documented history of racial prejudice and bias in its administration is certainly a relevant factor that the 
U.S. Supreme Court can and should consider in making the determination that the death penalty is both 
cruel and unusual. Bessler, supra note 391, at 548 (“While the Eighth Amendment forbids ‘cruel and 
unusual punishments,’ the Fourteenth Amendment was put in place to end the nineteenth-century scourge 
of unequal punishments based on race.”). 
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no matter which definition or understanding of that word is applied. And that is 
especially so given that American law has common-law origins, with the common-law 
tradition focused on treating societal members alike for like offenses.548 When one 
considers that a person’s very life is on the line in capital punishment proceedings, the 
inequality of the death penalty’s administration is grotesque and especially appalling.  
It is one thing for American courts to generally defer to legislative bodies around 
the country so long as such bodies act in a reasonable fashion within a constitutionally 
acceptable range of legislative prerogative. After all, reasonable lawmakers can disagree 
about how best to fight crime and reduce violence, and there are, therefore, multiple legal 
and policy approaches that can be pursued or taken for legitimate purposes when it comes 
to punishing misdemeanors and felonies. And in actuality, some differences of opinion, 
or in outlook, are to be expected from lawmakers, and are healthy even. “In a number of 
the Supreme Court proportionality opinions,” one book on sentencing notes of how the 
U.S. Supreme Court has handled the issue thus far in the Eighth Amendment context, 
“the Justices have emphasized their deference to legislative decisions.”549 But when it 
comes to the death penalty, such a severe punishment—especially given its inherent and 
torturous characteristics and the more-or-less randomized way it is administered—should 
no longer be tolerated by the courts. It is tremendously cruel—and tremendously unusual 
and uncivilized—to allow the death penalty to be used at all. And it is exponentially more 
cruel—and even more unusual and uncivilized—given the incredibly disparate fashion in 
which capital punishment is carried out. 
Already, the U.S. Supreme Court—in laying out its general approach to the law—
has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit the “arbitrary deprivation of life,” 
with the Court emphasizing that, “in the administration of justice,” the Fourteenth 
Amendment “requires that no different or higher punishment shall be imposed upon one 
than is imposed upon all for like offenses.”550 The bar on “cruel and unusual 
punishments” in the English Bill of Rights, it is worth recalling, was itself intended to 
reign in arbitrary punishments and judicial discretion551—and there is no better example 
                                                 
548 Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 162 
(2004): 
The American founders in 1791, like their English predecessors in 
1689, believed that the common law could be discovered only through 
faithful analysis of precedent. The word “unusual” in the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause reflected a commitment to the common 
law method. That method in turn reflected a commitment to the 
commonality of the common law—a commitment to the principle that 
like cases be treated alike. 
See also id. at 122 (“‘Unusual’ was a synonym for ‘illegal’ at common law because the common law 
doctrine of precedent insisted that judicial decisions could succeed in articulating law if and only if they 
served an underlying principle of moral—and therefore legal—equality among litigants.”). 
549 NORA V. DEMLEITNER, DOUGLAS A. BERMAN, MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, SENTENCING 
LAW AND POLICY: CASES, STATUTES, AND GUIDELINES 445 (4th ed. 2018). 
550 John D. Bessler, Tinkering Around the Edges: The Supreme Court’s Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 49 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1913, 1932–33 (2012) (citing cases). The U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment states 
that “no person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment also provides in part: “nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
551 See supra text accompanying notes 149–50. 
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of an arbitrary punishment in modern life than the American death penalty.552 The 
arbitrary, almost random infliction of capital punishment is, simply put, totally at odds 
with American constitutional values.553 
Even if the death penalty was once considered to be a “usual” punishment because 
it has long been used,554 today’s death penalty (actively used in just a small number of 
                                                 
552 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “death penalty statutes [must] be structured so as to prevent the 
penalty from being administered in an arbitrary fashion.” California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987) 
(citation omitted). At the same time, the Supreme Court has required that courts consider the “character and 
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally 
indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.” Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality 
opinion); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604–05 (1978) (plurality opinion). Despite the Supreme Court’s 
best efforts to ensure that the death penalty is not administered in an arbitrary fashion, the death penalty’s 
administration is as arbitrary as ever. Lindsey S. Vann, History Repeats Itself: The Post-Furman Return to 
Arbitrariness in Capital Punishment, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 1255 (2011). Capital punishment is, it has been 
noted, in decline. See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Alexander Jakubow & Ankur Desai, The American 
Death Penalty Decline, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 561 (2017). And although some prosecutors use 
capital charges to gain plea-bargaining leverage, many prosecutors are no longer even actively seeking 
capital charges. Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Rationing Criminal Justice, 116 MICH. L. 
REV. 187, 230–31 (2017). In retentionist jurisdictions, the fact that highly discretionary plea bargaining is 
used so frequently in the criminal justice system—a practice that often results in pleas to life sentences to 
avoid the death penalty—actually ensures that the death penalty (already highly arbitrary and discretionary 
in nature) will continue to be employed in a very arbitrary fashion. Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People 
Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-
innocent-people-plead-guilty/ (“[O]ur criminal justice system is almost exclusively a system of plea 
bargaining, negotiated behind closed doors with no judicial oversight. The outcome is very largely 
determined by the prosecutor alone.”).  
553 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (referring to “the traditional and common-sense notion 
that the Due Process Clause, like its forebear in the Magna Carta . . . was intended to secure the individual 
from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government”) (citations omitted); see also State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.”); Philip 
Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352 (2007) (“[W]e have emphasized the need to avoid an arbitrary 
determination of an award’s amount”; “[u]nless a State insists upon proper standards that will cabin the 
jury’s discretionary authority, its punitive damages system may deprive a defendant of ‘fair notice . . . of 
the severity of the penalty that a State may impose,’ it may threaten ‘arbitrary punishments,’ i.e., 
punishments that reflect not an ‘application of law’ but ‘a decisionmaker’s caprice.’”) (citations omitted). 
554 Historical sources equate “long usage” with a prevailing custom.  ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA: OR, A 
DICTIONARY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, COMPILED UPON A NEW PLAN 301 (1777) (“Custom is hence, both by 
lawyers and civilians, defined lex non scripta, a law, or right, not written, established by long usage, and 
the consent of our ancestors: in which sense it stands opposed to the lex scripta, or the written law.”); 
Custom, THE COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, IN WHICH THE WHOLE CIRCLE OF HUMAN 
LEARNING IS EXPLAINED, AND THE DIFFICULTIES ATTENDING THE ACQUISITION OF EVERTY ART, WHETHER 
LIBERAL OR MECHANICAL, ARE REMOVED, IN THE MOST EASY AND FAMILIAR MANNER (1766) (defining 
same in unpaginated entry); 1 GILES JACOB, COMP. & T. E. TOMLINS, ED., THE LAW-DICTIONARY: 
EXPLAINING THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND PRESENT STATE, OF THE ENGLISH LAW, IN THEORY AND PRACTICE; 
DEFINING AND INTERPRETING THE TERMS OR WORDS OF ART; AND COMPRISING COPIOUS INFORMATION, 
HISTORICAL, POLITICAL, AND COMMERCIAL, ON THE SUBJECTS OF OUR LAW, TRADE, AND GOVERNMENT 
171 (1797) (showing entry for “CUSTOM” begins: “Is a law not written, established by long usage, and the 
consent of our ancestors. No law can oblige a free people without their consent: so wherever they consent 
and use a certain rule or method as a law, such rule, &c. gives it the power of a law; and if it is universal, 
then it is common-law: if particular to this or that place, then it is custom.”); GILES JACOB, THE STUDENT’S 
COMPANION: OR, THE REASON OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 25, 112 (1725) (“Custom is what is established 
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American jurisdictions by just a small number of individual prosecutors) does not, as a 
factual matter, resemble how death sentences were used much more systematically in the 
past. The way the American death penalty is applied today—in an increasingly random, 
discretionary, and arbitrary manner555—simply is not rooted, and cannot be said to be 
grounded, in some kind of long or immemorial usage. In the five-year period from 2011 
to 2015, FBI data show that, in the U.S., there were more than 60,000 murder victims.556 
In contrast, for that same five-year period, there were 188 executions carried out in the 
United States.557 
                                                                                                                                                 
by long Use, and the Consent of our Ancestors.”; “Custom, which is Law, is what is Established by long 
Usage, and the general Consent and Approbation of the People, by their own Act; and what being Practiced 
Time out of Memory, hath the Binding Quality of a Law.”); 4 DEWITT C. BLASHFIELD & GEORGE F. 
LONGSDORF, EDS., ABBOTT’S CYCLOPEDIC DIGEST OF ALL THE DECISIONS OF ALL THE COURTS OF NEW 
YORK FROM THE EARLIEST TIME TO THE YEAR 1900, at 964 (1901) (citing Wilcox v. Wood, 9 Wend. 346 
(N.Y. 1832)) (“Custom is a law established by long usage. A universal custom becames common law . . . 
.”); see also THE CHRISTIAN EUCHARIST NO PROPER SACRIFICE, CLEARLY PROVED IN A LETTER TO THE 
LORD BISHOP OF NORWICH 39 (1714) (stating “according to a long usage, or prevailing Custome”); 7 
HENRY GWILLIM, AN APPENDIX TO BACON’S NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW, ALPHABETICALLY 
DIGESTED UNDER PROPER TITLES 406 (1801) (“Long usage . . . ought not to be shaken lightly”; “the right 
claimed by the plaintiffs . . . is supported by long usage.”); Alan Watson, An Approach to Customary Law, 
in 1 ALISON DUNDES RENTELN & ALAN DUNDES, EDS., FOLK LAW: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE 
OF LEX NON SCRIPTA 142 (1994) (“The Roman sources clearly indicate that some additional factor is 
needed to recognize custom as law, even if the nature of this factor is not apparent.  For example, the 
Epitome Ulpiani states that ‘[c]ustom is the tacit consent of the people, deeply rooted through long 
usage.’”); ANDY WOOD, THE MEMORY OF THE PEOPLE: CUSTOM AND POPULAR SENSES OF THE PAST IN 
EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 94 (2013) (“In 1612, the Attorney-General for Ireland, Sir John Davies, 
summarized the customary basis of the common law as follows: ‘the Common Law of England is nothing 
else but the Common Custome of the Realm; and a Custome which hath obtained the force of a Law is 
always said to be Jus non scriptum.’”). 
555 King, supra note 415, at 228: 
The death penalty has, in some sense, become a symbolic punishment. 
Less than 1% of murders result in a death sentence, but there is no 
indication that the minority who are actually sentenced to death are the 
most serious offenders. Professor David McCord examined all death 
penalty cases in 2004, examining facts about each death-eligible case. 
He identified a total of 469 defendants who met the “worst-of-the-
worst” standard. He found that, of those 469, only 30% had been 
sentenced to death, meaning that the vast majority received a sentence 
other than death. Moreover, many of the 341 murderers who were 
spared the death penalty had more serious cases than those who 
received it. In the two most aggravated cases that year—Oklahoma City 
bomber Terry Nichols and serial killer Charles Cullen—neither man 
received the death penalty. Of the eleven serial killers in the group, 
only five were sentenced to death. 
556 Expanded Homicide Data Table 8: Murder Victims by Weapon, 2011–2015, FED. BUREAU 
INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2015/tables/expanded_homicide_data_table_8_murder_victims_by_weapon_2011-2015.xls (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2018) (listing 12,795 murder victims in 2011; 12,888 in 2012; 12,253 in 2013; 12,270 in 2014; 
and 13,455 in 2015). 
557 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY (2018), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (listing 43 executions in 2011; 43 in 2012; 39 in 
2013; 35 in 2014; and 28 in 2015). 
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The modern system of capital punishment began in 1972 with Furman, but the 
attempt to reign in arbitrariness and discrimination in the death penalty’s administration 
has been an utter and abject failure. And American law, for that reason and many others, 
should no longer tolerate the use of death sentences and executions. As I argued in a 
recent law review article, “The Inequality of America’s Death Penalty: A Crossroads for 
Capital Punishment at the Intersection of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments”: 
“When the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments are read together, punishments cannot be 
‘cruel and unusual’ and, to avoid that nomenclature, they must not be inflicted in an 
unequal manner either. The words that adorn the U.S. Supreme Court building—‘EQUAL 
JUSTICE UNDER LAW’—must be given effect in the context of punishment (just as they 
were, for example, in the context of public education in Brown v. Board of Education) if 
the Fourteenth Amendment is to be meaningful and fully implemented.”558 
One badly decided U.S. Supreme Court case has contributed to the current state of 
affairs and corrupted and marred Eighth Amendment case law, allowing the death penalty 
to linger on in spite of all the racial prejudice and bias long associated with it. In 1987 in 
McCleskey v. Kemp,559 the Supreme Court rejected an Equal Protection Clause challenge 
to Georgia’s death penalty. In that case, the death row inmate, Warren McCleskey, 
argued that race had infected the administration of the state’s death penalty in two ways: 
first, those who murdered whites were more likely to be sentenced to death than those 
murdering blacks; and second, that black murderers were more likely to be sentenced to 
death than white murderers.560 In rejecting the equal protection challenge, the Supreme 
Court held that McCleskey had to prove “the existence of purposeful discrimination” and 
that decision-makers “in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.”561 In further 
rejecting McCleskey’s Eighth Amendment challenge, the Court observed that “our 
decisions since Furman have identified a constitutionally permissible range of discretion 
in imposing the death penalty,”562 and that, “absent a showing that the Georgia capital 
punishment system operates in an arbitrary and capricious manner, McCleskey cannot 
prove a constitutional violation by demonstrating that other defendants who may be 
similarly situated did not receive the death penalty.”563 It was a highly controversial, 5-4 
decision that swept under the rug clear evidence of racial prejudice where a person’s life 
was at stake, and the author of the McCleskey majority opinion—Justice Lewis Powell—
later famously regretted his vote in that case.564 
                                                 
558 Bessler, supra note 391, at 553. 
559 481 U.S. 279 (1987).  
560 Id. at 291–92. 
561 Id. at 292. 
562 Id. at 305. 
563 Id. at 306–07. In his opinion, Justice Powell—drawing considerable public criticism—made this 
statement: “Apparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal law system.” Id. at 312. 
Asserting that McCleskey’s arguments about racial discrimination “are best presented to the legislative 
bodies,” Justice Powell contended that it was a legislative, not a judicial, responsibility to determine the 
punishments for particular crimes. Id. at 319. “Capital punishment,” he wrote, “is now the law in more than 
two-thirds of our States,” though he conceded that “[i]t is the ultimate duty of courts to determine on a 
case-by-case basis whether these laws are applied consistently with the Constitution.” Id. 
564 Id. at 282; Justice Powell’s New Wisdom, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 1994), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/11/opinion/justice-powell-s-new-wisdom.html (“Too late for Warren 
McCleskey and numerous other executed prisoners, retired Justice Lewis Powell now concedes that he was 
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 Most notoriously, Justice Powell employed a slippery slope argument in rejecting 
Warren McCleskey’s unrebutted statistical proof of racial discrimination in Georgia’s 
death penalty system. As Powell wrote: “McCleskey’s claim, taken to its logical 
conclusion, throws into serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal 
justice system. The Eighth Amendment is not limited in application to capital 
punishment, but applies to all penalties.”565 “[I]f we accepted McCleskey’s claim that 
racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision,” he wrote in the 
opinion he came to regret, “we could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types 
of penalty.”566 “The Constitution,” Powell concluded, “does not require that a State 
eliminate any demonstrable disparity that correlates with a potentially irrelevant factor in 
order to operate a criminal justice system that includes capital punishment.”567 But the 
fear of too much justice expressed in McCleskey is not only regrettable, it is morally 
bankrupt. In fact, the death penalty is unlike any other punishment that human societies 
still use, and its use runs afoul of core constitutional values and basic human rights. 
The concept of human dignity is one that regularly informs—and that certainly 
should continue to inform—the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 
As Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in Brown v. Plata,568 for example: “[P]risoners may 
be deprived of rights that are fundamental to liberty. Yet the law and the Constitution 
demand recognition of certain other rights. Prisoners retain the essence of human dignity 
inherent in all persons.”569 As Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Brown v. Plata 
continued: “Respect for that dignity animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment.”570 The Supreme Court’s consideration of the concept of 
dignity, in fact, dates back many decades, finding voice in the very first case that 
established the lofty sounding “evolving standards of decency” test.571 A punishment that 
does not comport with human dignity is also one that must be scrutinized as a “cruel and 
unusual punishment.”572 It is especially cruel and unusual to dehumanize someone—
                                                                                                                                                 
wrong to cast the deciding fifth Supreme Court vote to uphold Mr. McCleskey’s death sentence in a major 
case.”). 
565 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 314.  
566 Id. at 315. 
567 Id. at 319. 
568 563 U.S. 493 (2011). 
569 Id. at 510. 
570 Id. 
571 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (“The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is 
nothing less than the dignity of man . . . .”) (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100 (plurality opinion)). 
572 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (“The [Eighth] Amendment embodies ‘broad and idealistic 
concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency . . . ,’ against which we must evaluate penal 
measures.”) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)); cf. Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 
F. Supp. 269, 323 (D.N.H. 1977): 
Where the cumulative impact of the conditions of incarceration 
threatens the physical, mental, and emotional health and well-being of 
the inmates and/or creates a probability of recidivism and future 
incarceration, a federal court must conclude that imprisonment under 
such conditions does violence to our societal notions of the intrinsic 
worth and dignity of human beings and, therefore, contravenes the 
Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual 
punishment. 
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indeed, to take someone’s life—in a manner that involves runaway arbitrariness or that is 
a reflection of racial prejudice.  
Law professor John Stinneford, as one commentator notes, “has argued that we do 
know exactly what the word ‘unusual’ in the English Bill of Rights signified to the 
English: ‘the word ‘unusual’ was a term of art that referred to government practices that 
are contrary to ‘long usage’ or ‘immemorial usage.’”573 As that commentator, Michael 
Perry acknowledges, though, the implications of Stinneford’s observation about the 
historical record are less than clear. As Perry explains: 
 
Let’s assume, for the sake of discussion, that Stinneford is right about what 
“unusual’ meant in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.  Stinneford goes on to 
argue that the framers of the American Bill of Rights knew what “unusual” meant 
in the English Bill of Rights and that they intended “unusual” in the Eighth 
Amendment to mean the same thing. There is reason to doubt that the framers of 
the American Bill of Rights did in fact know what “cruel and unusual” meant in 
the English Bill of Rights. But even if we grant to Stinneford that the framers of 
the Eighth Amendment intended “unusual” in the Eighth Amendment to mean 
what “unusual” meant in the English Bill of Rights, this problem remains: The 
issue for an originalist is not what those who drafted the Eighth Amendment—
“the framers”—meant by “unusual.” The issue, rather, is what “We the People” in 
1789-91, on whose behalf the Eighth Amendment was made a part of the 
Constitution, understood “unusual” to mean.574   
 
 At this point in American history, it is actually the “evolving standards of 
decency” test—a legal standard in place and in use for six decades—that is of long use. It 
has thus been clear, for decades, that what is considered cruel and unusual can and will 
change with the times. In fact, if one goes back in time, Michael Perry—an originalist575 
who is, as a scholarly matter, very interested in history—also makes this critique of 
Stinneford’s analysis and approach:  
 
For an originalist, the question is “not what the Framers or Ratifers meant or 
understood subjectively, but what their words would have meant objectively—
                                                 
573 MICHAEL J. PERRY, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, MORAL CONTROVERSY, AND THE SUPREME COURT 55 
(2009).  
574 Id. at 55–56. 
575 As two scholars have written of Michael Perry’s brand of originalism: 
Perry endorses a jurisprudence that seeks the “‘objective meaning’ to 
the public at the time the provision was ratified.”  Perry explains that 
this inquiry is hypothetical: “it is what the public ‘would have’ 
understood that should matter.” But his originalism has a unique flavor. 
It “does not entail . . . a small or passive judicial role.” Rather, because 
the Constitution is so textually vague and open-ended, Perry believes 
that judges can legitimately choose between many plausible original 
meanings, at varying levels of generality, such that much of the 
Supreme Court’s modern individual rights jurisprudence can (and 
should) be defended on originalist grounds. 
Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 240, 257 (2009). 
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how they would have been understood by an ordinary, reasonably well-informed 
user of the language, in context, at the time, within the relevant political 
community that adopted them. The Preamble to the Constitution tells us who the 
true authors of the constitutional text are: not the drafters (framers) but “We the 
People.” “It is the adoption of the text by the public that renders the text 
authoritative, not its drafting by particular individuals.” And there is nothing in 
the historical record to suggest that the public (We the People) in 1789-91 would 
have understood—indeed, it is less than clear that even the framers understood—
“unusual” in the Eighth Amendment to be “a term of art” that meant just what is 
meant in the English Bill of Rights a hundred years earlier.576 
 
 “It is much more likely that the public,” Michael Perry stresses, would have 
understood both cruel and unusual in the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment “to 
mean what Samuel Johnson’s A Dictionary of the English Language, first published in 
1756, tells us those two words were conventionally understood to mean at the time.” As 
Perry writes of that popular source: “In volume 1, at page 250, ‘cruel’ is defined as: ‘1. 
Pleased with hurting others; inhuman; hard-hearted; barbarous. 2. [Of things.] Bloody; 
mischievous; destructive.’ In volume 2, at page 503, ‘unusual’ is defined as: ‘Not 
common; not frequent; rare.’”577 Although Perry, in 2009, asserted that under the Eighth 
Amendment “a punishment is not unconstitutional unless it is both ‘cruel and 
unusual’,”578 he simultaneously wrote: 
 
Few would deny that the Eighth Amendment bans any punishment that is 
intrinsically barbaric: barbaric in and of itself, no matter how heinous the crime, 
how culpable the criminal, or how effectively the punishment would deter. 
(Torture is the paradigmatic example of such a punishment.) Intrinsically barbaric 
punishment is “cruel” within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment; such 
punishment is also (we may assume) “unusual” in the sense of “not common; not 
frequent; rare”—not common, that is, as an officially sanctioned punishment.579 
 
“Unless it has a deterrent effect,” Perry offers, “capital punishment is significantly 
harsher than necessary to serve the legimate aims of punishment.”580 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
                                                 
576 PERRY, supra note 573, at 56–57. 
577 Id. at 57–58. Samuel Johnson’s dictionary has been described as “the standard authority at the time 
when the Constitution was drawn up in 1787.” Id. at 57 n.10 (citation omitted). 
578 Id. at 80; see also id. (describing cruel and unusual as “significantly harsher than necessary to serve the 
legitimate aims of punishment and evidenced as such by the fact that the punishment is not commonly 
used”). 
579 Id. at 58 (original italics omitted). 
580 Id. at 78. For Perry, the necessity of punishment is an important part of the Eighth Amendment calculus. 
Id. at 64 (“[C]apital punishment is not consistent with the cruel and unusual punishments clause—the 
clause as originally understood—if: ‘no matter what the crime and who the criminal, capital punishment is 
significantly harsher than necessary to serve the legitimate aims of punishment; and as evidence that it is 
significantly harsher than necessary, capital punishment is not commonly used for any crime.’”). 
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 The prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments” can be broken down into 
three concepts: cruelty, unusualness, and punishment. As just noted, Samuel Johnson’s A 
Dictionary of the English Language gave this definition of cruel, a word that means 
basically the same thing today: “Pleased with hurting others; inhuman; hard-hearted; 
barbarous.”581 That source also lists this definition of unusual, one that also still captures 
the essence of that word’s widely accepted meaning in the modern world: “Not common; 
not frequent; rare.”582 And to finish out the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause’s 
trifecta of concepts, Johnson’s famed dictionary—the one so popular at the time—
defined punishment as “[a]ny infliction imposed in vengeance of a crime.”583 “Punish” 
itself was defined as “[t]o chastise; to afflict with penalties” and “[t]o revenge a fault with 
pain or death.”584 The death penalty, of course, qualifies as a punishment, one that must 
be subjected to constitutional scrutiny just like any non-lethal corporal punishment.585   
Regardless of whether a particular punishment was once authorized or imposed, 
every modern American jurist has a duty, in his or her own time, to decide whether that 
punishment must now—in this day and age—be adjudged cruel and unusual.586 It has 
                                                 
581 Cruel, SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed. 1768) (unpaginated 
entry). That dictionary also makes numerous additional references to cruel. The dictionary, among others, 
makes two separate references to “cruel death”; lists “Cruel; inhuman” as one of the definitions of 
“BARBAROUS”; lists “Cruel; murderous” as one of the definitions of “BLOODY”; lists “Savage; cruel, 
inhuman” as one of the definitions of “BRUTAL”; defines “BUTCHERLY” as “Cruel; bloody; barbarous”; 
defines “CUT-THROAT” as “Cruel; inhuman; barbarous”; defines “DOGHEARTED” as “Cruel; pitiless; 
malicious”; defines “FELON” as “Cruel; traitorous; inhuman”; defines “INHUMAN” as “Barbarous; savage; 
cruel; uncompassionate”; defines “MARBLEHEARTED” as “Cruel; insensible; hard-hearted”; lists “Cruel; 
inhuman; unjustly exactious or severe” as one of the definitions of “OPPRESSIVE”; defines “REMORSELESS” 
as “Unpitying; cruel; savage”; defines “SANGUINARY” as “Cruel; bloody; murtherous”; lists “Untamed; 
cruel” as one of the definitions of “SAVAGE”; lists “Cruel; inexorable” as one of the definitions of 
“SEVERE”; defines “TYRANNICAL” and “TYRANNICK” as “acting like a tyrant; cruel; despotick; imperious”; 
lists “cruel power” and “Cruel government” as definitions of “TYRANNY”; lists “A cruel despotick and 
severe master” as one of the definitions of “TYRANT”; lists “Cruel; severe; not clement” as one of the 
definitions of “UNMERCIFUL”; and lists “cruel” among the definitions of “WRATH.” Id. (unpaginated 
entries). 
582 Id. (unpaginated entry); “USUAL,” by contrast, was defined as “Common; frequent; customary.” Id. 
(unpaginated entry); see also id. (unpaginated entries) (defining “USUALLY” as “Commonly; frequently; 
customarily” and “UNUSUALNESS” defined as “Commonness; frequency”). Two of the definitions of 
“COMMON” are listed as “Frequent; usual; ordinary” and “Commonly; ordinarily”; one of the definitions of 
“ORDINARY” is listed as “Common; usual”; and “CUSTOMARY” lists “Usual,” “Habitual,” and 
“Conformable to established custom” as dictionary definitions. Id. (unpaginated entries). While 
“ACCUSTOMED” is defined as “[a]ccording to custom; frequent; usual,” “UNACCUSTOMED” is defined as “1. 
Not used; not habituated” and “2. New; not usual.” Id. (unpaginated entries). 
583 Id. (unpaginated entry); see also id. (showing unpaginated entry for “INFLICT” provides: “To put in act 
or impose as a punishment”).  
584 Id. (unpaginated entry). 
585 18 ENCYCLOPÆDIA PERTHENSIS; OR UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY OF THE ARTS, SCIENCES, LITERATURE, &C. 
481 (2d ed. 1816) (defining “PUNISHMENT” as “[a]ny infliction or pain imposed in vengeance of a crime.”); 
id. (defining “PUNISH” as “1. To chastise; to afflict with penalties or death for some crime,” and “2. To 
revenge a fault with pain or death—I will punish your offences with the rod. Bible.”). 
586 ANDREW NOVAK, THE GLOBAL DECLINE OF THE MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY: CONSTITUTIONAL 
JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGISLATIVE REFORM IN AFRICA, ASIA, AND THE CARIBBEAN 14 (2014): 
[I]n the United States after ratification of the Eighth Amendment, one 
of the first acts of Congress was to enact a law creating offenses 
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been clear for more than a century, in fact, that the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected an 
“originalist” interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. As legal scholar Andrew Novak 
writes: “The first successful challenge to a form of punishment and its appropriateness 
for an offense under the Eighth Amendment was in Weems v. United States in 1910, a 
constitutional attack on the punishment of cadena temporal (chaining with hard labor) for 
the crime of forgery of an official document in American-occupied Philippines.”587 “The 
Court’s decision in Weems,” Novak observes, “was the first to turn away from an 
‘originalist’ view of the Eighth Amendment and find that even forms of punishment in 
existence at the time the constitution entered into force could be unconstitutional.”588 
In the distant past, various acts—from beatings and whippings to manslaughters 
and murders—were described as, or were said to have the characteristics of, “cruel”589 or 
“cruel and unusual” acts.590 For example, in The Magistrate’s Criminal Law, one grade of 
manslaughter committed “in the heat of passion” (i.e., second-degree manslaughter) was 
classified as one “[w]hen done in a cruel and unusual manner.”591 Likewise, in 1853, a 
                                                                                                                                                 
punishable by death and by corporal punishment. Yet, the 
proportionality principle in American criminal sentencing has a long 
history in the United States and beyond since its articulation in Cesare 
Beccaria’s book On Crimes and Punishments in 1764, which was 
widely read in the early American colonies by such important figures as 
John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and George Mason. 
587 Id. at 15. 
588 Id. Prisoners in early America were sometimes forced to perform hard labor in chains.  RANDOLPH 
SHIPLEY KLEIN, ED., SCIENCE AND SOCIETY IN EARLY AMERICA: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WHITFIELD J. BELL, 
JR. 228–29 (1986); MICHAEL SHERMAN & GORDON HAWKINS, IMPRISONMENT IN AMERICA: CHOOSING THE 
FUTURE 50 (1981). 
589 In English broadsides, murders were frequently described as “cruel.” E.g., An Account of the Cruel and 
Barbarous Murder of James Heron, Pitman, at Benwell, near Newcastle, on Saturday, Jan. 19, 1811, 
HARV. LIBR., http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds/view/4787459 (last visited June 19, 2012); Robert Bruce, An 
Account of the Cruel and Barbarous Murder of Janet Simpson, Between Earsdon and North-Shields, on 
Saturday Evening, Jan. 12, 1811, HARV. LIBR., http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds/view/4788567 (last visited 
June 19, 2012). A reference to an “unusual Crime” is found in an Old Bailey record from 1677. The 
Proceedings of the Old Bailey, London’s Central Criminal Court, 1674 to 1913, Ref. No. t16770117-3, 
OLD BAILEY PROC. ONLINE, http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/images.jsp?doc=16770117006 (last visited 
June 19, 2012) (“A man was likewise Condemned to die for a kind of unusual Crime, but such as the Law, 
by reason of its bad example and mischievous tendency, has thought fit to restrain with capital Punishment 
. . . He begg’d heartily for Transportation, but it could not be granted.”).  
590 E.g., TRIAL OF THOMAS O. SELFRIDGE, ATTORNEY AT LAW, BEFORE THE HON. ISAAC PARKER, ESQUIRE 
FOR KILLING CHARLES AUSTIN, ON THE PUBLIC EXCHANGE, IN BOSTON, AUGUST 4TH, 1806, at 146 (1806) 
(“[I]f even upon a sudden provocation one beats another in a cruel and unusual manner, so that he dies, 
though he did not intend his death, yet is guilty of murder by express malice.”); GEORGE CUSTANCE, A 
CONCISE VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND 344 (1808) (stating “[i]t is also murder by express 
malice, if a master or teacher upon a sudden provocation beat his servant or scholar in a cruel and unusual 
manner”); see also THE TRIAL OF THE BRITISH SOLDIERS, OF THE 29TH REGIMENT OF FOOT, FOR THE 
MURDER OF CRISPUS ATTUCKS, SAMUEL GRAY, SAMUEL MAVERICK, JAMES CALDWELL, AND PATRICK 
CARR, ON MONDAY EVENING, MARCH 5, 1770, at 6, 33, 44 (1824) (referencing a killing in a “cruel and 
inhuman manner” and in a “cruel and unusual manner”). 
591 OLIVER L. BARBOUR, THE MAGISTRATE’S CRIMINAL LAW: A PRACTICE TREATISE ON THE JURISDICTION, 
DUTY, AND AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE IN THE STATE OF NEW-YORK IN CRIMINAL CASES 58, 
60, 63 (1841). 
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Mississippi slave was found to have been whipped in a “cruel and unusual manner.”592 
Many courts used the “cruel and unusual manner” phraseology even before the Civil 
War, so that language—indicating that certain acts can be found to be cruel and unusual 
because of their inherent characteristics—has been employed for a very long time.593 If a 
beating or a whipping or a manslaughter or a murder can be carried out in a cruel and 
unusual manner and classified as such,594 then surely a death sentence or an execution—
one intentionally designed to dehumanize and kill, and thus strip a person of all rights—
might also earn the “cruel and unusual” moniker. 
The U.S. Supreme Court itself has long recognized that once-common punishments 
can fall out of favor—and in fact have throughout world and American history. For 
example, in District of Columbia v. Clawans,595 the Supreme Court noted: “If we look to 
the standard which prevailed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, we find that 
confinement for a period of ninety days or more was not an unusual punishment for petty 
offenses, tried without jury.”596 Yet, in noting that punishments such as whippings were 
no longer in use, the Court in that case went on to emphasize in 1937: “Laying aside 
those for which the punishment was of a type no longer commonly employed, such as 
whipping, confinement in stocks, and the like, and others, punished by commitment for 
an indefinite period, we know that there were petty offenses, triable summarily under 
English statutes, which carried possible sentences of imprisonment for periods from three 
to twelve months.”597 There, the Court expressed the view that the protections of the 
                                                 
592 BESSLER, supra note 7, at 198. 
593 E.g., Dedieu v. People, 8 E.P. Smith 178, 182 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1860) (“In manslaughter, the most usual 
example is the killing of another in the heat of passion, but in a cruel and unusual manner. This is the 
offence in the second degree.”); Staten v. State, 30 Miss. 619, 621 (Miss. 1856) (“To constitute 
manslaughter in the second degree, the killing must be done ‘in a cruel and unusual manner.’”); People v. 
Pearce, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 76, 77–78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849) (stating that a killing is manslaughter in the 
second degree where the death is effected in a cruel and unusual manner; where the defendant struck 
decedent on the head with a club, knocking him down, and struck him with the club five or six times after 
he was down, he was guilty of second-degree manslaughter); cf. Jacob v. State, 22 Tenn. 493, 508 (Tenn. 
1842) (containing the following argument of a lawyer: “What! shall it be said that a man is indictable for 
beating his horse in a cruel and unusual manner in the street, and yet that he may lawfully and with 
impunity beat his slave, a human being . . . ? . . . . Thanks to the enlightened, humanized and Christianized 
age in which we live, that is not the law.”); In re Kottman, 20  S.C.L. (2 Hill) 236, 363 (S.C. 1834) 
(referencing the argument of a lawyer that “the father had beaten” his son “in a cruel and unusual manner 
without any just cause”). 
594 E.g., People v. Gallagher, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 578, 578 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848) (“The prisoner was convicted 
of manslaughter in the second degree, for having caused the death of his mother, in a cruel and unusual 
manner, by kicking her, and wounded her womb, where she was afflicted with prolapsus uteri.”); McWhirt 
v. Com., 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 594, 604–05 (Va. 1846) (“[W]here, upon a sudden provocation, one beats 
another in a cruel and unusual matter, so that he dies, though he did not intend his death, yet he is guilty of 
murder by express malice: that is, by an express evil design, he genuine sense of malitia.”); United States v. 
Travers, 28 F. Cas. 204, 210 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (Story, J., charging jury) (“If, therefore, upon a sudden 
provocation of a slight nature one beat another in a cruel and unusual manner so that he dies, though he did 
not intend to kill him, it is murder by express malice.”); 12 ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA 451 (1797) (“[I]f 
even upon a sudden provocation one beats another, in a cruel and unusual manner, so that he dies, though 
he did not intend his death, yet he is guilty of murder by express malice.”). 
595 300 U.S. 617 (1937). 
596 Id. at 626–27. 
597 Id. at 626. In that case, the Supreme Court examined the history of legislative enactments, noting:  
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Constitution might evolve, just as the public’s views about punishments naturally 
evolve.598 
The law sometimes changes slowly, often painfully so, but if an examination of the 
law since America’s founding reveals anything, it is that it does change—often 
substantially.599 Punishments that were once lawful have become unlawful, punishments 
that were once usual have become unusual, and practices such as slavery have been 
outlawed and given way to legal prohibitions against discrimination.600 Certainly, the late 
eighteenth-century Eighth Amendment, which forbade “cruel and unusual punishments” 
                                                                                                                                                 
At least sixteen statutes, passed prior to the time of the American 
Revolution by the Colonies, or shortly after by the newly created states, 
authorized the summary punishment of petty offenses by imprisonment 
for three months or more. And at least eight others were punishable by 
imprisonment for six months. 
Id. The Supreme Court further stated in that case:  
In the face of this history, we find it impossible to say that a ninety-day 
penalty for a petty offense, meted out upon a trial without a jury, does 
not conform to standards which prevailed when the Constitution was 
adopted, or was not then contemplated as appropriate notwithstanding 
the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial.  
Id. at 626–27. 
598 As the Court stated, articulating its view in 1937: 
We are aware that those standards of action and of policy which finds 
expression in the common and statute law may vary from generation to 
generation. Such change has led to the abandonment of the lash and the 
stocks, and we may assume, for present purposes, that commonly 
accepted views of the severity of punishment by imprisonment may 
become so modified that a penalty once thought to be mild may come 
to be regarded as so harsh as to call for the jury trial, which the 
Constitution prescribes, in some cases which were triable without a jury 
when the Constitution was adopted. 
Id. at 627. 
599 OPINIONS OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER 3012 (1982) (“If there is one constant that 
permeates the field of law, that constant is change. Statutes change, decisional law changes, local law 
changes and even regulations change.”); CHRISTOPHER BERRY GRAY, ED., THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 127 (2012) (noting that “the common law changes and develops primarily as a 
consequence of judicial decisions”). As James Madison, writing as “Publius” in The Federalist No. 14, 
himself noted: “Is it not the glory of the people of America, that, whilst they have paid a decent regard to 
the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for 
custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own 
situation, and the lessons of their own experience?”  THE FEDERALIST No. 14 (James Madison). 
600 Rainer Nickel, Widening the Scope: Anti-Discrimination Law, Social Equality, and the Right to Equal 
Treatment, in RUSSELL A. MILLER & PEER ZUMBANSEN, EDS., ANNUAL OF GERMAN AND EUROPEAN LAW 
358 (2004): 
U.S. anti-discrimination law can be taken as a good example for a 
progressive awareness of the social reality of prejudice and its social 
costs. Historically, the United States was the avant-garde of an active 
anti-discrimination policy, with roots reaching back even to the 
nineteenth century—a history that also reflects the long shadow of 
slavery and the struggles to overcome the legacy of slavery, racism. 
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and which was originally directed against federal action alone,601 must now be read in 
conjunction with the nineteenth-century Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses and considered in its twenty-first century context. “It is the genius of 
the common law to resist innovation,” the American revolutionary Patrick Henry offered 
in 1788 at a speech to Virginia’s ratifying convention for the U.S. Constitution.602 Yet, 
the common law—like constitutional and statutory law—has changed through the 
centuries, and there is no reason to believe—nor should there be—that the law will ever 
stop evolving to adjust to modern times and contemporary circumstances.  
Whereas the English prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments was, 
history shows, directed at reigning in the arbitrary discretion of courts, the American 
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishments constrain the actions of all three 
branches of government.603 Whereas the death penalty was once the mandatory 
punishment for a wide array of felonies, death sentences are now handed out in a highly 
discretionary and inequitable fashion.604 The only constant that runs through the history 
of the American death penalty, one rife with arbitrariness,605 is that death sentences and 
executions have always been parsed or meted out in a discriminatory and error-prone 
manner.606  And whereas torture, the aggravated form of cruelty, was once thought of as a 
                                                 
601 JOHN A. FLITER, PRISONERS’ RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY 
22 (2001) (“It is important to remember that as part of the Bill of the Rights, the Eighth Amendment was 
originally directed against federal action alone.”). 
602 The Original Meaning of “Unusual”, supra note 24, at 1339 (quoting Patrick Henry, Speech to the 
Virginia Ratifying Convention for the United States Constitution (June 9, 1788), in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE 
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY 
THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 172 (Jonathan Elliot, ed.)). 
603 TERRY JOHNSON, LEGAL RIGHTS 4 (2005) (“[T]he English Bill of Rights is unlike the American Bill of 
Rights, which limits the power of all branches of the national government—including the U.S. Congress.”). 
604 ROBERT M. BOHM, DEATHQUEST: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (5th ed. 2017) (“In 1837, Tennessee became the first state to enact 
a discretionary death penalty statute for murder; Alabama did the same four years later, followed by 
Louisiana five years after that. All states before then employed mandatory death penalty statutes that 
required anyone convicted of a designated capital crime to be sentenced to death.”); id. (“This change from 
mandatory to discretionary death penalty statutes, which introduced unfettered sentencing discretion into 
the capital-sentencing process, was considered at the time a great reform in the administration of capital 
punishment.”). 
605 EVAN J. MANDERY, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: A BALANCED EXAMINATION 131 (2d ed. 2012): 
The death penalty is arbitrary in many different ways: It is 
geographically arbitrary—defendants in states without the death 
penalty are treated differently from how defendants in states that do 
have the death penalty are treated. It is economically arbitrary—rich 
people have access to better representation. The death penalty is 
arbitrary by gender because the death penalty is rarely sought and 
imposed against women. It is arbitrary by race—people who kill whites 
are more likely to receive the death penalty than are those who murder 
blacks. Finally, the death penalty is arbitrary in the most basic sense—it 
is ultimately within the jury’s discretion to impose the death penalty or 
not, and the jurors need not explain the basis of their decision. 
606 See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in 
Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 45 (1984) (“[T]here is a considerable 
body of published research on racial patterns in capital punishment, and most of it indicates that racial 
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practice that operated principally on the body, it is now clear from the modern-day 
definition of torture found in the Convention Against Torture and other similar legal 
instruments that both physical and mental torture are strictly prohibited.607 Consequently, 
even if death sentences and executions could be imposed or carried out in a physically 
pain-free way, they should still be categorized under the rubric of torture. Death 
sentences and executions—the record shows—inflict cruel and inhuman torment and, in a 
particularly unusual manner, what modern-day jurists should classify, at the very least, as 
psychological torture.608 
                                                                                                                                                 
factors have been influential in determining who has been sentenced to die and who has been executed.”); 
see generally Bessler, supra note 391 (discussing the long history of racial discrimination in capital cases). 
607 MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.N. CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE (CAT): 
OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION TO INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES 1 (2009), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL32438.pdf; THOMAS M. ANTKOWIAK & ALEJANDRA GONZA, THE AMERICAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS 108 (2017). 
608 John D. Bessler, The Abolitionist Movement Comes of Age: From Capital Punishment as a Lawful 
Sanction to a Peremptory, International Law Norm Barring Executions, 79 MONT. L. REV. 7, 33–35 
(2018); see also People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal. 1972): 
The cruelty of capital punishment lies not only in the execution itself 
and the pain incident thereto, but also in the dehumanizing effects of 
the lengthy imprisonment prior to execution during which the judicial 
and administrative procedures essential to due process of law are 
carried out. Penologists and medical experts agree that the process of 
carrying out a verdict of death is often so degrading and brutalizing to 
the human spirit as to constitute psychological torture.  
